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Introduction
My presence at this symposium was requested to provide an 'inside
Washington-outside agriculture' perspective on issues of research funding and
productivity.  I come to paint agriculture on a canvas of Federal politics, and my
palette favors funding as a "primary color."  The fortunes of agricultural research will
be shaped in  the near term by the Federal funding climate and in  the long term by
goals, policies, and priorities determined nationally and locally.l
Priorities, of course, are 'set" at various levels - through the Federal budget
process, across the agencies, within agency programs, and among projects.
Different criteria and decisionmaking mechanisms may dominate each level of
priority-setting.  What seems rational and coordinated at each level, however,  may
never be consistent or effective in  a "cross-cutting' way.  Historically, research and
development (R&D)  priorities have been set in  the U.S. through an ad hoc,
pluralistic, and decentralized 'system'  of R&D missions pursued through various
agencies. 2 Today, when budgets are severely constrained, outcomes are often
confused with the process that precedes them.
For an overarching discussion of 'goals,'  see Carnegie Commission  on Science, Technology,
and Government,  Enabling  the Future:  Linking Science and Technology to Societal Goals (New
York, NY:  September 1992).
2  Priority-setting and other Issues are examined in  the report I directed that forms the basis for
my  remarks:  U.S.  Congress,  Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded  Research:
Decisions for a Decade,  OTA-SET-490  (Washington,  DC:  U.S.  Government  Printing Office,  May
1991).
-1-Preparing the Canvas
Symposia such as this and the ongoing self-examination of research
communities arise in  part because, as noted by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science:
the S&T [science and technology] policy arena has entered a period of
uncertainty and flux unparalleled since the Vannevar Bush report, Science-
The Endless Frontier, in 1945.
The reasons for this growing ferment have included the passing of the Cold
War, growing international economic competition and the U.S.'s loss of clear
economic superiority in  many fields, mounting Federal deficits, and a
creeping disillusionment with science and with academic institutions.3
Evidence occurs in  various forms, but one unmistakable indicator is the
number and range of reports occurring recently on variations of the general
theme:  What should be the role of science and technology in  the nation's
future, and how should the Federal Government act to foster that role?
An early indicator of the changing policy milieu for science was the Office of
Technology Assessment's 1991  report, Federally Funded Research:
Decisions for a Decade....  The report's tone and approach... reflects a
policymaking perspective,  asking what the nation needs from the research it
supports, rather than asking what science needs in  order to function
smoothly-a view that did not endear it  to certain segments of the scientific
community.
A more-or-less direct follow-on of the OTA report was a report on "The Health
of Research," done by staff of the House Committee on Science, Space and
Technology for its Chairman,  George E. Brown, Jr.  This report, released in
September 1992, called for rethinking the basis of Federal support for
research, and proposed that agencies' research programs be systematically
evaluated in  terms of their performance  and contributions to national goals.
It,  too, has generated controversy within the scientific community.  The report
will spawn a series of hearings in  the 103rd Congress on these and related
issues, to be held by the subcommittee chaired by Representative Rick
Boucher.4
3  For a perspective produced  at the  end of the Bush  presidency on academic research
performance, see the President's Council  of Advisors on Science and Technology, Renewing  The
Promise:  Research-Intensive  Universities and The Nation  (Washington,  DC:  U.S.  Government
Printing Office, December  1992).  A companion volume is Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Trends in the Structure of Federal  Science Support, Report of the Federal  Coordinating Council  for
Science, Engineering,  and  Technology Committee  on Physical,  Mathematical, and  Engineering
Sciences (Washington,  DC:  December 1992).
4  Quote from Albert H.  Teich et al., Congressional Action on Research and Development In the
FY  1993 Budget (Washington,  DC:  American Association for the Advancement  of Science, 1993),  pp.
15-16.
-2-As Chairman  Brown recently observed:
One of the more frequent pieces of advice that I hear from scientists goes
something like this:  'The economy is a mess, our education system is a
mess, our manufacturing system is a mess, our health system is a mess, but
our research system is preeminent in  the world, the envy of other nations.
For goodness sake, don't try to fix the one thing that ain't broke.'  Although I
follow the logic of this argument, it does suggest a somewhat self-referential
world view.  Perhaps we need to expand our horizons.5
I  would add that this world view also defies the logic of how a system works:  the
working parts are interrelated; what happens to one affects the others, and indeed,
the operation of the entire system.  This axiom seems lost on basic researchers who
advocate for "curiosity-driven" science some protection or exemption from the
rough-and-tumble of funding politics.  Expenditures for all R&D, however, are tied
together in  the discretionary budget.  When the executive branch proposes
investments, they all are "on the table," vulnerable to increases, decreases,
discontinuities, and misunderstandings.  Then the legislative branch "disposes,'
sometimes reordering the President's priorities.
Agricultural research must be seen as embedded in  the "Federal research
system."  The changing funding landscape currently tilts the system toward
technology and therefore toward linking economic incentives and impacts of Federal
policies.  This may scramble, in  the name of competitiveness, the order of the R&D
agencies.  The departments of Commerce and Labor will probably rise in importance
and budget, spearheading the new administration's technology-industrial policy,
while the most 'basic" of research agencies, the National Science Foundation,
stands in  jeopardy of becoming second tier, i.e., not a primary site of action on either
5  ong. George E. Brown,  Jr.,  "The Objectivity Crisis:  Rethinking the Role of Science  In
Society-Opening Remarks," Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancement  of Science,
Boston, MA, Feb. 12, 1993, p. 3.
-3-technology transfer or training issues.  Megaprojects such as the Space Station and
the Superconducting Super Collider will continue to cramp initiatives at National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Energy, respectively,
as well as across a dozen or so smaller R&D agencies.  The downsizing of the
Defense budget may be accelerated, but civilian research may reap little benefit.
The National Institutes of Health, an annual $10 billion Federal investment, is
wracked by the demands to stifle AIDS and other dread diseases, to energize the
biotechnology revolution, and in  general to sustain both the health and the
biomedical research missions of the nation.
Where, then, in  this panoply of efforts to stimulate the economy and reduce
the deficit, will agricultural research and the programs of USDA fit?6  I see many
comparative advantages:  Traditionally connected to practical applications and local
needs, agricultural research is not as dependent as other fields on Federal funding.
Further, the land-grant universities are comfortable with block grants as a funding
mechanism and are politically pragmatic with respect to earmarked appropriations.
Research performance in  the experiment station has long been multidisciplinary and
team-oriented.  Finally, agriculture's strong ties to industry represent a promising
market not only for products (through patents and licenses), but also for a new
generation of agricultural scientists trained in  outreach as well as research. 7
Whether these advantages translate into larger budgets for USDA, or favored status
on campus, remains to be seen.
6  Some of the following Is  discussed in Daryl E.  Chubin, 'A Congressional Perspective on Peer
Review, Pork, and Priorities In  Agricultural  Research,' paper presented at the Agricultural  Research
Institute Symposium  on the Dynamics and Performance of the U.S. Agricultural  Research System,
McLean, VA, Sept. 17-18,  1992.  Also see  The Future of Agricultural Research' [letters],  Science, vol.
259, Jan. 8,1993, pp. 162-163.
7  For other, less optimistic perspectives,  see Marcia Clemmitt,  *Plant Science Job Horizon
Dimmed by Lack of Funding,' The Scientist, vol. 6,  Sept  14, 1992, pp. 1,  6-7; Scott Veggeberg,  'Plant
Science Field In  Need of Healthier Funding Climate,'  The Scientst, vol. 6, Sept. 14, 1992, pp. 14, 18;
and  Elizabeth  Bird and Chuck Hassebrook, 'Report  Card  on USDA  Research Policy," Special Report,
Center for Rural Affairs, Waithill, NE, November 1992.
-4-Displaying the Big Picture
In  the following, the focus on agriculture research performance and funding
sponsored by U.S. Department of Agriculture  (USDA) is subordinated to the "big
picture":  context in  which Federal policymaking occurs.  I offer a collection of
"exhibits" - data and commentary - that illustrate the policy context and illuminate
the issues and choices that confront us all.  The exhibits are self-explanatory.  They
have been sequenced to proceed from (i) an overview of the Federal research
system, to (ii) a highlight of the Clinton Administration's R&D initiatives, (iii) a
consideration of policies that concentrate and distribute research funds by State and
institution, and (iv)  strategies for making agriculture a research priority.
Finally, it is important to note the difficulty in measuring the returns on the
Federal investment ($73 billion in  fiscal year 1993)  in R&D.  Various characteristics of
the portfolio remain elusive:  balance, risk-taking, and performance are all relative
terms.  If  viewed as a public good, certain expectations about returns, i.e., short-
term financial benefits, are inappropriate.8 But if the R&D portfolio is seen as a
contribution to the nation's economic well-being, then R&D clearly competes with
other missions.  Indeed, R&D is  deeply implicated in  the mission of competitiveness.
For better and worse (as it were), agriculture is on the cusp on that mission.
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A Changing Climate for Scientific Research
A  confluence  of factors  has  led  to  unusual  uncertainty  concerning  support  of  scientific
research. These  factors include end of the Cold War, global economic competition, federal
and state budget deficits, loss of faith in basic research as a key to prosperity, and diminished
public esteem for academic research. The latter is due to publicity about fraud in science and
a few instances of faulty bookkeeping of grant overhead charges.
The end of the Cold War, by diminishing funding in the defense industry, is causing
major federal laboratories to scramble for support by undertaking civilian R&D. In response to
the recession and global competition, many companies have engaged in "restructuring." This
has often  included  a curtailment  of efforts  in basic  research.  Federal  and state  budgetary
deficits,  combined  with diminished faith  in  basic research  as the key  to prosperity,  have
attenuated congressional enthusiasm for support of peer-reviewed research grants.
A significant recent development  involves the  Committee on Science,  Space,  and
Technology of the House of Representatives. The committee's membership totals 53. George
Brown, Jr.,  its chairman, has seniority and influence and is one of the few members having a
degree in science. He has long been an advocate of federal support for basic research. That his
position has evolved is evident in his favorable comments about a report  on the health of
research prepared  for him by  the  committee's staff.  Some quotes  from  the report  follow:
"Research policy designed forty years ago may no longer be suitable..."; "...maintaining  the world's
preeminent (and most expensive) federal research system is  not, in and of itself, adequate to insure
economic  vitality";  and "To create  a  more  rigorous  and  socially-responsive  science  policy, a
necessary first step is  to define goals toward which the research should be expected to contribute."
Evolution of attitudes by others in Congress is  evidenced by a huge expansion in non-
peer-reviewed,  pork-barrel  facility legislation.  A provision in the Senate  bill  for funding
National Science Foundation (NSF) would have drastically modified its status and would in
effect have placed NSF under senatorial micromanagement. Through intervention of  George
Brown and colleagues the onerous provisions were deleted in the House-Senate conference.
Scuttlebutt has  it that the current flurry of policy-review activities at NSF is a measure to
create a line of defense in the 1994 congressional budget hearings. The NSF policy-makers
should be steadfast in defending basic research. If they do so, they will be joined by influential
allies in academia and industry.
For the foreseeable future, federal support of scientific research is likely to be conditioned
by relevance to societal goals, with Congress havinga majorrole in specifying the goals. Obviously
one of these should be to maintaina viable academic capability to produce first-class scientists and
engineers. They will be essential as problem-solvers in an unpredictable and dangerous future.
Another goal  should  be  to  support highly  competent  investigators.  Some  function  best  as
members of a team  working toward a major objective.  But others perform even more magnifi-
cently when permitted to follow the dictates of their own intuition and judgment.
As directors of research, congressmen in general have obvious limitations. In addition,
they have a short time horizon-usually a few months to no more than 2 years. They are greatly
influenced by the media, whose time horizon is even shorter-days to weeks. Many of the great
problems that the world will encounter are long term (10 to 50 years). The R&D necessary to
facilitate solutions for such problems also often will require steady support for a decade or more.
There  is need for a mechanism to help politicians to choose to provide steady support for
important long-term goals.
A recent reportt by a panel of the Carnegie Commission recognizes the need for such a
mechanism  and names  12  major long-term  policy  areas that should be part of a  national
agenda. Included are health and social welfare,  economic performance,  and energy supply and
utilization. The report proposes creation of a long-lasting, nongovernmental  forum that would
interact with the political system. The membership in the forum would include a "broad based and
diverse group of individuals who are critical and innovative who can examine societal goals and
the ways in which science and technology can best contribute to their achievement"
Philip H. Abelson
"Report  of the task force on the health of research to the Committee on Science. Space, and Technology" (102nd
Congress,  2nd  session,  Government  Printing  Office, Washington,  DC,  1992).  1tEnabling  the  future:  Lnking
science and technology to societal goals' (Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, New
York, September  1992).
SCIENCE  * VOL.  258  * 30 OCTOBER  1992  7  723EXHIBIT  3
Summary and Issues for Congress *  5
Table 1-Tensions in the Federal  Research  System
Centralization of Federal research planning  Pluralistic, decentralized agencies Concentrated excellence  4--.  Regional and Institutional development (to
enlarge capacity) "Market" forces to determine the shape of  +--  Political intervention (targeted by goal the system  agency, program, institution) Continuity in funding of senior Investigators  <  Provisions for young investigators Peer review-based allocation  <  Other funding decision mechanisms (agency
manager discretion, congressional ear-
marldking) Set-aside programs  4-"  Mainstreamingcriteria inadditlontoscientific
merit (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, princi-
pal investigator age, geographic region) Conservatism in funding allocation  Risk-taking
Perception of a "total research budget"  Reality of disaggregated funding decisions Dollars for facilities or training  --  Dollars for research projects Large-scale, multlyear, capital-ntensive,  --  Individual Investigator and small-team, 1-5 high-cost, per-investigator initiatives  year projects Training more researchers and creating  -- +  Training fewer researchers and easing com- more competition for funds  petition for funds Emulating mentors' career paths  v  "--+Encouraging  a diversity of career paths Relying on historic methods to build the  q  Broadening the participation of traditionally research work force  undrrepresented groups
Source:  Federally  Funded Research, Decisions  for a Decade, Summary. Congress  of the  US,  OTA, 1991.
8EXHIBIT  4
Some  PCAST Dos and Don'ts
Universities SHOULD:  Universities should NOT:
*  Reemphasize  teaching. This, PCAST warns, will often mean  · Develop or implement research  or education  programs that
less research,  would increase the net capacity of the system of research-inten-
*  Base  faculty  evaluation  and  rewards  on a balance  of both  sive universities.
research and teaching.  *  Cut programs across the board. Rather, they should maintain
*  Collaborate more  with other  universities  and industry  and  those departments that are world class, and eliminate or cut back,
government labs, with the aim of conserving resources.  if need be, the rest.
*  Build  facilities  or programs  without  long-term  prospects  of
Federal agencies and Congress SHOULD:  sustaining them.
*  Pay all research costs, including all legitimate indirect costs.
*  Create a temporary facilities fund, equally matched with uni-  Federal agencies and Congress should NOT:
versity money,  to rebuild crumbling university  laboratories and  · Continue paying a portion of faculty salaries. That practice,
buildings.  Lest  this program  be  taken over  by  pork-mongers,  PCAST argues,  "artificially expands  teaching  faculties  depen-
PCAST recommends  that the projects  be  merit reviewed  and  dent on federal sources..."
available  only to universities  that pledge to forgo congressional  *  Encourage universities to embark on new research programs or
earmarking.  building facilities where there is little long-term prospect of sus-
*  Establish a program of portable graduate fellowships and un-  taining those programs.
dergraduate scholarships in science and engineering in each con-  · Continue  recasting government  labs,  such  as  the national
gressional district, to ensure political support.  laboratories of the Department of Energy, as basic research labs in
*  Eliminate  all federal, state, and local taxes on scholarships,  competition with universities. Government labs "have the ben-
fellowships, and stipends.  efit of superior resources, are not burdened by educational respon-
*  Shift as much as possible the research conducted at govern-  sibilities, and are not subject to the same type of merit review that
ment laboratories to universities,  where research  is generated in  ensures  high standards  of academic  research,"  the report  com-
tandem with education and training.  plains.
20  SCIENCE  * VOL.  259  *  I JANUARY  1993
Author:  Christopher Anderson
9EXHIBIT  5
Funding  of Big Science  (or Megaprojects)
Are the  SSC,  Space Station,  and the human  Genome  Project
distortions  of research priorities  by effective lobbies,  and
therefore  an expression of political will that should go
unchallenged?
Or are such  megaprojects a threat to the science  base and  the
ability of the  Federal Government to maintain  a robust and
balanced  research portfolio?
10EXHIBIT  6
Small Science Squeeze
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If practitioners of "small  science" are looking for confirmation of their
fear that Zbig science" is threatening their livelihood, they will find it in
a staff memorandum  prepared  by the Congressional  Budget Office
(CBO).  CBO  points out that the three  biggest civilian science and
technology projects-the space station, the Earth Observing System,
and the Superconducting  Super Collider-account for two-thirds of
the Administration's proposed fiscal year 1993 increase in the budget
category known as Function 250, which includes the National Science
Foundation, much of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, and the general science programs of the Department of Energy.
What's worse for small science devotees is that this year's proposal
may be only the thin end of the wedge. CBO projects that the annual
budgetary needs of the three mammoth  projects will double between
1992 and 1997-yet the Administration's budget assumes flat funding
for Function  250  beyond  1993.  If those projections turn out to be
correct-a big if-the result isn't hard to figure:  Small science gets
squeezed (see chart). Some relief would come from allowing Function
250 to grow. But, as CBO points out, there will be increasing pressure
to cut total government spending to hold down the ballooning federal
deficit, with the result that "by 1995, the cumulative cuts will  be so
large that Function 250 is unlikely to escape without any reduction."
Source:  Science  255:(20  March  1992),  p.  1507.
Edited  by  Constance  Holden.
11EXHIBIT  7
Alternatives to Peer  Review
A.  FORMULA  FUNDING:  Formal,  non-merit  based review
B.  EARMARKING:  Formal,  non-peer review
C.  "OLD  BOYS"  NETWORK:  Informal,  peer-based  non-review
D.  MANAGER'S  DISCRETION:  Informal  in-house review  with unknown
criteria  and participants
12EXHIBIT  8
Summary and Issues for Congress  *  7
Figure 6-Federal R&D Obligations by State (1985)
and at Universities and Colleges (1989)
Cumulative distribution of Federal R&D
obligations by State:  1985
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SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Geographc Patterns: R&Dln the United States,  Final  Report,  NSF  90-316  (Washington,  DC: 1990), table B-5; and National Scienoe Foundation,  Selected
Data on Academic Sdenc/Engineenng  R&D  Expenditures,
Fscal  Year  1989,  NSF  90-321  (Washington,  DC:  October 1990), table B-35 and CASPAR database.
Source:  Federally  Funded  Research:  Decisions  for
a  Decade,  Summary,  Congress  of  the  US,
OTA, 1991.
13EXHIBIT  9
Table 4. States leading In  R&D performance  by sector and R&D
as a percentage of gross state product:  1989
Largest 25 performers (ranked by size of R&D In  sector)  R&D intensity of state economy
Rank  Total R&D'  Universities  Federal  GSP
(in millions)  Industry  & colleges2  Govemment  Largest 25  R&D/GSP  (in  billions)
1  $30,881  California  California  California  Maryland  New Mexico  10.5%  $25.4
2  9,898  New York  Michigan  New York  Califomia  Delaware  5.8  15.4
3  9,058  Michigan  New York  Texas  Ohio  Massachusetts  5.5  .144.8
4  7,949  Massachusetts  New Jersey  Maryland  Virginia  Maryland  5.1  99.1
5  7,229  New Jersey  Massachusetts  Massachusetts  Florida  Michigan  5.0  181.8
6  6,581  Texas  Texas  Pennsylvania  New Mexico  California  4.4  697.4
7  5,791  Pennsylvania  Pennsylvania  Illinois  Alabama  Idaho  3.8  16.3
8  5,475  Ohio  Illinois  Michigan  Texas  New Jersey  3.6  203.4
9  5,305  Illinois  Ohio  North Carolina  New Jersey  Washington  3.4  96.2
10  5,091  Maryland  Washington  Georgia  Massachusetts  Connecticut  3.1  88.9
11  3,375  Florida  Connecticut  Ohio  Pennsylvania  Vermont  2.7  11.5
12  3,225  Washington  Missouri  Florida  Rhode Island  Missouri  2.7  100.1
13  2,745  Connecticut  Florida  Wisconsin  Georgia  Ohio  2.6  211.5
14  2,710  Missouri  Minnesota  Connecticut  Tennessee  Minnesota  2.6  93.6
15  2,680  New Mexico  Indiana  New Jersey  Mississippi  Pennsylvania  2.5  227.9
16  2,545  Virginia  North Carolina  Washington  Arizona  Colorado  2.5  66.2
17  2,399  Minnesota  Colorado  Virginia  Colorado  Rhode Island  2.3  18.8
18  2,120  Indiana  Virginia  Minnesota  Washington  New York  2.2  441.1
19  1,821  North Carolina  Maryland  Missouri  New York  Utah  2.2  28.1
20  1,649  Colorado  New Mexico  Indiana  Nevada  llinois  2.1  256.5
21  1,399  Wisconsin  Wisconsin  Colorado  Indiana  Indiana  2.0  105.3
22  1,302  Georgia  Tennessee  Arizona  Michigan  Arizona  2.0  65.3
23  1,302  Tennessee  Arizona  Tennessee  Utah  Texas  1.9  340.1
24  1,293  Arizona  Delaware  Iowa  West Virginia  Virginia  1.9  136.5
25  1,226  Alabama  Georgia  Alabama  North Carolina  Alabama  1.8  67.9
Includes in-state R&D performance of industry, universities, associated federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs),
and Federal agencies and the federally funded R&D performance of nonprofit institutions.
2Excludes R&D activities of university-administered FFRDCs located within these states.
KEY: GSP - gross state product
NOTES:  Excludes R&D performance in the District of Columbia and R&D expenditures undistributed by state. States not listed had
in-state R&D performance of less than $1  billion and an R&D/GSP ratio of 1.5 percent or less.
SOURCES:  National Science Foundation/SRS,  table B-17; and Bureau of Economic Analysis
Source:  National  Science  Foundation,  National  Patterns  of  R &  D Resources:  1992
by  J. E.  Jankowski,  Jr.,  NSF 92-330, Washington, DC,  1992.
14EXHIBIT  10
Academic  Earmarking
Is the  pursuit of pork  barrel funding  of facilities and  equipment  a
result of inadequate  Federal attention to these infrastructure
needs?
Or is academic  earmarking  a crass debasement  of principles of
merit  and  competition  in the name of  "distributive  politics"?
15EXHIBIT  11
Summary of FY 1992 Academic  Earmarks,
Distribution by Institution and Comparison with Federal R&D Funds for FY  1989
f(ota earmwked  funds =  $708  my
N of recipient  Cumulative  %  Cumulative n in top  100 institutions of  of earmarked  Federal R&D funds FY 92 earmarks  fundsI  received in FY89
10  32  6
30  61  19
50  78  26
75  88  35
100  95  42
167  100  51
source:  based on James D.  Savage, "The Distribution of Apparent  Academic Earmarks in the Federal Government's  FY  1992 Appropriations Bills," CRS Reort  for  the  Congress, Sept. 22,  1992, table 3.
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TABLE  1
APPARENT  FY  1992  ACADEMIC  EARMARKS,
BY  APPROPRIATIONS  SUBCOMMITTEE
(HOUSE  AND  SENATE)
Subcommittee  Dollar Value  rf  Tot
Defense  $169,200,000  23.9% (PL  102-172)
VA, HUD,  Ind. Ag.  151,016,000  21.3 (PL 102-139)
Agriculture  146,368,000  20.7 (PL 102-142)
Energy & Water  134,900,000  19.1 (PL 102-104)
Commerce, Justice  60,413,000  8.5 (PL 102-140)
Transportation  27,128,000  3.8 (PL 102-143)
Interior  16,664o000  2.4 (PL 102-154)
Labor, HHS,  ED  2,300,000  .3 (PL 102-170)
Total  $707,989,000  100.0%
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COMMITTEE  ON SCIENCE,  SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE  OF REPRESENTATIVES
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WASHINGTON,  D.C. 20515
EMBARGOED:  For Release  After 9 a.m. EST Friday.  Feb.  12
Date:  February  10,  1993
Contact:  Robert Palmer (D),  202/225-4275
Dave Clement (R),  202/225-8772
Press:  Rick Borchelt,  202/225-3359
HOUSE SCIENCE COMMITTEE  STEPS  UP PORK SCRUTINY;
REP. BROWN  ANNOUNCES  HEARING  SERIES,  UNIVERSITY  SURVEY
BOSTON -- Rep. George E. Brown, Jr.  (D-CA), Chairman of the House Science,  Space,
and Technology  Committee,  today  announced  that the Committee will turn up  the  heat  in  its
efforts to curb location-specific,  unauthorized earmarks  --  "pork" --  with a series of high-profile
hearings  and  a  survey  of colleges  and  universities  that  accept  unauthorized  earmarks.  The
Chairman's  remarks  came  during  the  annual  meeting  of the  American  Association  for  the
Advancement  of Science (AAAS)  in Boston, Mass.
"Congressional  porkbarrelling  threatens  many  of  the  science  and  technology
intiatives  of  the new  Administration,  which  risk being  sabotaged  by  parochial  political
interests,"  Rep.  Brown  told  reporters  at the  AAAS  meeting.  "Money  that is  diverted  by
Congress  to fund earmarks comes  out of the hide of other programs - publicly  debated,
peer-reviewed,  carefully  scrutinized  programs.  This  is  not a  legitimate  way  of funding
science  programs."
Rep.  Brown said that he would  schedule  within the next  two months  a series  of high-
visibility  hearings  on Capitol Hill to  hear from college and university presidents,  Members  of
Congress,  and  lobbyists  who  accept  or  help  direct  earmarked  funds.  "With each  of  these
groups of witnesses  we will ask why they go the route of sidestepping merit review,"  he said.
As part of the investigation process,  the Committee this week sent letters to 50 academic
institutions across the United States which received pork from FY1993 appropriations bills.  The
letters  ask the  institutions  to  describe  in  detail  how  the  money  is  being  spent.  The  list  of
institutions is attached.  The total earmarked  for these  50 institutions  totals $225  million.
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50 Academic  Pork-Barrel Projects
Following  are  the 50  academic  institutions from  which  Rep.  George  E. Brown,  Jr.  requested
detailed  information  on  fiscal  1993  Congressional  earmarks.  The  institutions,  projects,  and
amounts appropriated are listed under the agencies that financed the projects.
AGRICULTURE  DEPARTMENT
Michigan State U.: food-toxicology center;  $4.6-million
Rutgers U.: plant-blosclence facility; $2.6-milllon
St. Joseph's U.: center for food marketing;  $2.3-mlllion
U. of Wisconsin at Madison: agricultural-biotechnology facility; $2.16-million
Wake Forest U.: center for nutrition research; $3.7-million
ENERGY AND  INTERIOR  DEPARTMENTS
Hahnemann U.: ambulatory-care and teaching center: $10-mlllon
Indiana U.-Purdue U. at Indianapolis: cancer-treatment  facility; $10-milllon
Louisiana State U.: center for energy and environmental resources; $O1-million
Oregon Health Sciences U.: ambulatory-research and education building; $10-million
U. of Alabama: biomedical-research facility; S10-million
U. of Connecticut: advanced-technologies Institute; $10-milllon
U. of Oklahoma: study of liquid natural gas for transportation; $1-million
U. of Oregon: industrialized housing; S1-million
Kansas State U.,  U. of Chicago,  and Washington U. (consortium): plant-biotechnology research:
$2.5-milllon
ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  AGENCY
Clark Atlanta U.:  hazardous-substance-research center:  $3-mllllon
Columbia U.: environmental-health-research  center: S10-mllion
Lamar U.-Beaumont:  Gulf coast hazardous-substance-research center; $2.5-million
Tufts U.: center for environmental  management;  $3.2-million
U. of Detroi: polymer-research center:  $1.2-million
U. of Georgia: ultraviolet-radiation-monitoring  center; $700.000
U. of Maine: Maine quaterary-studies  institute: $1-million
U. of New Orleans:  urban-waste-management  research; $700.000
U. of North Dakota: energy- and environmental-research  center; $1.6-million
Arizona State U.,  New Mexico State U.,  Polytechnic Institute of New York, and San Diego State U.
(consortium):  environmental-research  center; $2-mllllon
North Carolina  State U.,  U. of Miami, and U.  of Michigan (consortium): Southern oxidants study:
$3.5-million
INTERNATIONAL  TRADE ADMINISTRATION
Iowa State U.: new materials center; $2.85-million
Auburn U. and Clemson U. (consortium):  textile center:  $7.48-million
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS  AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Delta College: science-leaming center and planetarium: S8-million
Oregon State U.: distance-leaming  activity, marine-science center; $500,000
Saglnaw Valley State U.: earth-science facility; $42-million
U. of Nebraska  at Uncoln: earth-science research;  $400.000
U. of Utah: science computation center; S10-million
Wheeling Jesuit College: classroom of the future; $2.8-milllon
NATIONAL OCEANIC  AND ATMOSPHERIC  ADMINISTRATION
U. of New Hampshire: biological-sciences facility; $15-million
U. of South Carolina: estuary management;  $672,000
TRANSPORTATION  DEPARTMENT
Embry-Rlddle Aeronautical U.:  airway-science program:  $.55-million
Henderson State U.: airway-science program;  $2.2-million
Middle Tennesee  State U.: airway-science  program:  $556.000
U. of Alaska: airway-science program:  $6.88-mlllon
U. of Callforma  at San  Diego: research on materials In  bridge construction: $1.6-mllion





At one time, agriculture was the principal research area funded by the federal government. But
today the sums appropriated forR&D on it are tiny in comparison with those allocated to space
or health. While appropriations for many agencies have expanded greatly since 1955, those for
R&D in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have remained at about $780 million
in terms of constant dollars. Most of these funds have been spent intramurally by the Agricul-
tural  Research  Service.  Some  have  gone  to state  activities.  The  USDA  did  not  initiate
competitive grants activities until 1978. At that time, the appropriation for them was only $15
million. Annual appropriations  grew slowly to about $44 million in 1988.
There  is no question about the major contribution made  by the R&D supported by
USDA during the past hundred years. And for much of that time, U.S. agriculture enjoyed
special  advantages of fertile  soil,  innovation  in  farm  machinery,  and  low-cost petroleum
products. But today strong global competition is with us. Imports of food into the United States
are  increasing. Other countries, including developing nations, are successfully engaging in
research. Advanced countries are devoting relatively more attention to agriculture than is the
United  States.  The  percentage  of total  R&D funds  devoted  to a  category  that included
agriculture, forestry, and fishing in 1988 were: United States, 1.9; Japan, 6.5; Germany, 3.1;
France, 4.6; and United Kingdom, 5.5. Yields of food grains in other countries often exceed
those in the United States. In some countries labor or fertile land is cheaper than in the United
States.  If the  United States  is to  maintain  or  increase  its  favorable  balance  of trade  in
agricultural  products,  it must enhance  the quality of its agricultural  products and increase
production efficiency. To do this will require devoting a larger share of its creative talent to
basic agricultural research.  A means to this end would be to expand the USDA competitive
grants program. A rationale for doing this and legislation authorizing it are already in place.
In 1989 the rationale for an enlarged competitive grants system was supplied by the
Board on Agriculture of the National Research Council (NRC). It issued a report* that was
unusually effective.  The document  won approval from the Bush administration  and led  to
action under  Public  Law  101-624  to foster  a National Competitive  Research  Initiative.
Recommendations of the NRC were followed quite closely in the crafting of the legislation.
The NRC report spotlighted six targets: plant systems; animal systems; nutrition; food quality
and health; natural resources and the environment; engineering, products, and processes; and
markets, trade, and policy. The legislation also targeted the six. Descriptions of the six targets
were similar. In the legislation, the following appears specifying an area to be supported:
Plant systems, including plant genome structure and function; molecular and cellular genetics and
plant biotechnology; plant-pest interactions and biocontrol systems; crop plant response to environmental
stresses; unproved nutrient qualities of plant products; and new food and industrial uses of plant products.
Equally broad scope characterized specifications of the other areas.
The legislation also specified, "in seeking proposals for grants...and in performing peer
review  evaluations of such proposals  the Secretaries shall  seek the widest participation  of
qualified scientists in the Federal Government, colleges and universities, State agricultural
experiment stations, and the private sector." The legislation authorized appropriations of$  150
million for fiscal year  1991, $275  million for  1992,  $350 million for 1993, $400 million for
1994, and $500 million for 1995.
To date that schedule  has not been met. The actual appropriation  for 1991  was $73
million and for 1992 and 1993 it was set at $97.5 million. A cap of 14% for overhead has been
set. Nevertheless, there have been so many proposals that only about 22% could be funded for
an average slightly over $50,000 per year.
It is early to  ask  about accomplishments.  However,  as one example,  the tools  and
methods that were developed by National Institutes of Health and National Science Founda-
tion investigators are being rapidly and successfully applied to plant and animal genomes and
to detection of disease processes in both plants and animals. Research in areas included in the
USDA competitive grants program (NRICGP) should have high priority and corresponding
increased federal support.
Philip H. Abelson
"Investing  in Research:  A Proposal  to Strengthen  the Agricultural,  Food, and Environmental  System" (National
Academy Press, Washington,  DC,  1989).
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TajLe  1. Total  R&D  by Agency
Congressional Action on R&D  in the FY  1993 Budget (budget  authority  in millions of dollars)l
Action  by Congress
FY 1992  FY 1993  FY  1993  Change  from  Request  Chnge  from FY  1992
Est.'  Requet  Approved  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent
Defense (militaryl  37.776.5  40,083.8  39,166.8  -918.0  .2.3%  1,389.3  3.7% National Aeronautics  and  Space Administration  8.543.2  9,308.4  8.842.6  -466.9  6.0%  299.3  3.5% Energy  8.247.9  8,070.9  7,385.1  -685.8  -8.6%  -862.8  -10.5% Health and Human  Services  10.283.7  10,664.6  10,668.1  -106.6  -1.0%  274.6  2.7% (National Institutes of Health)  (9,638.41  (10,138.61  (9.923.2)  (-216.3)  (-2.1%)  (284.8)  (3.0%) National  Science Foundation  1,968.3  2,331.3  2.003.0  -328.2  -14.1%  34.7  1.8% Agriculture  1,406.4  1,403.1  1.468.2  55.1  3.9%  -38.2  -2.6% Interior  624.1  643.6  608.8  66.3  12.0%  -16.3  -2.6% Trnsportation  473.3  618.4  497.1  -21.3  -4.1%  23.8  6.0% Environmental  Protection Agency  499.9  528.4  648.3  19.9  3.'%  48.3  9.7% Commerce  610.2  654.7  708.6  63.9  8.2%  98.4  16.1% Education  172.2  217.4  179.5  -37.9  -17.4%  7.3  4.2% Agency for International Development  336.3  339.2  321.0  18.2  -6.4%  -14.3  -4.3% Department  of Veterans  Aftairs  234.2  247.7  239.0  -8.7  -3.6%  4.8  2.0% Nuclear Reulatory Commission  120.0  127.7  125.4  -2.3  -1.8%  6.4  4.6% Smithsonian  107.0  126.0  118.8  -6.2  .4.9%  11.8  11.0% Tennessee  Valley Authority  92.7  66.0  86.9  30.9  66.2%  -6.8  -7.3% Corps  of Engineers  64.4  72.4  60.6  -21.9  -30.3%  -3.9  -7.2% Labor  37.2  61.2  44.3  -6.9  -13.6%  7.1  19.1% Housing  end Urban Development  24.2  34.2  24.0  -10.2  -30.0%  -0.2  .1.0% Justice  43.7  61.3  49.2  -2.1  -4.1%  6.6  12.6% Tresury  16.6  18.6  16.0  -2.6  -14.2%  -0.6  -3.9%
TOTAL  R&D  71.761.2  76,446.9  73.029.1  -2,417.8  -3.2%  1,268.0  1.8% -Author'  etimates.  Inclhdes conduct  of R&0  nd R&D  facilities.  Figure  for FY  1992 and  FY  1993 differ  from  those shown  in AAAS  Reort XVII  because of revisions  to agency requests and technical  corrections.
'Reflects  the rescission of  $1.4  billion in FY  1992.
Source:  Teich, Albert  H.,  et  al.  Congressional  Action on  the  Research  and Development Budget, American Association for  the  Advancement  of Science, Washington, DC,  1993,  p.  49.
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Table  11.  Department  of Agriculture
Congressional Action on R&D  in the FY  1'93 Budget (budget authority in mnions of dollarsl
Action  by Congrss
FY  1992  FY 1993  FY 1993  Chnge from Requet  Change  from  FY 1992
Eat.'  Request  Approved  Amount  Percent  Amount  Prcen
Agricultural  Reearch Service:
Programs  668.4  694.3  666.0  -28.3  -4.1%  -2.4  -0.4% Buildings  and Facilities  60.6  27.3  34.5  7. 2 26.4%  -16.1  -31.7%
TOTAL,  ARS  718.9  721.6  700.6  -21.1  -2.9%  -18.4  -2.6%
Coopertive  State Reserch Service:
Programs  418.6  404.3  420.1  16.8  3.9%  1.6  0.4% Buildings  and  Facilities  74.8  _0.0  62.1  62.1  --  -22.7  -30.3%
TOTAL,  CSRS  493.4  404.3  472.2  67.9  16.8%  -21.2  -4.3%
Forest  Service  184.1  173.7  186.2  12.6  7.2%  2.1  1.1% Economic  Research  Service  68.7  60.4  68.7  -1.7  -2.7%  0.0  0.0% Agricultural  Cooperative  Service  3.6  3.1  3.6  0.4  12.0%  0.0  -0.8% Agricultural  Marketing  Service  4.7  4.3  4.6  0.2  6.6%  -0.2  -3.6% International  Cooperative  Development  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.0  0.0%  0.0  0.0% Human Nutrition  Information  Service  10.8  13.7  10.8  -2.9  -21.3%  0.0  0.0% Nat'l Agricultural  Statistics  Service  3.4  3.4  3.3  -0.1  -2.4%  -0.1  -2.4% Federal  Grain  Inspection Service  0.7  0.4  0.7  0.3  76.0%  0.0  0.0% Animal  and Plant  Health Inspection  Service  1.7  16.7  16.3  -0.4  -2.6%  -0.4  2  6%
TOTAL.  USDA  R&D  1.496.4  1,403.1  1,468.2  66.1  3.9%  -38.2  -2.6%
*Authors'  estimates.  Includes  conduct of R&D  and  R&D  facilities.
'Reflects rescission of  $1.3  million  in FY  1992.
Source:  Teich, Albert H.,  et  al.  Congressional  Action  on  the Research and
Development  Budget, American Association  for the  Advancement  of  Science,
Washington, DC,  1993, p. 66.
22EXHIBIT  14
EXHIBIT  B
Federal  Agency Support of R&D  (FY 93),  by Discipline
agency
discipline  DOE  NSF  NASA  DOD  HHS/NIH  USDA  EPA  ALL
OTHER
Physics  X  X  X  X
Astronomy  X  X
Atmos  &  X  X  X  X  X
Oceanic
Earth Sci.  X  X  X  X
Water  X  X  X  X
Resources
Bio  Sci.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Chemistry  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Behav.  &  X  X  X  X
Soc. Res.
Math  Sci.  X  X  X
Comp.  Sci.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Electrotech.  X  X  X  X  X
Chem.  Eng.  X  X  X
Materials Sci.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
& Eng.
Mech.  Eng.  X  X  X  X  X  X
Source:  "Disciplinary  Analyses,"  in  Research and Development FY  1992,  AAAS  Report  XVII
(Washington,  DC:  1992),  pp.  189-338.
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Why an Nie?
Or How  to Become  a Priority
in the  Federal  R&D  Portfolio
1.  Increased  budget share  (Lederman  argument).
2.  Priority-setting  by a research  community or professional  society (e.g.,
astronomy,  ecology,  (FASEB),  or by an agency division (e.g.,  Office of
Energy  Research  at DOE).
3.  Increased visibility through  structural change  within an existing agency
(e.g.,  creation of an  SBE  Directorate  at NSF).
4.  Priority-setting  across  R&D  agencies  (e.g.,  OST/FCCSET  Committee
initiatives  in high-performance  computing,  global  change, education
and  human resources,  etc.).
5.  Other intra-agency  action(e.g.,  strategic planning  at NIH and  NSF)  and
inter-agency coordination  (e.g.,  to clarify support for neuroscience
research  by declaring  the  1990s  "Decade  of the  Brain").
6.  Creation  of a  new agency.
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* This paper was previously  published as chapter 20 in the book,  U.S. Agricultural  Research:
Strategic Challenges and Options, edited by  Robert D.  Weaver;  publisher,  Agricultural  Research
Institute,  Bethesda,  Maryland,  March  1993.Agricultural Research  Structures in a Changing  World




Society's  demands  on the  agricultural research  system are  evolving from
preoccupation  with  the yield and cost of individual products  to concern  with  safety,
quality and variety  on the  one  hand, and environmental  implications  of production
processes  on  the other.  The system's response  to the  demands  will  be profoundly
affected  by the  revolutions in  biotechnology,  ecology and legal  protection of
agricultural  research  property  rights.  The scope  of the public  role,  as exemplified  in
land grant universities,  will be  reduced in some  areas, expanded  in others.  New
incentives  are created  by opportunities  to  sell or license  research  products  under patent
protection.  The managerial  challenge  for universities is to  use these new incentives  to
improve  overall research performance  without compromising  teaching,  advising  and
other beneficial  scholarly  obligations  with less direct  financial  rewards.Agricultural Research  Structures in a Changing World
Brian Wright and David Zilberman
University of California
Berkeley, California  94720
Public  and private  sectors  in  the United  States have been  major partners in an
multibillion  dollar agricultural  research,  development  and extension  effort that has
made possible the impressive rate  of technical change  seen  in the  sector over this
century.  Despite  a  widely-acclaimed  record  of high rates of return to  public
investment (Ruttan  1982),  the  share of the  public partners  (USDA and state
agricultural  experiment  stations) fell from 40  to 34 percent over  the decade  of the
eighties  (Huffman  and Evenson  1993,  Table 4.1),  due  to sporadic  cuts in  public
support levels that  are mainly  traceable  to exogenous  budgetary pressures.  Over the
same period total  expenditures  increased,  however,  from  3.9  to 4.8 billion dollars  (at
1984 value)  due to  an increase  in private expenditures.
The budget cuts  are the  most  obvious  but not necessarily  the  most important
forces for change.  Other pressures  for more  fundamental  changes in  the  nature  of
agricultural research  structures  is being engendered  by qualitative  changes  in  the social
demands made  on the agricultural  research  and extension system,  in the  scope  and
nature of scientific  opportunities  for discoveries,  and  in the  potential  rewards forresearchers.
In this  paper we consider the  implications of these changes  for the nature  of
public  and private agricultural  research.  We focus  on land grant institutions  like U.C.
Berkeley  and their relations  with the private  sector in pursuing research  and
development.  The questions  include
*  What changes  should we want and/or expect  in the  public  and private
roles  in agricultural  research?
*  What is  the appropriate  structure for public-private  collaboration  in
modern agricultural  research  and extension?
*  How  should researchers  be  motivated and rewarded?
In what follows,  we first consider the  nature of the  changes in demands  on  the
agricultural  research  system.  Then  we review  in  Section 2  the reasons  why both  the
public sector and the private  sector have  valid economic  roles  in the research  and
extension  system.  In  Section  3 we consider  public and private  sector responses to the
new research  demands  and opportunities.  Then, focusing on  the land grant
universities,  we consider  in turn  the  implications for institutional  structure (Section 4)
and for the performance of the  universities'  roles  in teaching,  research  and extension
(Section  5).  Conclusions  follow.
1.  The Evolution  of Research  Demands
Historically,  the politically  expressed  demands  on the agricultural  research
system  have focused  on  efficiency  in agricultural  production  and post-harvest
2activities,  and the  promotion of rural  prosperity and parity with  other sectors of the
economy.'  The cost-decreasing  and/or yield-increasing  innovations  the system
produced for farmers  satisfied  the  supply requirements  so  effectively that market
forces placed  downward  pressure on the equilibrium  price of farm  commodities
(Cochrane  1958).  This  in  turn  led to effective  political action  by the  farm lobby to
obtain protection from price reductions  via government intervention  to  support prices.
On  the  other hand  the distributional  concern  for relative prosperity of the rural
population,  featured so prominently in political  rhetoric,  has not been  discernible
among the major objectives  of public  agricultural research,  which have  remained
focused  on technical and economic  efficiency.  Improvements  in  efficiency  clash with
the  achievement  of rural prosperity  when  the  induced  increases  in supply depress
market prices  so much  as to reduce  the  net returns  to rural  suppliers of labor, land,
and other inputs.
Now, however,  society's  effective political  demands of the farm  sector have
become much more complex.  Consumers  wish  to reduce the  actual  or perceived
health risks of chemical residues  in  foods,  and  of herbicides  and  pesticides released
into the environment  by farmers.  Other concerns  include the  effects of erosion  on
'Clear statements of the broad objectives of United States agricultural policies are  surprisingly difficult to find.  For
our purposes,  the following  extract  from  the Hatch  Act of  1955  is relevant:
"Sec.  2.  It  is  further the  policy  of the  Congress  to  promote  the  efficient  production,
marketing, distribution,  and  utilization of products of the farm  as essential  to the health
and welfare of our peoples and  to promote a sound and  prosperous agriculture  and rural
life as indispensable  to the maintenance  of maximum employment and national prosperity
and security.  It is also  the intent of Congress to assure agriculture a position in research
equal  to  that of industry,  which  will  aid  in  maintaining  and  equitable balance between
agriculture  and other segments  of our economy."  (U.S.  Congress,  1980, p.  18-22)
3land  and water quality, pollution by animal  wastes  and most recently  the effects  of
methane emitted  by belching  ruminants  on global  warming.  Standards  for animal
rights are being  advocated  for veal calves and  poultry. Clearly the farming  process
itself is increasingly  being  subjected  to  direct social constraints,  rather than being
viewed  as only indirectly  socially relevant  as
the means  to  achieving  a prosperous  farm sector and a cheap and  secure  food  supply.
(See  the accompanying  chapter  by Busch  for more  on this.)
At the  same time,  consumers  with  increasing  incomes  and no  intention of
eating or drinking  more  are  looking  for higher quality,  novelty, variety  and constant
availability  in  their foods.  These  objectives  are not obviously  mutually  consistent,
especially  if the  research continues  along the  path that produced high  yield and low
costs.
Scientists and  innovators  are being asked  to furnish production  processes,  and
new products,  that respond  to  these  multiple  social concerns,  and  there will  be  an
increasing  demand  for products  and services  that can  help  management  in this
complex and dynamic  environment.  Indeed  the multifaceted  interactions that
constitute an  agricultural  system will  increasingly  be  the  subject of analytical  attention.
Beyond  biotechnology  lies the challenge  of ecologically  appropriate agriculture.  This
is far more demanding  than  the more  narrow,  often  organism-specific,  focus  seen in
much of extensive  research effort in  moder  medicine,  for example,  and  also
characteristic  of that part of agriculture  that has  in the  past achieved  the greatest yield
increase,  the  cultivation  of a plant  or animal  species via the exclusion  of competitive
4species  by some  artificial  means.  Fortunately  these challenges  come at  a  time when
the research  capacity is being  transformed  by  the revolutions  in biotechnology  and
information  processing.
Besides improving  the prospects for pursuit  of the traditional  productivity
objectives,  the new  biological  techniques  make possible previously unimagined
qualitative  transformations  of plants  and animals.  They seem  to expand greatly  the
potential  for satisfying  the  new demands  for benign  production  processes,  on  the  one
hand,  and an  array of improved consumption  characteristics  on the  other.
Already  scientists  have  been able, for example,  to  transfer the  pesticidal
qualities  of Bt into agricultural  plants,  which might help  reduce chemical  pesticide  use.
On  the other hand genetic  manipulation  has  also  made  possible  delivery  of better-
ripened fruit, such  as the  Calgene  tomato,  with less damage and wastage.  A slew  of
more impressive  breakthroughs  can be  anticipated  in  the years  ahead.2
Through  biotechnology  agriculture  will  expand to  produce  new higher-quality
forms of existing products,  and  entirely new  agricultural  products,  many  of them
beyond the  traditional  range  of agricultural  commodities.  The term  "pharming"  refers
to  the use of plants as factories for biological  and chemical products.  The biological
production of fine chemicals  and  fibers may  offer a less costly alternative  to  the use of
finite or ecologically  sensitive environmental  resources.  Scientists  have  genetically
engineered plants  to manufacture  a wide  variety of materials,  including  human proteins
2For an excellent overview of prospective applications of genetic engineeringo of plants for control of insects,  weeds,
and diseases,  of animals  for growth  promotion, animal  health, reproduction  technologies and creation of transgenic
animals, and in food processing,  see U.S. Congress, OTA (1992), and also parts of U.S.  Department of Agriculture,
Economic  Research  Service,  (1992), especially Gibson  (1992).
5such  as albumin  and interferon,  alpha-amylase,  a bacterial enzyme  that  is widely used
in the food processing  industry and natural polymers, including  a type of polyester
(Moffat  1992).
The  advent of the  new  biotechnological  innovations  has  been  fostered  by new
legal protections  in the  form of the Plant Variety  Protection Certificate  (PVPC),
established  in  1970  and extended  in  1980,  and subsequently  the expansion of patent
protection  to life  forms by the  Supreme  Court in  Diamond v.  Chakrabarty  in  1980.3
Similarly the market for  software and databases  has been  sufficiently (if not optimally)
developed under the evolving law regarding  copyright  protection  that it has  made the
personal  computer a productive  and popular  management  tool  for farmers  and farm
advisers.
However the legal  system also  poses new challenges  for the modem biological
products developed  under its protection.  The marketing  of the  Calgene  Flavr-Savr
tomato may  be hindered  by legal  challenges or the  threat  thereof, or more generally by
adverse  publicity  regarding the  safety  of foods containing new genetic  material.
Already  its major backer,  Campbell's, is  backing  away from plans to  use this product.
In  sum, the agricultural  research  system is faced  with new challenges,  but also
with an  exciting new array  of opportunities.  How  should the agricultural  research
system  be  structured in  this new environment?
3For an up-to-date discussion  of relevant intellectual  property protections,  see Chapter  15 of U.S. Congress,  Office
of Technology  Assessment,  (1992).
62.  Why Public Research  and  Extension?
2.1  General  Arguments
As  a preliminary,  it is helpful  to keep  in mind  the reasons  why  we have  a
public  research  system  at all.  After all,  we rely  on the  private sector to produce  other
products,  including food, with  profits from private  sales  as the  incentive.  Public
provision  of research  and extension  has been justified by the argument  that the private
incentives for research  and extension fall  short of the  public gains at the margin.
Important  "externalities",  benefits  (or costs) not captured in  private profits,  are
associated  with public research  inputs, outputs, or the  process  itself.  This argument
has much  greater force for  some areas of effort  than others.
It is  widely accepted  that pure  knowledge,  not embodied  in any  product,  is a
"public  good",  the  benefits  of which  are properly  made  available  free of charge
because  they  are  "non-rival";  use by one does not reduce the  supply  available to
others.  The product of successful  basic research  is of this type.  The desirability of
free provision  is fortunate, for it  is very difficult to exclude  non-purchasers  from
acquiring  such  "disembodied"  information,  and since  the  information  is often of quite
general use  the number of potential  "free  riders"  is often very  large.  It follows  that
basic  research  is mostly produced  in,  or at least supported  by,  the public  or non-profit
sectors.
Basic  research  findings  feed  into the applied  research  areas,  which tend  to  be
more industry-specific.  In  many areas  the  fruits of applied research  are at least
partially capturable  by its producer,  for two quite different reasons.  The creator  of
7disembodied  applied process discoveries  reaps  the benefits  to the  extent that it
dominates the  industry  that uses  the process.  For example, an advance  in  irrigation-
equipment manufacturing  techniques  would be  likely to benefit  a major manufacturer
of such equipment.  Furthermore,  much  applied research  and development produces
innovations  that  are embodied  in  products,  such  as  machines or drugs, that  can  be
sold for profit in private  markets, and protected  from copying by patents or secrecy.
In  these cases the derived private  demand  for applied research  may well be  adequate,
if not optimal.
In  agriculture,  the  producers of applied research  have  historically  had little
scope for  capturing  sufficient compensation  from  the market  to justify their  efforts.
Most  advances  have  been  either yield-increasing  or cost-reducing.  Some of these
advances  are embodied  in  plants or animals that can reproduce,  passing  on the
advances to  later users, and  spoiling  the innovator's  prospects  for lucrative  sales in  the
absence  of effective  legal protection.  Others  are  process advances  such  as new
techniques  of crop cultivation  that can  be easily copied  by diligent observers.  Given
the extremely  competitive  nature of agricultural  production,  the  rewards accruing  from
use  within  the innovator's own farming operation  are  typically  a tiny fraction of the
full  social value.
There  are  of course  prominent exceptions  to these  generalizations.  Private
hybrid corn innovators  have prospered  because  their product cannot  be successfully
reproduced  by their customers.  New  hybrid chicken  varieties  are  also produced
privately.  Mechanical  and  especially  chemical  farm  inputs, originating  in other
8sectors, have historically  had patent  protection.  This  has  not always  been very
effective.  Eli Whitney's (or was  it Catherine  Greene's?  See Warrick  1992  pp. D3-
D4) cotton gin,  to take  a  famous example,  was so widely copied,  despite  patent
protection,  that it was  necessary  to award him  a prize to provide  him,  ex post,  a
significant  return  for his  innovation.
Given the anticipated  opportunities  for innovation,  on the one hand, and the
lack of privately  appropriable  returns  from many  types of applied  innovations on the
other, the public sector role in supporting  agricultural  research  has been  unusually
large, and has included the applied development  and dissemination of techniques  and
products  that in other sectors is left in  the hands of the  private  sector.  Thus the
historical role  of the public  agricultural  research complex  covers the whole  range from
basic  scientific  investigation  to  the farmer's field.  In  the United  States  the  land grant
universities  cover this span,  in large  part integrated  within  a college  of agriculture
and/or natural resources.
2.2  The Logic  of the Land Grant System
Three  aspects  of the  structure  of the land grant agricultural  research  system
suggest the  types of externalities  important to  their mission.  The first is that it is a
decentralised  system of vertically  integrated  individual  institutions,  dispersed  across
the  states with substantial  funding from  state  as well  as federal  sources.  Second,  its
basic  structure  is program-oriented  rather  than project-oriented,  in that its  staffing is
predominantly  on  a permanent  basis.  Third,  the research  mission is pursued  in concert
with  an educational  mission;  researchers  are also  university  teachers and  students  and
9others  involved  in public  education.
Decentralization  of research  and extension  to the  state level has traditionally
been rationalized  by  the  argument that it reflects  the fact that  many applied  research
problems are locally specific.  Pests, diseases,  plant varieties and cultivation  practices
differ across  states  and even  counties.  An  institution  that is close to  the problem is
more likely to respond effectively.  Thus dispersion  of the applied research  function
makes sense. The dispersion  of the basic researchers  along with their applied
colleagues,  as in the land grant universities,  allows both  types  to take  advantage  of the
knowledge externalities  available  due to close informal  contact.  The experience  of
institutions set up with  a more  exclusively  applied focus,  such  as the  International
Rice  Research Institute,  apparently  has led  them  to  an  increasing  appreciation  of a
permanent, in-house,  more basic  research  capacity.
Concentration  on local  problems also reflects  the fact that their solution
receives  the greatest political  support from  local agricultural  interests.  Yield increases
and cost reductions  supplied  gratis  to all producers  in an industry  tend to  reduce
output prices rather than  increase profits.  But  to the  extent that  the effect is  only on
local producers,  the  price reduction  response  is muted, and the local benefits  to the
sector are more likely  to be  positive.  Given productivity  increases  offer  greater
benefits if they occur on a  national  or international  scale, but  the benefits  would tend
to go  to consumers,  who  have  little influence  on  the  system.  The result is that local
problems  get the most  attention,  and  the spatially  decentralized  research system is
well  suited to addressing  them.
10The permanence  of the research  and extension  staffing means  that  there  is an
accumulation  of institutional  capacity  in the  form of knowledge  and expertise  to
respond quickly  and  effectively  to emergency  problems,  such  as the poinsettia whitefly
or the abruptly-apparent  selenium  toxicity to  waterfowl  at Kesterson  reservoir  in
California, as they  arise.  This  "option value" could  be  important to  the extent that the
same response  cannot be had  as efficiently  from the  private sector  in  the form  of
temporary consultants or contractors.  When  the  whitefly  struck California,  would  it
have  been  better for each  affected farmer  to have  sent out for  bids from private  fly-
problem-solvers?
The  argument for public provision of quick  access to  a standing  capacity for
flexible  emergency  response seems similar to  the  argument for a publicly  supported
standing  army or fire brigade  (granted some  would  argue against  the  latter).  The
argument  has force  if in-house  performance  incentives  are more  appropriate,  if the
externalities  from easy  contact  with  and access  to basic researchers  are important,
and/or if it would be difficult  to know  what contractor  to choose if the expertise  were
not already present in  the public sector.
The association  of research  with teaching is a practice  that is widespread  across
the academic  spectrum.  As  Ruttan  (1982, p.  110)  reports,  "Over time, a consensus
seems to  have  emerged in  the  United States  that research  is highly complementary  to
graduate  education,  but  less  so to  undergraduate  teaching."  But the interplay  between
functions  is difficult to  analyse  and not  well  understood.  Obviously  class  time
competes  with research  time, for faculty  and  students.  On  the  other hand the  functions
11are complementary;  in a sense each  offers positive externalities  to  the  other.
Students  who learn  how  to apply  their classroom  learning  by participating  in
real  research  in  a critical  environment  under  the supervision  of their professors can
reap educational  and  motivational  rewards.  Furthermore  their work has an  actual
social  contribution,  in  contrast to fictional  educational  exercises.  Their experience
might also help students  make better  and earlier choices about the  direction of their
careers.  Such  benefits  would normally become  more  available as the  student advances
in his or her academic  career.
For professors and  other teachers,  involvement with  institutional research  helps
keep  their teaching  relevant to current  problems.  This is likely  to be  more important
for advanced  undergraduate  and  graduate  classes  where there is  usually  more
discretion  about choice of subject  matter and teaching  tends to  be more  focused  on
research  challenges.  As researchers,  their involvement in  teaching,  especially  in
advanced  courses,  helps broaden  their perspective  beyond their currently  pressing
research  challenges  to  comprehend current work in  other corers of their academic
field,  and in related  specializations.  Since  scientific  progress  often  results  from
drawing  links between  lines of investigation,  involvement  in teaching  can encourage
faster progress  in research.
The above discussion  has focused  on some  rationales  for the current structure
of agricultural research,  as  seen in the  land  grant system in  particular.  The features
noted  have  their  drawbacks,  of course.  Decentralization  means  inevitable  duplication
of some research  (especially  basic  research)  and of teaching  functions.  Permanent
12employment  on a  program  basis  makes it possible for deadwood  to  accrue  and for the
institutional culture  to tolerate  sloth and lack  of responsiveness  to  social  demands  in
both education  and research.  Teaching  demands  can divert  bright minds  from vital
research  tasks, and, on the  other hand, research  demands  are currently  being  blamed
for neglect of undergraduate  teaching  in the  universities  and colleges  in  general.
The social  optimality  of the  land  grant approach  to agricultural  research  in
trading off the advantages  and disadvantages  of its  institutional design  has not  been
scientifically  established,  of course.  But  its contribution  to American  agricultural
productivity  is well recognized.  (See,  for example,  Nelson  and Wright,  1992,
p.  1947.)  The relevant question  now  is how  the existing structure  of public  and
private collaborative  research  will  respond  to changes  in the  social,  institutional  and
scientific  environment.
3.  Private and Public Sector  Responses  to the New  Environment
We have  some evidence  already  about  the private  sector response  to the new
opportunities.  There  has been an explosion  in  the private creation  of new varieties
after  they were  covered by the  PVPA  (Evenson  1983),  and this  occurred  with
conventional  technology;  it was not caused  by the  new  possibilities associated  with
genetic  engineering  (U.S.  Congress,  Office  of Technology  Assessment,  1992).  One
might have  anticipated  this private  sector response  from  the history  of successful
private production  and marketing  of hybrid corn varieties,  which  had some  natural
protection  from unauthorized  duplication  by customers.
13New advances  in biotechnology  have  opened  up a  whole new  technological
frontier, and patented  life  forms and other genetic engineering  products  are already
being marketed  to agricultural  producers  as well  as to  other industries including
prominently  those  in  the health  sector.  Furthermore  there  is a complementarity
between  the  institutional  and  technological  advances.  Modem  analysis  of DNA is
likely  to  make policing of life form patents  more effective.
The  ability to patent  and copyright  has also changed the  marketing possibilities
for public  and non-profit research  institutions  and the  researchers  who  are employed  in
them.  Whereas  previously they had few opportunities  to  sell their output (as distinct
from their services  as  research  inputs)  the  institutions, and  their employees, now face
very significant rewards  for success  in  meeting  market needs,  the diversity of which is
reflected  in  the fact  that two of the  most  successful  to date are  the  Cohen-Boyer  gene-
splicing patent and  Gatorade.  An  agricultural  example  is the domination  of the market
for strawberry varieties  by the  University  of California,  Davis.
4.  Implications  for Institutional Structure
4.1  Vertical  Integration of Public Agricultural Research
The new opportunities  to sell the property rights to embodied  research  outputs
will affect  the public and  private research  structures  in many dimensions.  Perhaps the
most obvious is that private for-profit  applied research  is  more feasible  for  these new
innovations,  so that the public  role need  not be  vertically  integrated right  down  to the
farm  gate, as it has  been  for other agricultural  innovations  without capturable  property
14rights.  Somewhere  between  basic research  and  extension,  an interface  can  develop
between  the  public and private  innovation  institutions.  The transfers  will tend to  be
vertical,  with the private  party downstream.  If the transfer  happens  at the
pretechnology  stage, before  the knowledge  is embodied  in a marketable  product, it is
similar  to the public  provision of technology  to farmers,  in that the private party
acquires  a  free good.  In this  case,  though,  it is an  input to  further  (private) research
and development,  rather  than directly  to the  production process  itself.  This distinction
can be crucial.
The purchaser(s) of university research  output are  likely to  be corporate  entities
with substantial market power, not  competitive farmers.  To the  extent  that the
clientele of university research  is dominated  by large  powerful firms,  administrators  of
land-grant  institutions  may have  a "potentially  massive public relations  problem"
(Kenney et al  1982  p. 52).
As  noted  above,  market power in  the relevant  final product is  essential where
developmental  expenditures  are significant  and any results  are  not protected  by patents.
If a potential purchasing  firm  is unprotected  by pre-existing  market power, it might
well  be reluctant  to invest in  the development  of the  technology  to the marketing
stage,  for fear that others equally  free  to acquire  the  public technology  gratis might
beat it to the  punch, or even copy  the technology  if it is too  applied  to pass  the
novelty  and non-obviousness  tests required for patenting.
The more  novel  the  innovation,  the  less likely the  availability  of pre-existing
market power  to  protect  it.  This  might explain why  the Commonwealth  Scientific  and
15Industrial  Research  Organisation  in  Australia found that they literally  could not give
their technology away.  A policy  of exclusive  licensing was adopted to  elicit greater
interest in  adoption  of its  discoveries  by the  private  sector.  Where  this consideration
is important,  the public/private  interface  will  tend  to lie beyond  the stage  at which  the
first property  right is acquired.  Significant patenting  will occur in the public part of
the research  sector.  Private participation  will replace  some public efforts at the
applied  end of the research  spectrum.  This is  already happening  in other technological
areas  such  as irrigation,  where  the  dealers  are  the final  agents  of information transfer
to farmers;  a major part of extension ends  at the dealer's  yard. But substitution of
private for public  research  will  remain concentrated  in  the development  stage,  where
further patenting  is a possibility.
Another obstacle  to  direct technology  transfer,  found by Postlewait,  Parker, and
Zilberman in  a  survey,  is the  reluctance  of in-house research  departments  to encourage
the purchase  of technologies  that  were not developed  in the company itself.  As  a
result,  licenses to  some of the most advanced  technology  developed  in the U.S.  have
not been purchased  by local  companies.  For example,  a Stanford researcher  invented
an  music chip for electronic  keyboards.  Despite the technology's  obvious potential  to
revolutionize  the  industry,  no American  company  wanted  to license  the  chip,  and
eventually  Yamaha  licensed  the technology and  dominated the market.
Where the private  innovator has market  power, its research  may,  as mentioned
above,  extend  up towards  basic research,  even  without  the  legal protection  of property
rights.  In this  case  the innovator may  well  be a  large firm  with a  structure of
16bureaucracy  possibly  similar to  that of a public institution.
Some other large firms take  the  opposite  tack, acquiring technology  by
purchasing small companies  that were developed  around  a certain  innovation.  Some
large chemical companies  lurk around  trying  to absorb  promising innovative
companies.  In turn,  these  young companies  need  the marketing  capacity  of the big
companies  and they  may  seek an  adopting parent.  In effect  some of the  big
companies  are marketing organizations  that rely on small R&D companies  to develop
a diversified  product mix.  They may  also be potential  customers  for university
research rights.
Increasingly,  extension  personnel  are  becoming  more  involved  in giving policy
advice to government  and to public agencies,  and  in the  facilitation  of environmental
management  and controls.  In  these roles  they extend knowledge  produced by
university research.  As the  downstream reach  of extension  is rolled  back  in some
areas  of technology,  it is expanded  in  other areas to meet  changing needs.
4.2  University  Marketing Arrangements
The possibility  of patenting  research  findings  in a public  institution  such as a
land grant university raises  many  issues,  among  which are:
· How  will the  rights  be marketed?
*  Who shares in  the revenue?
*  Should the university participate  in development  investment?
Answers to  some of these  questions already exist  (at least  provisionally)  in  the
structure  of the  "Office of Technology  Transfer"  (OTT) or of the  "Office  of
17Technology Licensing"  (OTL),  themselves  institutional  innovations  seen in  several
universities.
The leader  is  Stanford,  whose  OTL is available  for patenting and  licensing  the
research  of any faculty  who wish  to use it.  The proceeds  are divided  as follows:
After  15  percent  is taken  off the  top to finance  the  OTL,  net royalties  are split into
one-third  shares  for the  inventor, one third for the inventor's department,  and  one-third
for the university.  In fiscal  1992, Stanford received  $25.5  million in royalties and
fees.  (Barnum  1992)
The  University of California has  a similar systemwide  office that awards
university employees  on  a sliding  scale,  with  50 percent of the first $100,000  of net
royalties, 35  percent of the next $400,000  and 20 percent of any higher  amounts going
to the inventor.  Total revenues  to  the  University from patents and  royalties  were
$28.8 million in  1992 (Barnum  1992).  In contrast to  Stanford, faculty  at the
University  of California, which  has a central  OTL, must use university  services  to
patent university research.  Some campuses,  including Berkeley,  are now developing
their own campus-based  OTL's  to  offer better  service  to their faculty.
Thus researchers  at both public  and private  universities can  stand to  gain a
substantial  share of the realised  value of their discoveries  , and their departments  and
the  whole  institution also  stand  to gain.  Paradoxically,  the explicit incentive appears
greater  in these public institutions than in the typical large private  firm, where the
patents  of employees  are routinely  assigned  to the  firm via prior contractual
commitments and  there is usually  no  significant explicit reward  to  the patent recipient.
18What has  been created  is a monetary  market for those types  of innovation
output that can  obtain legal  protection,  within  the context of the  hierarchical
bureaucratic  structure  of the  university.  Given the current  popularity of markets  as
allocators  of resources,  the potential  significance  of this institutional  innovation,  for
the  university  as  well  as  for the researcher,  should need little elaboration.
Some universities  are now  moving downstream  again  beyond patenting to
financial  participation  in development  of their patented  technology,  either directly or
through a related  institution  to avoid legal problems  of product  liability.  The
University  of California, for example,  is considering  the formation  of California
Technology  Ventures  Corporation  to  help commercialize  the products  of University
research.  It is time to question  whether  the university  is an appropriate  institution  to
handle  the challenges  and  risks of participation  in venture  capital investment.  Private
inventors  are notorious for having  exaggerated  views of the financial  prospects  of their
brainchildren.  In  at least one case  investment  in  venture capital  has reportedly  placed
the  financial health  of a major private  university at  risk.
4.3  Beyond  Patents to Partnerships?
The value  of patent revenues  in  no way  captures  the contribution of university
research  to  industry.  Most of the  important  new biotechnology  companies  were
created  by university  professors  who linked  up with venture  capitalists  to  form new
companies  that developed  and marketed  new products.  The  founders  of Genentech,
Amgen,  and Chiron,  for example,  include  professors  at Stanford,  U.C.  San Diego, U.C.
Berkeley  and U.C.  San Francisco.  Some of the top agricultural  biotechnology
19companies have  similar  origins.  The founders  of Calgene  and  of Biosys include
professors at U.C. Davis, and at U.C. Berkeley  and Stanford,  respectively.  Generally
the founders continue to  be university professors  while  being involved with these
companies.
One benefit of these  companies  is that, by their proximity  and  their personal
links to  the university,  they  are often  good sources  of employment for students  and
graduates.  They also  enable the  university  to continue  to  employ high-quality  research
professors while paying them less than  the market value  of their services.
But can the  university design contracts  that give  it a greater share  of the  wealth
which  it helps to  produce,  off-campus,  via its indirect contribution  of prior research,
expertise  and other  services?  This is a challenge  for the  future,  not unlike  the
challenge  of optimal  design of contracts  for university  research  undertaken  for  the
private  sector.  In  both cases  there  are real  pitfalls, including  the danger  of exposure  of
the university  to  legal actions  (as seen previously  in the  tomato harvester  case) and the
danger of distortion  of the university's  research  mission  by private interest that  "free
ride" on university  research  efforts.  (See Ulrich,  Furtan and Schmitz  (1986)  for a
discussion of free-riding by private-sector  brewing companies  on public research  in
Barley  in  Canada.)
5.  Implications  for University  Performance
5.1  Research  Efficiency
As  noted, the frontier technologies  we  have been  discussing  happen  to offer
20unusual opportunities  for market returns  due to patent  and copyright protection.
Patents and copyrights  are very  effective  at encouraging  the researcher  to  use his or
her own information,  informed  by  market pressures,  to choose  between  research topics
according  to his  or her capabilities,  research costs,  the probability of success,  and the
value if successful.  Since research  resource  management  is characterized  by
uncertainties  and informational  shortages,  this  utilization of the  researcher's
information  and  his or her market expectations  is extremely  important.  The disclosure
mandated under patent law also  makes the  information discovered  more  accessible  for
other  members of society  who  can  use  it in  further innovation  efforts.
If instead a  prize  (money  or promotion)  is the  reward  for achieving  a  pre-
specified goal,  the researcher's  information  about  the  market value of success  is
unused  unless an effective  means  of gathering  it is found by the  prize-setter.  This
does not matter if the  latter has accurately  identified  an appropriate  social  goal.  Some
of the most important  technical  advances  have  occurred in  response to prize incentives,
including  the technique  of food preservation  by canning,  and the  navigational
chronometer.  But in  research  an important part  of the individual's  skill is often  the
ability  to know what questions  to ask, what goals  to set, given  the  economic
environment  and the  technical  possibilities,  as  set out in  the (as yet incomplete)  theory
of induced  innovation.  (See for example  Binswanger  and Ruttan,  1978).  Prizes  for
achievements  defined  ex  ante do  not reward  such skills.  If we assume  the prize setter
has similar  skill and  the  latitude  to use it, there may  be no  problem,  but  this is a  big
assumption.
21On  the other hand, if research  contracts  are awarded  by competitive  bids (an
increasingly popular  trend), private  information  about capabilities and success
prospects  is also  lost to  management.  When  the  research  process  is managed  by
central direction  of research  inputs including personnel,  all  of the private  information
about capabilities costs,  probabilities, and  market returns  may  be neglected.  (For more
on this  see Wright  1983,  1985.)
But patents,  copyrights and  similar awards have  their problems  as research
motivators.  The race  to be first to patent  may involve wasteful  duplication  of effort
on similar projects  by personnel  within  or between  institutions, especially if the
resources devoted  to  a given  line of research  are  very responsive  to economic
incentives  (Barzel,  1968,  Wright  1985).  Duplication  is made more  likely  by the need
for secrecy  about research  strategies  in preserving  a competitive  advantage.
Collaboration  with complementary  research  colleagues  may be  discouraged  for the
same reason.  This problem  will  be particularly  severe  in large  teams such as  a
research  laboratory  where individual  contributions  are difficult  to verify.
In addition  the patent  incentive might be  too powerful  in the  sense that  it
distracts  attention  from other important  tasks with  less direct motivations.  For
university personnel,  these  could  include teaching,  advising  and  other institutional
services,  on the  one  hand, and research  (such  as more  basic  investigations)  which
yields non-patentable  knowledge.
Similar kinds of objections  to providing  value-based rewards  for innovation  are
increasingly  expressed  in the  business  management  literature,  largely  influenced  by
22recent Japanese  thinking  associated with  the  "Kaizen"  (gradual improvement)  system.
They may  also explain  the  observation  that large  private firms in  the  United  States
generally  choose  less high-powered,  more implicit, rewards  for their employees  than
the arrangements  now  becoming popular in  research universities.
In the case of universities,  it should  be borne  in  mind  that many of the
problems with  the  new incentives,  including duplication,  envy,  and misdirection  of
effort already  exist  in the  system of rewards  based on implicit criteria  imposed ex  post
by deans  and/or academic  peers, from tenure  and merit increases  to  general prizes  such
as the Nobel Prize,  reflected in  the adage  "Publish  or Perish."  The advent  of a parallel
system of market-determined  rewards  might to some extent  offset the distortions  of the
traditional  implicit  incentive  structure.  For example,  the fact that researchers  worry
that the  patent incentive biases research  toward applications  (Blumenthal  et al.  1986
p.  1364)  might  be good  news  to those like Ed Schuh  who  claim  that university
research  has lost a  sense  of relevance  (Schuh  1986,  1991).  In principal,  this  issue
should be  amenable  to empirical  resolution for specific  cases.
5.2  Social  Externalities
The market transfer of knowledge  has been emphasized  above.  Two points are
worth  bearing  in mind about  the associated  social contribution.  First, an  innovation,
even if patented,  usually  transfers  benefits  to  society  greater than  what the consumer
pays.  An  innovator will  often reduce,  directly  or indirectly,  the  price of some
consumer goods,  generating  consumer  surplus.  Furthermore,  the disclosure  inherent  in
the  patent process  furnishes  a knowledge  externality,  as mentioned  above.  In  short,
23monetary  returns do not necessary  constitute  adequate  rewards  for invention,  even  in
some  cases  where a strong patent is obtained.  In  these cases,  public employment  of
researchers,  and/or other incentives  such  as prestige might be  beneficial.
Second,  it would be  a grave  mistake  to conclude  that without the recent
innovation  in  biological research  property  rights  the university  research  contribution  to
private research  activity would  be negligible.  As Nelson  (1986) concluded  from  a
1984  survey of research  managers  by Levin  et al.,  the role of university research  is
especially  important in  biologically-based  industries  (p.  187).  More generally,
"university  research rarely  in  itself generates  new technology;  rather it enhances
technological  opportunities  and the  productivity of private  research and development,
in a way that  induces firms  to  spend more both  in the industry  in question and
upstream"  (p.188).  This stimulation  is at least partially  local.  As Jaffee  (1989)  and
Acs et al.  (1992)  show, states  with  high university  research  expenditures  also have
more  industry research expenditures,  more  patents,  and  more reported  innovations.
The locations of Silicon  Valley,  the Route  128  area near Boston,  and the emerging
biotechnology  industries  near Berkeley and Davis  support this view.  As  argued  above,
the spread of university patenting  of life forms  should expand  this complementarity,
especially  in  biological applications  including agriculture,  while also increasing  the
direct role of universities  in  the generation  of new  technology
5.3  Cash  Cows?
As  we have  seen,  the sale  of research  products  can  be a  multimillion dollar
enterprise  for universities.  The funds can  help  retain productive  researchers  who
24might otherwise  go  to  industry,  and can  also augment  the university'  resources.  But
one  should keep a realistic view  of the possibilities  here.  Stanford is singularly
successful  in this  research  marketing  area.  Yet Stanford  gets  only about  11  percent  of
its budget  from industry  (Postlewait,  Parker  and Zilberman).
6.  Conclusions
The agricultural  research  system is facing  fundamental  changes  in  the  nature
and  complexity  of its  challenges  and its opportunities.  We  can expect  that this  will
result in  less vertical integration  of public research  in  several  areas including
production  of new plant  varieties,  leaving a greater role for the  private  sector in
applied research.
In other areas,  the role  of university  research  and extension  may  well expand.
Many  of the coming  social  demands  can  be met only  if complex  innovations  are
achieved  in institutions  and policies.  The university,  in addition to  furnishing new
technologies,  should facilitate the  debate on  options  and help  shape  the  necessary
institutional  adaptations.  In  informing  people  about  alternative  risky choices,  for
example  pesticide versus  irradiation  to preserve  foods,  the university  should exploit  its
educational  role in  teaching  and extension,  as well  as  its research  capabilities.
The  new opportunities  bring  with them new  management challenges.  The
potential  for private  gains  from research  property rights  must  be handled  carefully.  Its
introduction  of market  signals for researchers  will  be a very  positive  development  if it
is not allowed  to  distract them  unduly  from teaching,  advising  and collaborative
25research  activities  with a  less direct  financial reward.  To ensure  that the latter does
not happen,  careful research  is warranted  regarding  the structure  of license-sharing
arrangements  and the determination  of relative  research  contributions  from
collaborative projects.
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32PRIORITY  SETTING IN A STATE AGRICULTURAL  EXPERIMENT  STATION:
SHIFTING PARADIGMS
Bill R. Baumgardt
Director  of Agricultural  Research
Purdue University
West Lafayette IN
"There are many  interesting research  problems.
Some of them are important."
Richard  Bradfield
(Taken from introduction by  Vernon W. Ruttan,  in
Agricultural Research Policy.)2
Introduction
When I was an undergraduate  at Purdue University in the mid-1950s,  I first met the
director of an Agricultural  Experiment Station (AES).  I held several jobs to support
myself and family.  One of them was helping with research on forages and dairy
cattle nutrition, both in the laboratory and in the field.  On this particular summer
day I was at the Purdue dairy center working in the field with dairy cows on an
intensive  experiment  comparing  forage management  systems of continuous
grazing, daily strip grazing and green chopping of forage.  The project was co-led by
Professor G. O. Mott of agronomy and Professor D. L. Hill of the dairy husbandry
department.  On this hot summer afternoon they had brought AES Director
Norman J.  Volk and a dairyman  from Indiana to see the project in action.  They
even asked me, the lowly student worker, to tell what I was doing on the project.  I
learned some time later that they had a request in to Director Volk for additional
funds for the project.  Apparently Director Volk was favorably impressed by their
proposal because he approved the request for funding.  The project went on and  I
continued to have a job.  This simple story suggests at least four things: (1) the AES
Director was important;  (2) he had control of funds; (3) he had the authority to act
on his judgments; and (4)  he was interested in the input of a farmer-user.
Let me point to another example of the former paradigm for priority setting,
this one  from proceedings  of the 100th anniversary  of the Wisconsin  Agricultural
Experiment Station:  "The attitude  here at Wisconsin was best expressed in the
words of Professor E. B. Hart - that the station worker in cooperation with the
station director take a practical farm problem  of importance  in a local region or state
and then dig as deep  as he can in science to find the answer to the problem."
(emphasis mine)  Let me hasten to add that I happen to believe that there is much
merit in this philosophy.  I hope that when translated into contemporary  terms, it
still can be the foundation  of the AES process.  However, much has changed from
those  simpler  times.
Another example of priority setting is the PIPD, or Problem Identification,
Program/Project  Development system used effectively at some SAES.  In this system
the AES administrators  and scientists seek input from  clientele as well as extension
workers and station scientists to get input for identifying  high priority problems.
Then, by sitting down together, they develop projects to address those problems.
There  is a risk associated with such a close  linkage and implied  immediacy of
response.  Caution should be used in entering  into such a planning and program
identification  process unless you have control of the resources  and are prepared to
respond  positively!
I am suggesting that in the new paradigm  (which I'll discuss  in some detail
later) we go outside to learn real world problems and link that with a joint effort to
seek help in attracting funds to address the problems.
This experiment  station system, based largely on federal  (Hatch and McIntire-
Stennis)  formula  funds plus state funds, and near  autonomy of the director, was
very productive.  However, the paradigm  has shifted for some  SAES,  is shifting for
23 many others, and likely will shift for all by the year 2000.  In my view these shifts are
not inherently  either good or bad.  They simply are reality and our challenge  is to
deal effectively with them to identify  the high priority problems and assist in
obtaining  funds to address them.
With that hint of how I  intend to approach my assignment, let me make just three
introductory points:
1) I don't pretend to have the formula  for setting priorities  in State Agricultural
Experiment  Stations  (SAES).  Even the ideas I will be sharing with you certainly are
not mine alone, but a composite  of where I'm at in my synthesis  and thinking
process.
2) I will talk about some key components of a priority setting process which seem to
me to be important wherever we may be.
3) Priority setting, in terms  of both parameters and process, has changed  and likely
will be dramatically different tomorrow than it is today.  I suggest that our challenge
is to be prepared  "to do the best of things in the worst of times."
Changes and Impacts
Of course many things have changed  over the years.  Here are just a few that come
to mind:
- In the 1950s to 70s, AES funding was largely federal formula funds and state funds.
- Today more  sources are involved and many of them priority  setting implications.
- Funds directly to a Station are more limited and restricted.
- Directors have less "power" in the sense that funds controlled  represents power.
- The priority setting process is more complex and there are many more
stakeholders.
- SAES are not nearly as centrally managed (and funded) as are the USDA
Agricultural  Research  Service  (ARS) laboratories  and international  centers.
- Science has greatly advanced and has become much more sophisticated  and
expensive  to conduct.
- An expanded. more diverse groups of stakeholders  are asking questions, such as:
-is  too much emphasis  is being placed  on research at the expense of teaching.
-what about public vs. private roles.
-is too much emphasis  is being placed  on "farming"  at the expense of neglecting
other increasingly  visible  areas related  to our mission (and where our graduates
go for employment!).  Here I'm thinking of things like: diet and health; food
safety; environment  and water quality; waste management  etc.
Need to be cognizant  of such concerns  and to recognize that these priority
issues must be evaluated  as well.
[There is something of a paradox here.  Farming or production agriculture
makes up less than 3% of the food and agricultural sector, but still has more
"clout"  than that in terms of getting things  done.]
These changes  have several  impacts relevant  to priority setting and implementation
in SAESs today.
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- Less ability to fully fund research projects out of resources  controlled by the AES.
- More emphasis on using the limited  flexible resources  to "jump start" programs  of
new faculty members,  provide start-up packages,  and as matching requirements  to
get additional funds.
- Greater  reliance  on outside funds, which  dampens any singular effort or plan to set
priorities.
Priority Setting
Needs and opportunities always  exist.  Research is conducted  on some topics
and not on others.  Priorities are always there; the question is who selects them.
Without a well thought  out timely plan, pressures  are in charge  and the present gets
undue attention, not the future;  fighting brush fires become the priority of the day;
defense is the game, not offense; infighting rules, not meeting outside needs, threats
and  opportunities.
Levels  of Priority Decision  Makingi  At this point I'll simply introduce this topic, so
we all can think about as we examine  the process in more detail  in the remainder of
this paper.
- National  level
The process of priority setting and establishing categories for funding tends to
be more long-term considering impact and appropriation of funds.  The SAES
community expends  considerable  time and effort by  in "tending" the system.
There have been some big payoffs  for the efforts.  For example, the start of the
competitive  grants program in 1977 and the influx of additional funds for
biotechnology  in 1985.  This program was grown further with the initiation of the
National  Research Initiative  (NRI) in 1991.  The Water Quality  Special grant is
another example  of the success of initiatives by the Land Grant Agriculture
community.  While there has been debate about whether emphasis should  be placed
on "formula funds" or "competitive grants",  it is interesting  to note that in recent
years the only times there have been increases in formula funding was  in those
years where a  major competitive grant program was started or "grown".  Although
arguments  showing the importance  of, and impressive  returns  from  formula  funds,
Congress  has favored  research funding options where they have more control over
the agenda.
- State and Local
Some states realized significant  growth in state funding for AES during late
70s and early 80s
Unfortunately  not all of it has "stuck"  as states got into fiscal trouble.
However,  it a very critical point today, whether to maintain what we have or
in some cases to actually capture some growth.
- A simple outline of various kinds of funds used  in AES programs is shown in
Table  1:  "Funding Sources  and Uses"
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Principal strategies
Next I would  like to discuss some of the critical points  for "priority setting" in
these  times of shifting paradigms.
Mission.
The first and foremost strategic decision which each SAES must make  is
determination  of its purpose  or mission.  Failure  to determine  that and  determine  it
well leaves the SAES with no focal point or central  thrust for lining up the
organization's  energies  and resources  to accomplish  the most desirable ends. We
need  to realize  that an organization  cannot  really determine  its mission or purpose
in isolation;  the client  or  "customer"  makes this determination!  Therefore,  to be
effective  in developing our mission statements  and subsequent strategies and tactics
we must proceed  from the outside  (the client and the world  in which we must
operate)  to the inside (management's response to the client's needs and wants).
(McConkey,  1981)
To determine the mission of any organization  it is necessary  to carefully answer
three  major questions:
1. What is our present purpose?
2. How will the future impact on our present purpose if we make no changes?
3.  What should  our purpose become?
(Of these, number two is more important than number  one and number three is
the critical one.)
Infrastructure  at the strategic level.
Where and how to allocate scarce,  flexible resources,  or base funding in the AES, is
key.  By this I mean faculty,  facilities, and core operating budgets.  Since most
universities and SAES  are in a re-allocation  rather than in a growth mode, it is
important to make  such decisions at "targets of opportunity"  when transitions  can
be least disruptive  to the "losers."
Strategic Allocation of Faculty Positions:
- Faculty members (or AES scientists,  if you prefer - I'll come back to this distinction
later) comprise  the "engine" which powers the entire system.  Thus wise  allocation
of scarce faculty positions is critical.
Deciding which areas of expertise  to capture in a faculty position is key area for
strategic  placement of resources.  The impact is long-term because a faculty member
(and the area of expertise carried with that person) may be with us for 25 years or
more.
In our Purdue Agriculture system, all open positions created  by retirements
or persons leaving the university for any reason, revert to the Dean's office.  To
prepare for the strategic allocation of scarce faculty positions, departments have
developed long-term  (10-year)  staffing plans and they are asked to update them
periodically.  Once (or in good times, perhaps twice) per year department heads are
invited  to submit their high priority requests  for positions,  along with justification.
The Dean and Directors make decisions about which positions will be allocated.
Occasionally,  a very high priority position will be  acted upon immediately  upon
learning of the (impending) vacancy, but that is rare.  Any downsizing  (rightsizing)
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that is to occur is accomplished  by decreasing the number of positions in the pool,
not by making such decisions on a position by position basis as the vacancy occurs.
Thus, departments  technically  do not have "open positions" until  a position  is (re-)
allocated  to them.  Also, they have not lost any specific positions;  it may not have
been requested, it may be a possibility for later consideration  etc., but positions are
not collapsed  at the Department level by this system of allocating scarce faculty
positions.
Now  let us get on with factors involved  in the process of deciding which positions
are to be allocated.  Areas  of expertise needed for the teaching function may be the
more important driver, or the aspect receiving  first consideration  today.  Guidelines
I use in evaluating the priority of the position for my input in terms of the priority
of research  component of a position (especially  if more that  25% time assignment to
research)  include the  following:
*  Importance  and likely impact of area.
*  Needs of clientele and users.
*  Opportunities in science and technology anticipated for the specific field.
*  Availability of infrastructure  - equipment,  facilities,  appropriate space  (and
start-up  funds).
*  Opportunity  for outside support to develop  and sustain a productive
research  program.
A more detailed  version of this list in the format of an evaluation  guide is shown in
Table 2.
Selecting  the individual  faculty member.
- Some traits may be universally required, but many have to be specific to the
position.
- Overall, priority is given to:
*  Excellence  in their field.
*  Evidence  of strong productivity
*  Communication  abilities  (and ability to relate  their work to a variety of
audiences).
*  Entrepreneur with a team spirit.
- A self starter who can develop nationally recognized  programs.
- Yet, one who will work effectively  as a team member for at least part of
their research.
*  Ability  to handle multiple responsibilities.
- Education  and research
- More than one area  at a time.  (For example, to conduct basic and applied
projects at the same time;  individual project  and a team project.)
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A candidate for a faculty position in the plant sciences  area that we were
interviewing recently described the situation rather nicely.  I had asked her a
question about how she would select particular  specific problems to work on.  She
responded, "There  is a tendency for scientists, especially recent graduates or post-
docs, to think, well I have these abilities,  techniques, capabilities, let's see what
problem  I can find to use them on."  She added that she believes it would be much
better to go out and listen to what the problems (of farmers) are, and then design
investigations  to solve those problems.
She had the insight to add, "I'd better go out and tell people what I'm doing
If people don't know what you're doing, they may think you're dispensable."  I
would simply add, that statement applies as well to research programs as it does to
individual  faculty members!  More vigorous  approaches  to informing  clientele  and
the  general public about what we're  accomplishing to help them are necessary.  We
need to capture  and communicate  the excitement  and relevance  of discovery.
Faculty members or Station Scientists?
There  are significant  differences  in philosophies  and  operational models
among the Land-grant  colleges  of Agriculture  and each institution must address this
issue in their own context.  However, it is becoming much more common for an
individual to carry responsibilities  in two of the functional areas  of teaching,
research and extension.  Or to put it another way, it is common for an individual to
have responsibilities for both education  and discovery.
Faculty members participating in the AES at Purdue (and I believe in most
settings) must be  "complete"  faculty members  in context of the definition
appropriate  for each of our respective universities.  Most AES Scientists (i.e. faculty
members with AES appointments)  also have a  responsibility to participate in
education (classroom  teaching and/or extension education).  It is generally accepted
that teaching is the fundamental function  for a college or university.  Over time,
some so-called "research  universities"  developed  a pattern where some  faculty did
not teach, spending all their time on research and related  scholarly  activities.  On
the other hand, most predominately  teaching colleges  and universities  have
expected  their faculty members not only to teach, but also to be involved  in some
research  or scholarly activity.
In the new paradigm, I believe that every faculty member - even those at
research universities or with an AES appointment  - will be expected  to participate
more fully in the education mission.  It seems to me that this is an appropriate
expectation.  But, considering the purposes  of this paper, I do not wish to digress
into a discussion of the synergism between research  and teaching.
Rather,  I would like to focus on the unique research responsibilities  of a
faculty member with an AES appointment.  Such a faculty member is expected  to do
more than simply "conduct research"  and to obtain some funds to conduct  research
or engage in a scholarly activity of his/her choosing.  The AES faculty member
already has part of his/her salary paid and time assigned to conduct research.  It is
part of the contract for such an appointment.  In addition, that research is to be
directed  to jointly determined  thrusts.  This is done not to stifle creativity, but to
provide focus.  Creativity should be encouraged and rewarded.  Changes in the
defined thrust can be made by means of revisions in the AES projects.  I would
78 suggest that the  AES faculty  members have fundamental  responsibility  for the kinds
of research related activities listed here.  Note,  a specific  faculty member may be
involved in 1 and/or 2, and/or 3, but all will be expected to be involved  in 4 and 5.
1) Mission oriented basic research
2) Applied research  and site specific  systems development.
3) Consumer-report  type research activities.
4) Educating and training graduate students
5)  Communicating  to a variety of "publics"  (and not just to colleagues).
Operating Resources.
The level of operating resources  and funds to put around  faculty members  is
another  important component  of infrastructure.  Strategic  decisions  in this area  also
are critical.  The funding process used at Purdue places most of the core or base
funding in the departments.  The department head has responsibility to allocate and
manage those resources  in the context of that departments research program as
defined by their AES projects.
The cost of conducting research varies among the disciplines  encompassed  by
agriculture.  This needs to be taken into account when an AES  Director evaluates
the equity of funding provided  to various departments.  I have developed some
estimates  of costs by discipline/department,  starting with expenditures data for
several SAES and making some adjustments based on known  anomalies.  More
precise estimates  of the cost by discipline would be very helpful.  Part of the charge  I
was given when invited  to prepare this paper, was to identify areas where the NC-
208 Regional Research committee  could  contribute to the priority setting process.
Here is one example.  We need better estimates of the cost of doing research  in
various  disciplines  and in department  composites.
Another strategic decision which must be made is the allocation  of scarce
resources  to faculty positions versus  operating funds.  Institutions  vary in the
flexibility that exists at the College or Station level.  In situations where the College
has significant  flexibility in moving funds between positions and operating funds, a
critical strategic  question is,  "At what point should some faculty positions be
eliminated  and the funds re-allocated  to support programs and projects?"  It was
noted that faculty is the engine  which drives the research  machine, not only in
terms of creativity and productivity, but also in getting grants!  But at what point on
the curve of shrinking  resources  available to put around  faculty members  to make
them  productive  (and somewhat direct the research program)  should the decision
be made to decrease  the size of the engine in order to fuel it for more effective
operation?  Not at all an easy decision, but one that is crucial!
Multi-State Programming.
Another strategy which needs to be considered  is to build and expand  on
Regional  research,  developing  innovative  ways to  enhance multi-state
programming.  Typically  in regional research a topic or problem is identified  and
then  the Stations  divide up the effort for solving  the problem.  Regional  research
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often involves most all of the states in the region and increasingly  may involve
Stations from other regions  as well.
Alternative models  for multi-state planning should be pursued.  In terms  of
alternatives  to regional research,  there are (at least)  two other kinds  of Multi-State
Planning needs, usually involving 2 to 4 contiguous states who may choose  to get
together and target areas to:
(1) Cooperate by picking different parts of the puzzle on which to work, OR
(2) Cooperate by agreeing to work on different puzzles.
Such bordering state coalitions require a shared vision for a need to get together and
seriously consider how to do things more efficiently.
(1) Pursue, and ultimately agree  on, problem and model to be pursued.
(2) Develop  truly integrated efforts in specifically  targeted  areas.  May involve
both research  and extension  and perhaps teaching.
(3) The process often may start with discussions among Deans and  /or
Directors.
(4) Next need to get together with department heads.  Keep faculty informed
by each department head and invite input and ideas.
(5) Faculty planning and implementation  (with appropriate  administrators  to
facilitate and to uphold the pledge).
(6) Note, some of these activities  could go the route of establishing regional
research projects, but the appropriateness  of keeping linkages from targeted states
need to be met.  It may be difficult under the formal  regional research system to
achieve  some of the flexibility and speed of response required by the "virtual
corporation".
NOTE, THE MODEL:  the "Virtual  Corporation". book by William H. Davidow  and
Michael  S. Malone  (1992)  (Also highlighted  in Business Week,  February  8,  1993,
cover story on pp. 98-103)  The Virtual Corporation can be defined as a temporary
network of companies  that come together quickly to exploit fast-changing
opportunities.  It can be the ultimate in adaptability.
The key attributes of such an organization are: (1) Excellence;  (2) Technology;
(3) Opportunism  (partnerships will be  less permanent, less formal, and more
opportunistic);  (4)  Trust (these relationships make companies  far more reliant on
each other and require  far more trust than ever before ); (5)  No borders.
Capitalize on contemporary issues and concerns.
Agricultural research needs to be both forward looking  (basic research) and also
active in solving the important problems of the day (applied and adaptive  research).
Thus, it is obvious that the leaders and scientists have a  responsibility to conduct
research  on problems of concern.
However,  there is another reason to vigorously  address  contemporary  issues and
concerns.  Agriculture  no longer has the political clout it once had.  To gain the
public and political support necessary to achieve  research funding, it is necessary to
build coalitions  with groups who have captured  the imagination  of large segments
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of the general population.  Current high priority issues include the environment;
food  safety, diet and health;  competitiveness;  rural community and economic
development;  and upgrading  skills of individual  citizens.  Most of the disciplines
within Agricultural  Experiment Stations can participate  in productive  research
addressing these problems.  It is especially critical that we build coalitions to develop
plans to address  these contemporary  issues and concerns.
Building an Empowering  a Constituency within the State.
The following  discussion is based  on a presentation I made to the New Directors'
Workshop  sponsored by USDA-CSRS  in Washington,  D.C.  on April 22,  1992.
I don't pretend to claim credit for the ideas and concepts described here.  Rather, I'll
relate principles and examples that I have observed and been associated with.
Each institution has a structure and situation unique  to their respective  state.
Specific plans, strategies and actions must be developed within the specific  context.
For purposes  of this paper I will simply outline some of the important principles
that seem to me to be fundamental to success  in building and empowering  a
constituency.
I.  What is the essence  of building a constituency?  Communicate:
- In the real estate business it is said that three things are important:  Location,
Location and Location.
- In advocacy efforts for a public entity such as an AES, three things are important:
Communication.  Communication  and  Communication.  It is extremely
important to remember that communication means,  "-  - the interchange of
concerns,  opinions,  and  information  - -."  Thus,  communication  must involve
listening as much as talking.
1) Communication:  Ask, learn, know the concerns  of those we  exist to serve and
whose support we need.
In terms of both the "need to" and the "how  to" of listening to our customers,
I refer you to a paper written by John Gerber, while he was Assistant Director of
the Illinois AES.
Tom Peters (of In Search of Excellence fame) writes, "to begin with, good
listeners get out from behind the desk.  Good listeners construct settings so as to
maximize naive listening, the undistorted  sort."  Similarly  we need to get out
with our "customers"  and listen to their interests and concerns.
2) Communication:  Develop  a crisp plan of how your group (AES)  can be an
important part of the solution to the problems  they see.
3) Communication:  Tell them clearly  and simply what you propose  to do and
learn.
4) Communication:  After you get the funds/support,  inform them what you are
doing.  No, better yet, tell them what you are learning.  Update often.  Provide
brief vignettes  of what is being learned in appropriate  AES newsletters  and
reports  and as handouts at meetings around the state..
5)  Communication:  Inform them of what has been learned and how they can
adapt the findings  to their situation.  (Even whether or not it might fit their
situation.)
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important to maintain contacts especially when you don't want them to do
anything.  One of the key reasons  (Applies to legislators, their staffs, and to user
or support groups.)
7) Opportunities can be created to keep clientele  informed  and seek their input
on various  relevant processes.  For example,  ESCOP has an elaborate planning
process  to develop  research priorities  (which are then inserted  into the Joint
Council and the  USDA planning and budget development  processes).  The SAES directors vote to develop the final ranking for ESCOP each year.  I have found it helpful to  seek input from various  groups in Indiana  in terms of ranking these
priorities.
II. Build trust and credibility:
- To be successful,  an advocacy effort has to be built on trust and credibility.
- Be positive
- Don't over commit or promise more than can be delivered  (for the dollars
available/being asked for etc.).  To do so essentially guarantees failure at some
point in the future.
- Programs need to be relevant.  Show what can be accomplished  to help  them; to
solve problems  and address issues of concern; to prepare them for future
challenges.
Note, many kinds of research are relevant, but it must be presented  that way!
- Get back to people; let them know that things are happening
III. Empower others:
- Key actions: Identify, Listen, Energize.
- Build coalitions,  not only with traditional  clientele,  but also with larger
segments of society.  (In most cases,  it is no longer possible for a few university
administrators to get agreement  of the presidents  of one or two farm
organizations and then to be sure that good things will happen.)
- Building coalitions requires  time, patience,  and communication.
IV. Create a vision and develop a plan:
-Can one plan for an effective  advocacy program by an empowered  constituency?
-Yes, but I've saved that to last because my bias is that for a plan to be successful
one must know the critical elements of the process you are about.
-Therefore,  I chose not to approach this activity as a planning exercise, but rather
to suggest some of the elements  which in my judgment are critical.
-In the case of the "Crossroads 90" agricultural research  and extension  funding
initiative in Indiana,  Dean Thompson and  key leaders  of the "Coalition" of 45
organizations  developed  the "vision" and  empowered  many to "charge on."
Information Needed  to Make the Priority Setting Process More Effective
Priority setting  is never  easy and much of it is subjective.  The development  of
several kinds of information would enhance  the objectivity  of the process  and make it more reliable.  Several  of the needs identified here could be developed by the NC-
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208 Committee.  Development of the benchmark data and estimates  of the impacts
as listed her would be very useful.
Support costs
It would be useful to have reliable estimates (median and range) of the costs
of conducting research by discipline and/or department.  It would be most useful to
have such data presented both as total costs and then also as total support costs
minus  faculty salaries,  all on a research  FTE basis.  Presenting these as index values,
or per cent of the overall mean would be most useful.  Data classifications should
include "hard funds" (state and federal  formula); grant and contract; and other;  as
well as total for all sources.
Access to reliable data of costs of doing research by discipline would provide
one index to aid Directors in the equitable allocation of scarce resources ("hard
funds") among departments in the AES.  Furthermore, it would provide a more
objective means  of measuring the relative degree of success in getting outside funds
by discipline or department.  CRIS data from the USDA system could be a useful
source for arriving at some of the information (raw data) needed to calculate the
index costs of doing research.  Additional specific data might be obtained by
surveying  SAES  Directors.
Alternate funding sources
It would be helpful to have benchmark data on what sources of outside funds
are typically available to faculty in various disciplines.  The data should include the
average  size "grant" and the total outside funds per research  FTE, by discipline.
Accomplishments
Individual Stations  and the total agricultural research system need to
improve  their effectiveness  in communicating  with many  audiences  concerning
what was accomplished  with the investment in agricultural  research.  Too  often the
"annual reports" of AES research tell what was done rather than what was learned.
And, the reports often are too detailed  for most audiences.  There is a great need to
develop crisp, readable vignettes of what was learned or accomplished  from research
projects.
Impacts
This committee  should be in an ideal position to lead an effort to further
develop methodology  for making ex ante  impact assessments of doing particular
kinds of research.  The assessments should  include  social and environmental  as well
as economic impacts.
Furthermore,  it would be valuable  to provide estimates  of economic impact
of NOT doing the research  in U.S.  (vs. doing it).  Agricultural  economists  can
provide estimates of the impact of doing or not doing specific kinds of research.
Some real examples should be studied and should  include the impacts of learning
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14TABLE 1
AGRICULTURAL  RESEARCH FUNDING  CATEGORIES AND  USES
Federal formula (Hatch, McIntire-Stennis, Animal Health) and State match:
Infrastructure and core competencies of expertise.
*Project funds for priority state, regional and national needs  (Shrinking!)
Federal Competitive  Grants  (eg, USDA-NRI, NSF, NIH)
*Targeted basic research
State Special  Lines:
High priority state problems;
*Systems; Cost reducing; Site specific etc.
Federal Special Grants:
*High priority regional and national problems
Industry Grants and Contracts:
*Usually product oriented
*Often linked in terms of moving discoveries (of public and private sectors) to users.
*Consumer Reports type function
Commodity Market Development  and Research programs ("Check-Off"):
*High priority needs perceived by producer community
*Often product, new use, and market oriented (Sometimes forbid "production"
research)
15TABLE 2
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING  LONG-RANGE  STAFFING PRIORITIES
FROM A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
EVALUATING  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SPECIFIC RESEARCH AREAS
(an aid in targeting areas for future growth)
FACTOR  Evaluative Criteria  Rating Categories
RESOURCES  Faculty expertise  Exceptional, Strong, Adequate,Weak
Quality of graduate students  High, Medium, Low
Availability of graduate students  Good, Poor
Quality of equipment & facilities  Excellent, Adequate, Insufficient
Quantity of equipment & facilities  Excellent, Adequate, Insufficient
IMPORTANCE  Centrality of mission  Yes, No
Importance to users  High, Medium, Low
Progress potential  High, Medium, Low
Demand for graduates  High, Medium, Low
Contribution to graduate education  High, Medium, Low
Comparative advantage  Yes, No
FUNDING  Cost of this research  Low, Medium, High
Cross-disciplinary potential  High, Low
Grant funding potential  Good, Adequate, Poor
Industry funding potential  Good, Adequate, Poor
Priority for reallocated funds  High, Low
Likelihood for new State funds  High, Low
Other sources of funding  (Listing)
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in the United  States:  Current Directions  and Likely Impact
By Wallace E. Huffman  and Richard E. Just*
In the United States,  the public and  private sectors  are major institutions in the agricultural
research  and  development system.  This is in contrast to developing  countries where private R&D  is
almost nonexistent.  Huffman  and Evenson (1993,  Table 4.1)  estimate that U.S.  total public and
private agricultural research and development  expenditures  were $3.9 billion in  1980 (in  1984
research  dollars) with 40 percent  due to public  research activities.  In 1990,  total public and private
agricultural  R&D expenditures  had  grown to  $4.8 billion (in  1984 research  dollars) with only 34
percent  in the public sector.  Thus,  even before the most recent economic hard times of land-grant
universities,  the relative  importance of public R&D  in total U.S.  agricultural  R&D had fallen
significantly.  Although the early  1980s  was  also a period of general economic hard times in
agricultural  states, total  state agricultural  experiment station (SAES)  expenditures on agricultural
research  were  13 percent higher  in real terms  in  1988 than  in 1980.  Since then a decline in total
real SAES  funds has  occurred.
Although  the U.S.  public agricultural  research  and  extension system has faced  periodic
scrutiny  and criticism  since the 1970s  (e.g.,  Hightower  1973;  Office  of Technology  Assessment  1981;
Rockefeller Foundation  1982),  new concerns  about structure,  management,  and funding have been
raised recently  (Office of Technology  Assessment  1992;  Chubin 1992)  which  suggest possible new
* The authors are  professors  at Iowa State University and the University  of Maryland,
respectively.  Helpful  comments were made by Peter Orazem  as well as participants  in a session
on  this topic at the  1992  AAEA meetings  in Baltimore.  We thank Larry Busch  and Bill  Lacy
for kindly making  data available  from a late 1970s survey of public sector agricultural  scientists
and  Ann Judd,  Yale University,  for carrying  out the statistical analysis.2
directions  in SAES  research.  Environmental  and  food safety concerns  have surfaced  with greater
intensity.  The decline  in the number of farms  and farm population slowed during the  1970s,  but
they declined  sharply again during the  1980s.  Production of agricultural commodities  has become
increasingly  concentrated regionally and in specialized  farming units that are much larger  and run
by increasingly sophisticated  farm businesses.
Within the agricultural economics profession,  concerns  have been expressed that SAES
research  has become too  "disciplinary"  and needs  to return to more effective linkages  between
research,  extension,  and teaching  (Bonnen  1983;  Schuh  1986).  Numerous  studies have confirmed
good overall rates of return to public agricultural  research  expenditures  (e.g.,  Ruttan  1982),  but
significant problems have been demonstrated with the allocation between pretechnology  and  applied
sciences  and between  plant and animal oriented research  (see Huffman  and Evenson  1993,  Table 9.1).
With the economic recession starting  in  1990 followed  by a slow recovery  and  reduced  real
expenditures by state governments  on SAES research  and extension and by the federal  government on
extension,  deans of colleges of agriculture and  directors of agricultural  experiment  stations and
cooperative  extension services have turned to generally tighter central  control with more emphasis  on
setting priorities,  review of proposals, and  management  (also see Office of Technology  Assessment
1991).  Some land-grant institutions have reorganized their structures to separate administration of
extension from teaching/research  or of extension/research  from teaching in order to enhance direct
relationships  with the field.  At the same  time, federal  funding of the land-grant system has  tended
to shift to  competitive grants and contracts,  and administrators have shifted  from resistance  to
encouraging pursuit of both public and  private grant and  contract funds.  These changes  raise a
number of issues about the future of agricultural  research and extension in the United States.3
In an earlier paper,  Just and Huffman  (1992)  presented some principles  dealing  with the
structure and management  of U.S.  agricultural  research  and  education.  This paper extends the
examination of new economic  and  political incentives facing  land-grant administrators  and agricultural
scientists  and presents econometric  evidence about the effects  of current  changes  in structure  and
management  of public agricultural  research on U.S.  agriculture.  First, some important  issues facing
land-grant agricultural  research and extension  are examined  and  then hypotheses  are formulated.
Second,  evidence is presented showing selected  organizational  and  structural characteristics  of SAES
research and  then econometric  evidence is presented showing what determines structure  and
management  of SAES  research  and how structure,  management,  and  funding of SAES research  affect
state agricultural  multifactor productivity.  While measures  of performance other than multifactor
agricultural  productivity may  be important  and of interest (e.g.,  number of scientists trained,  effects
on  environmental quality),  we leave those areas of inquiry to future investigations.
Some Important Issues
Vertical Integration of Science
Bonnen (1986),  Schuh (1986),  and others have argued  that the land-grant system has become
unresponsive  and SAES  research has  become  "too disciplinary"  in its orientation.  They argue that the
activities  in each of the fields or departments  supported by colleges  of agriculture and agricultural
experiment stations have become increasingly  focused on output indicators  and rewards  cherished by
the  respective scientific societies,  e.g.,  journals of the American Agricultural  Economics Association,
American  Society of Agronomy,  etc.  These  arguments focus  on horizontal  linkage of the applied
agricultural  disciplines,  including activities  in teaching,  research,  and  extension.14
From another perspective,  the agricultural  disciplines may  be viewed  as  inadequately  linked
vertically.  That is,  U.S.  agricultural  R&D  is part of a much larger public and private R&D system.
Strong upstream linkages to the general  sciences and the parent disciplines which produce the
knowledge that fuels pretechnology sciences and  downstream technology  development  in agriculture
may  be needed.2 Huffman  and Evenson (1993)  argue that these vertical linkages  among disciplines
need strengthening.  When applied agricultural  sciences become disconnected from pretechnology
sciences,  the flow of new innovations dries up rapidly.  For example,  weak ties of SAES research to
general  and pretechnology  sciences  was a barrier in the early  1980s to applications  of biotechnology
to  agriculture.  Both vertical and  horizontal linkages  appear to be required  in order to have a long-
term  successful  science and technology  system.  In order to identify changes  that enhance the
organization of the public system, perspective  is needed on how the general R&D system functions
and how public agricultural research fits into this larger system.
Hypothesis  1.  Integration of pretechnology  and  applied sciences  and  extension
activities does  not enhance  public agricultural  research  productivity.
Formulas,  Grants,  and Earmarks:  Allocations  of Federal Funds
Arguments  for and  against both formula  and  competitive grant funding of SAES research  have
been  made for many years (Rockefeller  Foundation  1982;  National  Research Council  1989;  Office  of
Technology  Assessment  1991).  Issues raised  by federal earmarked  funding of research have surfaced
largely  during the  1980s (Office  of Technology  Assessment  1991,  p.  86-93).  Anticipating the
political-economic  incentives of different funding mechanisms  is more slippery than most writers
acknowledge.  Formula funding  is  a type of categorical  or block-grant disbursement of federal  funds
to States,  which  has  considerable discretion in use.  In federal  formula-supported  research,  typically a
state government  employee  (SAES  director,  department  chair,  or scientist) decides  the exact nature of
the research  that  is to be undertaken subject to broad guidelines of the enabling legislation.  The5
Hatch  Act provided for the first formula-funded  state research.  It is sometimes  argued that formula-
funded  research has  weak ties to science  and produces  too much duplicative and pedantic  activity
(e.g.,  Rockefeller Foundation  1982;  Office of Technology Assessment  1992).  Other  evidence shows
higher  output rates of human capital (doctorates)  and  some types of publications  (Office of
Technology  Assessment  1992,  p.  423).
Competitive grant  funding through  a merit or peer review process is usually a multistage
activity.  Institutions that have funds to allocate solicit proposals from scientists and then reviews  of
the proposals  from scientific experts.  The experts are  generally asked to evaluate the scientific  merit
of the proposals  and the competency of the researcher(s).  Next, the proposals and  the reviews  are
evaluated  and  competing proposals are compared  and ranked  by a panel of experts.  This ranking
guides the disbursement of research  funds.  Because almost all institutions receive proposals for using
more funds  than are available,  the process is  competitive because only the most highly ranked projects
are  funded.  The primary  examples  of large merit or peer-review  research  programs  in the United
States are those of the National  Science Foundation and  National Institutes of Health  (Office of
Technology Assessment  1991).  The National Research  Initiative of the USDA-CSRS  is also a peer-
review program.
The merit  or peer-review  system has several  characteristics  argued to be advantages  and
others that are disadvantages.  Proponents  claim that (1) experts used  in the reviewing and ranking
process  are highly knowledgeable  and make good absolute and relative judgements  about the scientific
merit and competency  of principal  investigators,  (2) only high quality proposals and  competent
researchers  are funded,  and (3) research  funds can easily be  channeled  into new  areas.  However,  the
merit or peer review  process  also appears  to have disadvantages.  First,  the disbursement of federal
research  funds supporting peer-review  programs  is  concentrated  in relatively few  institutions and
states  (Office  of Technology  Assessment  1991,  p.  125-26).  Second,  Chubin and  Hackett  (1990) have6
documented that peer-review  processes  are burdened with many hidden and major conflicts  of interest
that tend to subvert the process  and make  it political.  Experts and  review panels  make evaluations
that cannot be refuted by principal  investigators,  panels tend to take narrow views of acceptable
procedures  and  rank too highly proposals of "friends  and associates."  Third, the proposal writing and
evaluating process  consumes large amounts  of scientists'  time that could be  allocated to other
productive activities.
Academic  earmarking,  sometimes  called pork-barrel  funding, provides funds  for particular
research projects directly allocated by Congress,  are not subjected to peer review,  and are not
competitively awarded  (Office of Technology  Assessment  1991,  p.  87).  These funds  have grown
rapidly since  1980  and  apparently  have been used  by universities to build major new research
facilities, to undertake  large research projects than otherwise would not have been undertaken,  and  to
add  significantly to research capacity in new  areas or regions.  Academic  earmarks  are a channel  by
which  some institutions and states may be  able to  expand their research  capacity quickly  and
ultimately become more competitive  in peer reviewed proposals (e.g.,  the Soil Tilth Center  at Iowa
State University,  the Soybean Laboratory  at the University of Illinois).  Some groups see
disadvantages  of earmarks  from politizing science,  reducing the average  quality of research,  and
diverting research funds  away  from federal peer-review  or formula research programs  (Office of
Technology  Assessment  1991,  p.  88).
In reality,  all  mechanisms  for allocating federal research funds suffer from political
considerations  whereby characteristics  other than scientific merit matter  (Chubin  1992);  and  formula,
competitive,  and  earmarked  funding each  contain some good and some bad incentives.  The net
advantages of a federal competitive-grants  system of agricultural  funding,  however,  may  be
exaggerated.  First, the competitive-grant  process places  a major  burden on agricultural scientists for
conducting  the reviews upon which  granting  decisions are made.  Bredahl,  Bryant,  and  Ruttan  (1982)7
note that the cost of entreprenuring  and managing  competitive grants falls mostly on the researchers
compared  to the cost of entreprenuring  and managing formula funds that falls mostly on
administrators.  Second,  less than 50 percent of all written proposals  (e.g.,  in the National Research
Initiative)  are awarded funds,  and  some of the time spent on these activities represent  socially wasted
resources.  Third,  the size of awarded grants is almost always significantly less than the marginal  cost
of a project,  which  means that resources from other sources  must be used to complete the project
(e.g.,  from time otherwise allocated to other research  projects,  teaching,  or  leisure).  Fourth, projects
are funded  for short duration (often for one year,  and never  more than five years)  although some
projects take  10 years or longer to  complete,  e.g.,  crop  rotation and beef-cattle  crossbreeding
experiments.  This causes  inefficiency  when successful  research  requires  a long-term sustained effort
or a group of scientists with specialized  skills.  Fifth,  institutions must generally carry out-dated
scientists on teaching appointments  and new scientists on "star"  scientists'  projects,  e.g.  as post-
doctoral  researchers  or research  associates.  Terminating  tenured  university (and government)
scientists  is just as difficult with competitive-grant  funding as with formula-funded  research.  Sixth,
the criteria for allocating federal  research funds have a political (or nonscientific) factor which
reduces the claimed advantages  for competitive-grant  funded agricultural  research.  Thus,  the issue of
whether to fund research  with  competitive grants,  formula funds,  or earmarked  funds  is difficult to
answer.  The answer may depend  on the particular circumstances.
Hypothesis 2.  Competitive grant funding and earmarked  funding of agricultural  land-
grant research  is  no more  productive than traditional  formula funding.
Managed Public Research
The production  of scientific discoveries  is  an area where  implicit contracts  rather than
elaborate  formal written contracts  dominate.  Short, formal  written  contracts generally  accompany8
inter-institution transfers  of funds  for research.  These contracts usually state in general terms that
some type of advance  in knowledge is to be attempted  and that a written report summarizing  the
activity  will be prepared  at the  end of the project.  Detailed contracts are almost always  impractical
because they are unenforceable.
Defining  contracts is a common labor-management  problem,  and managers  of firms in the
private sector  have found the most  efficient way to deal  with labor contacts  is to have implicit
contracts that create incentives  for "good performance,"  [e.g.,  rewards by promotion to  a position
with  more responsibility and higher rate of pay  (Elliott 1991;  Goldin  1990, p.  114-115)]. 3 Such
contracts represent  an application of Adam Smith's  "invisible hand" to R&D.  Application of this
principle by public research administrators  suggests developing  incentive schemes  to  insure diligence
and productivity toward long-term objectives.  Given the somewhat unspecified nature of most
scientific tasks,  public research  administrators  may enhance  research  productivity by establishing  clear
economic  incentives for their scientists by defining expectations  about the quantity and  quality of
outputs from the R&D activity  but leaving the exact choice and  specification  of the problems,  choice
of methods,  and timing of work to the scientists (Schultz  1985).
This principle goes against the top-down administration of scientists,  at least for discoveries  in
the general  and pretechnology  sciences.  It also suggests that elaborate research priority setting
activities are  likely to be unproductive because  they are both used and misused as instruments  of top-
down research  management.  In applied research  and technology development, on the other hand,  the
final product is more clearly  defined,  so administrators  at this level  might be more effective in top
down  management.  Heretofore,  however,  empirical  evidence has  not shown that one system is
definitely better  than another.
Hypothesis 3.  Top-down management of land-grant research  and development  is no
less productive than competitive  choice of problems  and methods by scientists in
response to financial and professional  incentives.9
Administrative Structure
The  administrative structure in the SAES system is quite different from the USDA.  Both
systems have been in place,  although changing,  for over  100 years.  The USDA's research  agencies
primarily have one large national research agenda and receive almost all of their research funds from
the federal government.  In contrast,  the  SAES system has more  than 50 different  research plans
associated  with about 50 separate agricultural  experiment stations at land-grant universities  (exceptions
are the New Haven station and  others in the U.S. Territories).  Although all SAESs receive
significant  CSRS-administered  funds (so-called  regular federal  funds),  are monitored  by CSRS,  and
frequently  cooperate with  USDA research  agencies,  the SAES system is mostly a state-run system
with more than 50%  of funding from state government appropriations.  In contrast to criticisms of
Schuh (1986;  1992),  Bonnen (1986),  Rockefeller  Foundation (1982)  and others of the SAES  system,
Schultz  (1985,  p.  15-17),  Ruttan  (1982),  and Huffman  and Evenson (1993)  conclude that the SAES
system has  been a relatively successful  system and  the future looks promising.
The primary  reason for success  of the SAES system appears to be its decentralized  nature
which provides sufficient  flexibility and incentives  to adapt  to local or state needs.  Specific  reasons
are:  (1) agricultural  technology  and  agricultural  problems are frequently geoclimatic-specific  so  each
state has  somewhat unique needs  which can be addressed  only by scientists working locally (Griliches
1960;  Evenson 1992),  (2) SAES researchers  are close enough to local  problems that their research can
help  to solve local  problems,  (3) the SAES  research  is located  in almost all  cases  in the center of a
scientific  community where advances  in science are occurring regularly,  and  (4) SAES research,
training  of new scientists,  and graduate education are conducted  as  complementary  activities that
facilitate  inter-field  and  inter-layer  scientific information exchange  (Huffman  and Evenson  1993,
Ch.  3).10
The SAES  in  every state,  as well  as the land-grant university  and  all other public institutions
in a democratic  society,  are continually facing competing social-political-economic  pressures  (Weimer
and Vining  1992).  Some of these pressures  come from the federal  government,  some from local  and
national clientele groups,  and some from their staff.  This is not a new phenomena facing state
agricultural  experiment stations  or land-grant universities,  which have responded  to such pressures
over a 100 year tradition (Huffman  and  Evenson  1993,  Ch.  1 and 9).  One perspective  is that public
institutions like the SAES  can survive over the long term only by responding  along lines suggested by
interest group theories of behavior  (see Becker  1983;  Reid  1977; Evenson and  Rose-Ackerman  1985).
However,  institutions should be structured so  social-political-economic  markets do not fail  due to
public  good characteristics  of scientific knowledge  or due to diversion of public resources to private
wealth enhancement  of public employees  and officials.  Because political  and administrative  careers
are short relative  to the length of time over which research  outputs have their impacts,  the political
process  can significantly  underinvest in general  and pretechnology  science relative to  applied science
and  other more immediate goods and services.
These  considerations  also give rise to  an interaction between public  research funding and  the
research  agenda.  These are reasons why federal formula,  competitive-grant  and earmarked  funding;
private sector  funding; selling new  innovations for profit; and  including clientele groups directly into
agenda setting  are burning issues in the SAES system today.  Methods  and sources of research  funds
invariably  affect  the incentives for particular types of work.  Also,  the environment  in  which scientists
work undoubtedly affects  their creativity  (Price  1986; Schultz  1985;  Berry  1980;  Bonnen  1986).4
Hypothesis  4.  The administrative  structure does not directly affect productivity of
public  research  and  extension.Hypothesis 5.  Administrative structure does not affect problem choice  and the allocation of
research  funds.
Empirical Evidence
Before presenting statistical analysis,  we first present some variables used to measure
structure, management,  and  funding of SAES  research.  The  empirical  evidence  is then presented
investigating the five hypotheses  given above.
Data Characterizing SAES  Structure, Management,  and Funding
Structure.  Table 1 contains  information on administrative  structures for agricultural
research,  teaching,  and  extension in land-grant universities.  Thirty-four  states have traditional
administrative  structures  where departmental  administrators report to a single  agricultural college
administrator  (see column  2).  Nine states have structures  where  extension  is administered  separately.
Seven states have administrative structures where unit administrators  report along competing
administrative  lines to  an agricultural  administrator (e.g.,  Vice President for Agriculture) and  a
non-agricultural  administrator  (e.g.,  Academic  Vice President).
Also,  thirty six states have a traditional budget type where  agricultural  research,  teaching  and
extension budgets are  coordinated.  Only eight states have budgets for all three functions that are
separate.  Thirty eight states have a traditional supervisory type where agricultural  research,  teaching,
and extension functions are under  a single agricultural  supervisor.  Eight  states have agricultural
teaching and research  under a single agricultural  supervisor  and extension under a separate
supervisor.
Management.  In doing research,  the selection of research  problems  and projects  are key
decisions.  Busch and  Lacy (1983)  conducted  a survey of 1,876 SAES  and USDA scientists in  197812
regarding research procedures and problem selection.  Table  1 transforms  their data for  individual
scientists'  responses  to influences  on choice of research  problems into station averages.  Two types  of
indexes  are created,  one for influence of department  chairs  and SAES  directors  and  another dealing
with more general  external versus  internal control over research  problems.
The role of department  chairs and  experiment station directors in choosing research  projects
of scientists is reflected  in the two  far righthand columns  of Table  1.  Department  chairs and directors
represent  a larger share of total research  personnel  in smaller stations,  and in general,  their influence
is greater  in smaller stations  (e.g.,  CT, NH, WY,  OK,  NM,  NV, MT).  Exceptions  are Florida,
Georgia,  and  Vermont.  Furthermore,  department  chairs  (or heads) were  generally rated  as having
more  influence than the SAES  director (or director of the institute) (exceptions  are HI,  ID, IL, RI,
and  SC).
The rating by SAES scientists for degree of influence  (7 point scale)  by immediate supervisor
in their choice of research  problem represents  the influence of department  chairs  (SD).  The average
index for degree of influence  by an institute director represents  the influence  of SAES directors
(SAD).  An average  index of "external  downstream"  influences  on scientists'  choice of research
problems  was  derived from responses  to eight questions  (7 point scales).  An average  index of
"internal  influences"  or "own preferences  matter"  in research problem choice  was derived  from
responses  to seven related  questions.5 Then,  an index of relative external  downstream influences  on
scientists'  research  problem choice  was  derived  as  the ratio of external to internal  influences  (E/I).
This  index of relative  external  downstream influences  on research  problem  choice shows that
California,  Wisconsin,  and several  other stations that have a reputation for scholarly  research
programs  have low  external downstream  influence  ratings.  That is,  the scientists'  preferences  or
assessments  matter relatively strongly in  research problem  choice relative  to external  downstream
influences.  In these stations,  the administrators  are  also a smaller  share of total research personnel13
than  in small stations which  might contribute  directly to  reduced  influences.  Stations known for
diverse outputs and  tendencies  toward  central  control,  e.g.,  Oklahoma,  Florida, and  most smaller
stations,  show relatively high external  influence on scientists'  research problem  choices.  Many
stations,  however,  have E/I values that are relatively close to the mean;  32 are within one standard
deviation.
Funding.  Agricultural  experiment stations differ significantly  in the relative importance  of
alternative funding sources.  Table 2 presents information  on the share of funds received from
(1) all  USDA contracts,  grants,  and cooperative  agreements,  (2) other federal  contract  and  grant
funds,  (3) contract  and grant funds from private business,  commodity  groups,  and other
nongovernmental  sources,  and  (4) state government  appropriations.  The  average share  is computed
by summing relevant  totals for  1970,  1975,  and  1980 before dividing.
For all  states, the largest share of SAES funds  comes  from state government  appropriations.
Several  SAESs  have an average share from state government  appropriations that is less than forty
percent  (e.g., Indiana,  Louisiana,  Nebraska,  New Hampshire,  Rhode Island,  and Tennessee).  Even
before the  1980s,  several  states had moved heavily into contract and  grant funding of SAES  research.
On average,  the share from  federal  contract and grant funds outside the USDA (e.g.,  Environmental
Protection Agency,  National  Institutes of Health,  National Science  Foundation)  was  larger than the
share obtained from the USDA.  These federal  contracts and grants from outside the USDA accounted
for more  than  12 percent  of the SAES funds in Colorado (25%),  Rhode Island (22%),  Oregon (20%),
Wisconsin (18%),  New York (15%),  Indiana  (15%),  California  (14%),  and Tennessee  (13%).  On the
other hand,  the states that received  the  largest share of SAES  funds from  USDA contracts,  grants,
and  cooperative  agreements  were  Maine  (8%),  Iowa  (7%),  Nebraska  (7%), Arizona (6%),  Colorado
(6%),  New Mexico  (6%),  and Utah  (6%)  (see Table 3).14
Statistical Evidence
We now examine the hypothesis that structure,  management,  and  funding sources  of public
agricultural research affect  the productivity of agricultural  research  as reflected  in state level
multifactor productivity statistics.  Subsequently,  we consider whether  structure,  management,  and the
federal  grant share of funding are  exogenous.  Testing  exogeneity is important for easing concerns
about direction of causality.  The productivity data and  standard explanatory  variables are taken from
Huffman and  Evenson's (1993)  state aggregate data for 42 U.S.  states,  1973-82.  The New England
States,  Alaska,  and Hawaii are  excluded from the data  set.
Although the Huffman  and  Evenson data set covers  1950-1982,  we use only the 1973-1982
because  (1) the  Busch and  Lacy  (1983)  data  represent influences  on problem choice during the mid-
1970s  and no other survey of this type exists for other years,  (2) a  10-year period provides  a large
enough sample size to provide confidence  in the empirical  results,  and (3) the Huffman and Evenson
data set does not extend beyond  1982.  While many  land-grant universities have been re-evaluating
their administrative  structures,  some have been making  changes  and scientists in  institutions change,
these measurement  errors  are likely minor  compared  to variations  among states so that results are  not
greatly affected.  All of the variables  used  in the analysis are described briefly  in Table 4.
Productivity.  Our major interest is  in how the structure, management,  and funding of
agricultural  research  affects the productivity  of agricultural  research  as agricultural  research  and  other
public polices impact  multifactor productivity.  For this investigation,  we modify the Huffman  and
Evenson (1992;  1993)  model.  In their model,  state multifactor productivity is expressed  as  a three
equation model.  The three equations  are for multifactor  productivity in the U.S.  crop  sector,
livestock sector,  and aggregate  agricultural  sector.  To  provide empirical  evidence  about the effects of
structure,  management,  and funding  of public agricultural  research,  the variables  in Tables  1-3  were
added to the Huffman and Evenson model  (1992;  1993).15
Selected regression results from fitting the multiple-equation  model to state multifactor
productivity data for  1973-82 are reported  in Table 4.  The results  show that the productivity of the
scientific discovery  and technology development  processes are  affected by the organization  of
agricultural  research.  First, other things  equal,  a larger average share of SAES funds received  from
federal  contracts,  grants,  and  cooperative  agreements  uniformly reduces agricultural productivity  in  all
sectors.  This result is highly significant  and  implies  rejection of Hypothesis 2.  Alternatively, the
results suggest inefficiencies  associated  with public contract and grant funding  and earmarked  funding
compared  to  formula funding.  It also  may reflect problems associated  with redirecting  SAES research
away  from state needs.6 A larger share of nongovernment  contract and grant  funds, on the other
hand,  increases  crop sector productivity,  but reduces  livestock sector  and aggregate  productivity.  One
possibility is that nongovernment  contracts  and grants involve  considerably  lower transactions  costs on
scientists'  time  (e.g.,  reviewing  activities)  than federal  grants and contracts.  Another possibility  is
that private sector  crop research  and some forms of SAES testing of crop  varieties and pesticides  are
highly complementary  activities.  Thus, private funding of SAES  crop research  may raise local
agricultural  productivity because of geoclimatic  specificity of crop technology.  Similar localized
benefits  and complementarities  with private research  are apparently  much less important for livestock
production.
Second,  the results in Table 4 suggest that traditional administrative structures  which do not
separate agricultural  research,  extension,  and teaching in some way are more effective  for  enhancing
local  agricultural  productivity.  However,  the results are  not statistically significant except  marginally
for livestock.  Thus, Hypothesis  4 is  not rejected.  The coefficient  of DB2  (1 for nontraditional type)
is  far from significantly different  from  zero  in the crop sector  and  aggregate productivity  equations.
Thus,  this evidence does not suggest that the  administrative type is a major research  efficiency  factor,
except possibly in the livestock  sector.716
This paper argues  that scientific discovery  is an abstract, human capital  intensive,  creative
process that is difficult to routinize and  most likely thrives  in a decentralized  but supportive
environment  with economic  incentives that promote diligence, cooperation,  and creativity.  While the
results show that the administrative  structure  does not matter greatly,  different channels  of influence
on scientists'  choice  of research problems are important.  Apparently,  alternative  administrative
structures  can be both used effectively  and misused.
The results  show that greater  administrative  influence on choice of scientists'  research
problems raises the productivity  of public  applied research but reduces  the productivity of public
pretechnology  science research.  These conclusions are based on the signs of the coefficients  of the
interaction terms for In (SD x  SAD) with In APP and  In SC.  The direction of the effect  is the same
in  all three productivity  equations.  Thus, moving from  applied  to pretechnology  and general
scientific research,  the comparative  advantage of administrators for  "directing" problem  choice
appears  to  decrease.  These results are all highly significant in the sector specific results.  Thus,
Hypothesis 3 is firmly rejected  with respect to pretechnology  science but is not rejected  with respect
to  applied  research.
The second type of influence on problem choice  is the index of relative  downstream influence
(E/I).  Roughly,  scientists can be viewed as choosing projects because of downstream  influences  such
as  issues raised  by clientele and feedback  from extension personnel, or because they are important in
their own assessment  (to their own professional  career or to the development  of innovations).  The
results  suggest that greater  relative external  influence on scientists'  research problems  reduces  the
productivity  of public  applied  research  but increases  the productivity of public pretechnology  science
research.  These results suggest that applied scientists tend to be sufficiently familiar with needs  in the
field  to choose  where their productivity is greatest on the basis of scientific discoveries  available in
pretechnology  sciences  in absence of interest group pressures.  However,  for  research of the17
pretechnology  type,  the results suggests that research  is more productive when scientists have a  "sense
of importance"  that  can be  obtained from considering  external  downstream  influences.  Scientists
doing pretechnology  research  can in principle undertake  any of a huge  range of scientific
investigations,  but many of them will  not lead to discoveries that are useful for  enhancing  local
agricultural  productivity.  Recall  that the E/I index  is much more comprehensive  and  subtle than the
direct measures  of administrative  influence SD and SAD.  Taken together,  the result that greater
external  influence  reduces applied  research  productivity but increases  pretechnology research
productivity implies  that overall research  productivity  is enhanced by greater vertical  integration of
the  sciences.8 Furthermore,  these results are  all significant beyond the 1 percent  level and thus lead
to  rejection of Hypothesis  1 that vertical  integration  is unimportant.  These results offer empirical
support for the land-grant  philosophy  that productivity  follows  from communication  among  general
pretechnology  sciences,  applied sciences,  and  application activities in the field.
The importance  of integration of the land-grant activities  is further suggested by the
interaction  terms,  In APP x  In SC and In APP x  In EXTG.  The  coefficients  of these terms imply that
applied  and pretechnology  sciences  are significantly  complementary  for crop research  and  that applied
research  and extension activities  are highly complementary  for livestock research.  The lack  of
complementarity  among  applied research  and  extension for crops  may  suggest that much of the
benefits of new technology  for crops  are embodied  in inputs  and accompanying  information provided
by private marketers.  Conversely,  the lack of complementarity  between pretechnology  and applied
sciences  for livestock  may be due to the fact that most advances  in livestock productivity over the past
two  decades  have  not had  strong roots in pretechnology  sciences  and (perhaps  as  a  consequence)
productivity  growth  for livestock  has been  comparatively  weak  (Huffman  and  Evenson,  1993). 9
Exogeneity.  To  investigate the validity of the results  in Table  4, exogeneity  tests  were
performed  on the variables  representing structure,  management,  and funding.  As  is well known,18
endogeneity can cause simultaneous  equations bias in coefficient  estimation.  Thus,  we consider the
possibility that structure,  management,  and funding are jointly determined  with (or caused  by)
productivity  First, we examine  the index of relative  external  downstream  influences  on scientists'
research  problem choices  (E/I).  Geoclimatic  conditions and distance  from central  markets  have a
major impact on the geographical  location of agricultural  production (USDA 1957;  Huffman  and
Evenson  1993).  Thus, variables representing the share of each state's land area  included in  16 major
geoclimatic regions  might be an important  determinant of the management  of agricultural research.
These  variables capture much of the effects  of geoclimatic  conditions and distance  to markets.  Also,
the SAES  administrative structure (DB2) might impact research problem  choices.  Column  (1),  Table
6, presents  some econometric  evidence on the determinants  of E/I.
These results show that administrative structure,  as represented  by a dummy variable DB2 for
nontraditional  land-grant administrative type,  does not affect  E/I.  Furthermore,  we find only weak
evidence  that geoclimatic variables  impact E/I.  In particular,  we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the coefficients  of DB2  and all  the geoclimatic  region variables are jointly equal to zero.  Under the
null hypothesis,  the sample F-value is  1.79,  but the critical F-value is 2.03  at the 5 percent
significance level.  Thus,  we conclude that the index of relative  external  influences  on scientists'
problem  choices  (E/I) is relatively exogenous. 10
A  related  issue is whether  the land-grant administrative  structure (DB2) is affected  by
scientists'  research  orientation  (as represented  in E/I) and geoclimatic  variables.  If the E/I index is
really  exogenous,  then scientists might change the administrative  structure to a form that is most
productive for them.  In Table 5,  column  2,  evidence is presented on this issue.  Although the
estimated  coefficient  of E/I is positive,  suggesting that relatively  strong external  influences  increase
the likelihood of nontraditional  administrative structure,  the coefficient  is not significantly  different
from zero at the 5 percent level.  Furthermore,  the geoclimatic region variables do not have much19
power  for explaining  DB2.  In particular,  we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients  of
E/I and all  of the geoclimatic  region variables  are jointly equal to zero.  The sample value of the F
statistic is 0.67, but the critical value of the F statistic is 2.03  at the 5 percent significance level.
Thus,  we conclude that structure, as represented  by DB2,  is relatively exogenous.
Currently,  the share of SAES  funds that comes from federal grants,  contracts,  and  cooperative
agreements  (SHFD),  or so-called federal nonformula funds,  are receiving  attention as  the
National  Research  Council exerts pressure  on Congress  and  Office of Management  and Budget against
formula funding of agricultural  research  (National  Research  Council  1989).  In the previous  section,
we showed that SHFD contains relatively  large variation  across the states and  over time.  What might
be  some of the reasons?  In the past,  SAES directors  and department  chairs have frequently expressed
negative opinions about these research  funds because  they feel some loss of local  control over the
direction of research or that state funds for agricultural  research are diverted to research of little local
value (i.e.,  little local  geoclimatic specificity)  as  a result of taking federal  nonformula research  funds
(see discussion in Huffman  and Evenson  1993).  Also,  it seems  likely that geoclimatic  and locational
factors  are important in competing for these  funds.  Thus, we  examine the relationship  between
SHFD and the index of influence of departmental  chairs  (SD),  SAES directors  (SAD),  and  relative
external  influences  on scientists'  research problem choices  (E/I) and the geoclimatic  region variables.
These  results  are reported  in Table 5,  column  3.  The results show that larger  relative
external  downstream influences  or stronger  influence by department  chairs or directors on scientists'
problem choices  is associated  with a statistically significant reduction in the average share of federal
grant, contract,  and cooperative  agreement  funds for SAES research.  One can interpret these results
as suggesting that  external  downstream  and local  administrative  influences  are biased  against
nonformula federal  research  funds.  Also,  many of the geoclimatic  region variables  are  individually20
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level and  are highly positive for regions 8 and 15
and  highly negative for regions  11  and  14.11
The hypothesis that the regression equation for SHFD has no  explanatory  power is rejected.
The sample value of the F statistic under  the null hypothesis  is 34.1  whereas  the critical  value of the
F statistic is  1.67 at the 5  percent level.  Thus,  evidence suggests that SHFD is not totally exogenous.
Accordingly,  caution  is suggested for interpretation of the SHFD coefficient  in the multifactor
productivity analysis  of Table 4.
While the results of Table 4 do not suggest a strong productivity  effect of administrative
structure, the final results of Table 5 suggest that administrative structure affects  the allocation of
funds.  In the fourth column of Table 5,  the share of the stock of public applied crop  and livestock
research  in the total stock of public agricultural  research is regressed  on E/I,  SD,  SAD,  DB2,  SHFD,
SHPR,  and  15  geoclimatic region variables.  The most interesting result is that the share of applied
research  is reduced  when extension  is administered  separately from agricultural  teaching  and research
functions  (DB2 has  a negative effect with t-ratio 6.8).  This result lends  credibility to the argument
that a combined land-grant administrative structure promotes  integration of research  and  extension and
helps to keep  research activities  relevant.
Conclusions
During the 1990s,  U.S.  public agricultural research,  extension,  and higher education have
been hit again with  economic hard times.  Land-grant administrators are looking for new sources  of
funds  and  prioritizing research  which leads to tighter control over research  projects undertaken.
As the extension and research problems  of agriculture and rural areas  have expanded beyond
traditional  agricultural  interests,  the administrative  structure in land-grant universities has been
modified  in many states.  The administration of extension in a number of states has  moved  to a21
university official  above the dean of agriculture.  Similar changes  in administration of experiment
stations have occurred  in some states as directors have struggled to gain access  to biotechnology
expertise in other colleges.  As  a result, simple traditional administrative  lines have been modified in
a way that most  likely weakens  the incentives  for cooperation  across  traditional teaching,  research and
extension  activities.
Our work suggests some economic  and political consequences  of changing the structure,
management,  and  funding of agricultural  research  in land-grant universities.  Tighter control over
research  problem choice may  enhance  applied  research productivity  but significantly reduces
productivity from pretechnology  science research.  While modifications  of general administrative
structures within the land-grant universities  do not appear to have major direct  impacts on the overall
productivity of agricultural  research  and extension,  administrative  separation of land-grant activities
can cause  research  efforts to be directed  away from applied  work.  The  current trend toward
competitive  grant and earmarked  funding,  as opposed to formula  funding from federal  sources,
apparently  reduces productivity of research  expenditures  and/or shifts the focus of scientific  inquiries
and technology  developments  away  from innovations that raise local  agricultural  productivity.  In the
long term,  this type of change  in focus can be expected to erode local political support for SAES
research.  It might, however,  increase  politcal  support for national funding of agricultural  research.
The  results of this paper emphasize  the importance of maintaining  a vertically integrated
agricultural  science establishment.  In the short run,  pretechnology  sciences and applied sciences  may
be somewhat independent,  but in the long term progress can only  occur when vertical  linkages  exist
and function  well.  Pretechnology scientists are  more productive when they are aware of practical
needs,  and applied scientists  are more productive  when they are informed  and  literate in the parent
sciences.  Historically,  the applied  sciences in agriculture have tended to  become disconnected from
the parent sciences due to  increasing sophistication.  As a result,  agricultural  faculties of land-grant22
universities have been poorly prepared  to assimilate new scientific developments,  for example,  in
biotechnology.
The  results of this paper also  emphasize  the importance of scientist directed  research  at least
in the pretechnology  sciences.  Prediction  of advances  in most areas  of science and  technology is
difficult.  This means  that micro-management  of R&D  is most likely an unproductive  activity,  and
research  management  approaches that follow  a research  priority setting methodology  are likely to  fail
because  they ignore the realities of the  scientific discovery  process.  Although  the production of
scientific discoveries  is uncertain,  it is  unreasonable  to assume  an equally likely probability  of a
discovery in all  areas.  Working scientists are most likely the best judge of their own ability to  make
a breakthrough.  Research  administrators,  recognizing  these realities,  can effectively  "direct"  the use
of research  funds by setting appropriate  incentives  for useful  outputs and the  "riskiness"  of the
research  enterprise.
Previous work has  not examined quantitatively the implications  of alternative land-grant
funding mechanisms,  management,  and administrative  structures.  The work reported  in this paper
represents  only a beginning to this area of inquiry that contains many unanswered  questions.
However,  the results suggest that several current directions  may be counter-productive  and  deserve
further  examination.23
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ENDNOTES
1.  For example,  Bonnen (1986)  and Schuh  (1986)  have charged  that incentives  in land-grant
universities  have been far too skewed  in favor of refereed journal  articles.  This is
apparently  an untested proposition.
2.  In the Huffman  and Evenson (1993)  R&D system for agriculture,  the general  sciences  consist
of mathematics,  probability  and statistics,  atmospherical  and meterological  sciences,
chemistry,  geological sciences,  physics,  bacteriology,  biochemistry,  botany,  ecology,  genetics,
microbiology,  molecular biology,  zoology,  economics  and  psychology.  The pretechnology
sciences  consist of applied math,  applied physics,  engineering,  computer science,  climatology,
soil physics and  chemistry,  hydrology and  water resources,  plant physiology, plant genetics,
phytopathology,  environmental  sciences,  animal  and human physiology,  animal and  human
genetics,  animal pathology,  nutrition, applied  economics,  statistics and econometrics,  political
science,  and  sociology.  The  applied  agriculture sciences  consist of agricultural  engineering
and  design,  mechanics,  computer design,  agricultural  chemistry,  soils and  soil sciences,
irrigation  and water  methods,  agronomy,  horticulture,  plant breeding,  applied plant pathology,
integrated  pest management,  animal  and poultry science,  animal breeding,  animal  and  human
nutrition,  veterinary medicine,  farm management and marketing,  resource economics,  rural
sociology,  public policy studies,  and human ecology.  The pretechnology sciences  are unique
in their upstream  ties to general  science and  downstream to applied agricultural  sciences.
3.  In fact,  it is illegal  to have a labor  contract that extends  for more than one year  into the
future.  Furthermore,  labor contracts have generally been interpreted  in a one-sided  fashion
by obligating the  employer but not the employee  to  stated terms of performance.
4.  See Johnson (1987)  and Beattie (1983)  for additional discussion of advantages  and
disadvantages  of different administrative structures.
5.  Items used  to  approximate the  importance  of external  (E) downstream  influence  on scientists'
problem  choice were  (1) potential marketability  of the final product,  (2) publication
probability  in a farm  and/or industry journal,  (3) evaluation of research  by scientists in
your  field,  (4)  colleagues'  approval,  (5) credibility of other investigators doing similar
research,  (6)  demands by clientele,  (7) feedback from extension personnel,  and (8) priorities
of the research  organization.  For  internal influences,  (I) the rated items  were (1) potential
contribution to scientific theory,  (2) likelihood of clear  empirical results,  (3)  publication
probability  in professional journals,  (4)  currently a  "hot"  topic,  (5) enjoys  doing this kind
of research,  (6)  scientific curiosity,  and  (7) client needs as  assessed by you.
6.  Recall  that the coefficient  of SHFD might contain  simultaneous  equation  bias.  Thus,
conclusions  for this coefficient  should be viewed  with some caution.
7.  The administrative  structure variable,  however,  only represents  an approximation  of the
actual  administrative structure over the time period of the analysis.  Nevertheless,  regressor
problems  caused  by measurement  error  and proxy-variables  are generally not large enough to
reverse  the signs of estimated coefficients  (Greene  1990,  p.  293-98).27
8.  While no question in the survey measured  upstream influence on applied researcher's
problem choice,  reason suggests that greater downstream  influence comes  at the expense
of less upstream  influence.
9.  All of the productivity  elasticities for the research  variables  are positive when evaluated  at the
sample mean,  except for applied  livestock research.  See Huffman  and Evenson  1993  (Ch. 7
and 9) for a discussion of reasons why this is true.
10.  We have only  one set of values  for DB2,  and  this is  the reason why only 42 observations  are
used in  fitting this  equation.
11.  Note that dummies  are associated  with regions  as follows:  1 - Northeast Dairy Region,  2 -
Middle Atlantic Coastal  Plain,  3  - Florida  and Coastal  Flatwoods,  4  - Southern Uplands,  5 -
East-Central  Uplands,  6 - Midland Feed  Region,  7 - Mississippi Delta,  8  - Northern Lake
States,  9  - Northern Great Plains,  10  - Winter Wheat  and Grazing Region,  11  - Coastal
Prairies,  12 - Southern Plains,  13  - Grazing-Irrigated  Region,  14 - Pacific Northwest  Wheat
Region,  15  - North  Pacific Valleys.  The Dry Western  Mild-Winter Region  is represented  in
the  constant term.28
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Table 2.  Average share (%)  of SAES  funds from major sources:  average over 1970,  1975,  and  1980.
All USDA  Fed.  (but  Private  Bus.,  State
Contracts,  not USDA)  Commodity  Group  Government
Grants and  Coop  Contracts  and other non-  Appropriations
State  Agreements  and Grants  govt.  sources
Alabama  2.39  3.66  2.72  42.79
Alaska  1.31  0.38  0.00  61.75
Arizona  6.14  6.63  5.18  61.94
Arkansas  2.88  2.33  3.24  57.11
California  3.40  14.46  6.22  69.32
Colorado  6.26  25.14  0.50  43.94
Connecticut  0.53  6.58  0.84  65.38
Delaware  1.96  2.55  4.21  44.56
Florida  2.46  4.09  4.91  76.83
Georgia  3.35  1.47  2.62  68.51
Hawaii  2.53  6.40  2.89  72.99
Idaho  3.18  2.30  8.95  55.45
Illinois  3.02  7.23  5.75  47.85
Indiana  4.20  14.95  6.82  38.09
Iowa  6.90  8.51  16.29  40.44
Kansas  2.03  5.87  11.45  49.51
Kentucky  0.50  0.24  0.04  66.45
Louisiana  1.60  1.87  2.52  74.39
Maine  8.03  2.63  6.78  37.24
Maryland  0.63  3.20  0.79  63.31
Massachusetts  3.05  3.22  5.09  48.05
Michigan  5.13  12.78  9.03  49.24
Minnesota  4.96  5.33  4.24  65.91
Mississippi  4.06  2.77  2.37  50.92
Missouri  5.10  6.23  3.00  46.55
Montana  2.82  6.58  6.83  40.07
Nebraska  6.78  3.71  3.03  37.23
Nevada  4.21  3.51  2.14  51.04
New Hampshire  1.90  0.13  0.13  36.34
New  Jersey  2.11  6.44  9.05  63.70
New  Mexico  6.19  2.75  6.20  50.39
New  York  3.77  14.87  3.90  50.27
North Carolina  3.70  8.24  3.33  59.53
North Dakota  2.33  2.58  4.69  64.23
Ohio  2.59  1.73  0.00  74.18
Oklahoma  4.15  8.31  4.20  53.84
Oregon  2.65  20.14  5.03  47.59
Pennsylvania  4.19  4.87  5.95  52.30
Rhode Island  0.69  21.56  1.59  34.34
South Carolina  1.50  0.00  0.00  73.08
South Dakota  2.10  1.49  3.18  57.17
Tennessee  0.91  13.09  2.59  36.53
Texas  4.54  3.11  13.28  55.04
Utah  6.13  12.33  4.01  45.92
Vermont  2.73  2.65  5.62  44.25
Virginia  4.22  10.37  6.68  49.78
Washington  3.80  8.55  8.93  51.76
West Virginia  1.89  2.82  1.78  43.94
Wisconsin  3.70  18.04  7.51  48.39
Wyoming  0.70  3.19  1.02  54.37
Source:  USDA,  Inventory  of Ag.  Res.,  Table IV-F.31
Table 3.  Definition of Variables.
Variable  Definition
MFP  Multi-factor  productivity:  Divisia output index divided by Divisia input index, 1.00 for national mean 1949-52.  (Crop,
livestock,  and aggregate)
APP  Stock of public applied  research in  1984 dol,  total lag of 33 years,  trapezoidal shape weights 7 rising +  6 constant  +
20 declining.  Research  spillins from similar subregions and regions are included.  (Crop,  livestock)
SC  Stock of public pre-technology science research  in  1984 dol.  Lag pattern and spillin as in APP.  (Crop,  livestock)
SHFD  Average share (1970,  1975,  1980) of SAES  funds received  from  grants,  contracts,  and  cooperative agreements with
the federal government.
SHPR  Average share (1970,  1975, 1980) of SAES funds received from grants and contracts with private business, commodity
groups,  and other nongovernmental  sources.
DB2  Dummy  variable taking  a  value  of 1 for  nontraditional  administrative  type for  agriculture  research,  teaching,  and
extension,  i.e., administrative types 2 and 3  (Table 2),  and a  zero otherwise.
SD  Average rating by SAES scientists for degree of influence by immediate supervisor in their choice of research problems
(Busch and  Lacy  1983; also,  see Table 3).
SAD  Average rating by SAES  scientists  for degree of influence  by director of research institute  (or SAES)  in their choice
of research problems (Busch and Lacy  1983; also see Table 3).
E/l  Index of relative external downstream influences on SAES scientists in choice of research problems (see discussion  in
text and Table 3).
EXTG  Public extension stock having a commodity  focus in days per year, total time lag of 3 years (.5,  .25, .25),  adjusted for
number of geoclimatic subregions.  (Crop, livestock)
SCH  Schooling  of farmers:  average  years of schooling completed  by rural males  15-65 years of age (interpolated  between
census  years).
PRIVG  Private agricultural  research  stock in 1984  dol, total lag of 33 years, trapezoidal shape 7  + 6  +  20, adjusted  for the
number of geoclimatic subregions.  (Crop,  livestock)
ST  Ratio  of the  number of private agricultural and extension staff to the number of public staff in  1970.
DROUGHT  Drought dummy variable:  equals  1 if rainfall is less than  1 standard  deviation above normal,  and 0 otherwise.
PREPLANT  Cumulative rainfall,  Feb. - July.
WAGEMG  Real wage rate for production workers  in manufacturing.
NPSUPPORT  Government  crop price  support:  weighted  ratio of support price to market price for crops.
NPSUPMLK  Government  milk price support:  weighted  ratio of milk  support price to  milk market price.
NDVERSION  Government  crop diversion payments:  equivalent price ratio  of direct government crop acreage payments.
TIME  Trend
Dr  Share of a state's agricultural  land classified  in each  of 16 geoclimatic regions.32
Table 4.  Selected Regression Results Examining Effects of Sources of Funds,  Administration  Type,
and  Choice of Research on SAES Problems Multifactor Productivity:  42 U.S.  States,
1973-82  (t-ratios in parentheses) a/
Crop  Livestock  Aggregate
Variable  Sector  Sector  Agriculture
SHFD  -.014  -.006  -.007
(5.7)  (3.3)  (5.0)
SHPR  .011  -.009  -.005
(2.7)  (2.6)  (2.0)
DB2  .007  .051  .008
(0.2)  (1.9)  (0.4)
In APP  -.454  -1.227  b/
(2.8)  (9.9)
In  SC  .528  1.377  b/
(3.3)  (10.7)
In APP  x In SC  .005  -.005  b/
(2.9)  (3.1)
In APP x In EXTG  -.003  .014  b/
(0.6)  (3.0)
In (SD x SAD) x  In APP  .372  .353  .063  .404
(5.3)  (6.1)  (0.8)  (6.5)
In (SD x SAD)  x In SC  -.394  -. 362  -.054  -.426
(5.4)  (6.2)  (0.7)  (6.8)
In (E/I) x In APP  -1.421  -2.851  -1.787  -3.065
(2.9)  (7.7)  (3.7)  (8.1)
In (E/I) x In SC  1.464  2.817  1.724  3.144
(2.9)  (7.4)  (3.5)  (8.0)
/  Each equation contains additional variables including  15 geoclimatic region variables and annual
trend and trend squared.  The set of 3 equations was  estimated by Zellner's seemingly unrelated
method  with some  cross-equation  equality  restrictions between  crop  (livestock)  sector equation
and  the aggregate  sector.  The weighted R2 for the system is.83.
b/  In the equation for aggregate productivity,  all the variables with sector-specific  designations were
multiplied  by  the  appropriate  sector  output  share.  Then  these  parameters  for  the  aggregate
equation were  constrained to  be the same as on similar variables  in the  sector equations.33
Table 5.  Evidence  investigating exogeneity of structure  and management  of public
agricultural  research  (t-ratios  are in parentheses).
Applied
Variables  E/I  DB2  SHF  Research  Share
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
E/I  .445  -27.38  -.008
(0.3)  (5.8)  (0.3)
SD  -1.12  .006
(2.2)  (2.6)






DB2  .007  -.018
(0.3)  (6.8)
D1  .083  .049  1.60  -. 136
(1.2)  (0.1)  (1.1)  (20.3)
D2  .123  .181  -4.15  .058
(1.9)  (0.3)  (1.42)  (8.6)
D3  .120  -.427  2.49  .184
(1.0)  (0.4)  (0.8)  (13.0)
D4  .070  .361  -8.51  .105
(1.1)  (0.7)  (6.2)  (14.9)
D5  .068  .525  -4.02  -.052
(1.1)  (1.1)  (3.0)  (7.7)
D6  .023  .292  -3.30  -. 149
(0.4)  (0.7)  (2.8)  (26.5)
D7  .195  .763  .67  .112
(1.8)  (0.9)  (0.3)  (10.9)
D8  -.768  4.378  157.07  -1.763
(0.7)  (0.5)  (6.2)  (14.2)
D9  .196  .269  -3.39  -.099
(3.1)  (0.5)  (2.2)  (13.3)
D10  .050  -. 165  7.53  -.013
(0.6)  (0.3)  (4.8)  (1.8)
D11  -1.643  9.528  -77.06  .252
(2.0)  (1.5)  (3.9)  (2.6)
D12  .397  -.237  .21  .123
(2.1)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (5.7)
D13  .099  .314  1.17  .104
(1.5)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (16.0)
D14  -.335  -. 697  -25.28  .119
(1.2)  (0.3)  (6.0)  (5.7)
D15  .827  .249  94.95  -.058
(1.9)  (0.1)  (9.1)  (1.1)
Constant  .709  -.347  38.20  .586
R2 .53  .30  .60  .97
N  42  42  420  420
F (Ho:  no
explanatory  power)  1.79  .67  34.1  538.3
F (critical  value)  2.03  2.03  1.67  1.60Impact of Changing Intellectual Property Rights on
U.S. Plant Breeding R&D
Carl E. Pray, Mary Knudson, and Leonard Masse1
I. Introduction
The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)  and the application of
utility  patents  (UPs)  to  plants  are  currently  the  topic  of
considerable controversy  among  plant  breeders,  business  people,
environmentalists  and  others.  The  primary  goal  of  the  seed
industry is eliminate "farmers rights" to sell protected varieties.
Seed firms feel they are losing money because seed firms posing as
farmers are selling protected varieties without permission from or
royalties to the owner.  A second goal of the seed industry is to
strengthen the rights of variety owners by disallowing certificates
for varieties that have only minor changes.  This goal is embodied
in the clause on  "essentially derived" varieties in the 1991 UPOV
treaty.
Public sector scientists and some private firms are concerned
that  the  application  of  utility  patents  to  plants  will  have  a
negative  impact  on  the  exchange  of  information  and  germplasm
between scientists within the U.S. and world wide.
In  order  to  decide  whether  the  U.S.  should  strengthen  or
weaken  current  intellectual  property  rights  on  plants,  policy
makers need information on the impact of IPRs on public and private
research.  This  paper  attempts  to  measure  the  impact  of  recent
changes  in  IPRs on the amount and direction of U.S. private R&D.
II.  Model  of R&D by Private Firms
To place IPRs in their proper perspective it is  important to
remember  that  they  are  only  one  factor  a  firm  considers  when
investing in a research program.  In fact, the primary factors in
many  early  models  of  R&D,  which  were  based  on  the  work  of
Schumpeter, were  firm size and market power.  In these models  the
larger  the  firm the  more  research  it  conducts  both  in  absolute
terms and as a percentage of sales or other measures of firm size.
Many of the early empirical  studies in  this  literature found an
inverted  U  shaped  relationship  between  R&D  and  firm  size,  with
small and large firms spending less R&D per sales than the medium
size firms.
1From Rutgers University, University of Michigan and Rutgers
University,  respectively.  This  research was  funded  by the  USDA
Economic  Research  Service  and  the  New  Jersey  Agricultural
Experiment Station.
1The  role  of  demand  in  influencing  investment  in  R&D  was
emphasized by Schmookler (1966) in several important studies in the
1960s.  He tried to show that the growth in demand in an industry
stimulated R&D with a certain time lag.
More recent studies  have  incorporated Schmookler's  ideas on
the role of demand and have divided the Schumpeterian emphasis on
industry  structure  into  two  factors:  appropriability  and
technological  opportunity.  Thus,  the  three  main  factors
influencing a private firm's investment in research to develop new
products  are:  (1) the expected demand for the products;  (2) the
technological  opportunity  for  developing  new  products  through
research and (3)  the ability of the firm to appropriate some of the
benefits  which users  of  the new  products  receive  (see Griliches
1984).
The  demand  for new varieties  of  crops  is  a derived  demand
based on the expected demand for the crop and the productivity of
the  new  variety.  The  quantity  demanded  is  also  influenced  by
farmers' ability to  reproduce seed of the crop.  Some crops  like
alfalfa  are virtually  impossible  for  farmers  in many  regions  to
produce themselves while  other  seeds  such as  wheat  and rice  are
easy to reproduce and store.
The  technological  opportunity  for  firms  to  develop  new
varieties depends on the costs of the research inputs,  the skill
and  level  of  technology  used  by  their  plant  breeders,  and  the
germplasm  and  information  available  from  public  research,  from
other  private  research  and  abroad.  The  major  change  in
technological  opportunity  in  recent years  is  the  application of
molecular  biology  to  plant  breeding.  This  has  increased  the
productivity  of  conventional  plant  breeding  and  led  to  the
production of transgenic plants with genes from other species and
even from bacteria and animals.  Technological opportunity can also
be changed by changes  in the spillovers of information from other
firms and the public sector due to changes in intellectual property
rights.  The more easily germplasm and information are  available
from  other  firms  and  government  research  programs,  the  more
research a firm will do ceteris paribus.
Appropriability  is  a function of  the firm's  ability to keep
other seed companies and farmers from duplicating or making close
substitutes  for  their  variety.  It  is  thus  a  function  of  the
technical characteristic of the variety, the structure of the seed
industry,  and  intellectual  property  rights.  Firms  have  greater
appropriability  in  crops  in  which  hybrid  varieties  are  used2.
Firms  can,  with  careful  management,  keep  the  parental  lines  of
hybrids  secret,  and  farmers  and  other  seed  companies  can  not
2  Primarily crops that are naturally cross pollinated such as
maize, sorghum, pearl millet and sunflower.
2produce hybrid seed by simply multiplying hybrid material purchased
from  the  owners  of  the  hybrid.  Without  intellectual  property
rights  firms  have  little  appropriability  of  new  pure  line
varieties3. Farmers and seed companies can easily reproduce such
new varieties.
Intellectual  property  rights  provide  firms  the  right  to
exclude  other  firms  and  farmers  from  reproducing  the  varieties
which they develop. This gives the firm a temporary monopoly on the
sale  of  the  protected  variety which  allows  the  firm to  charge
higher prices for seeds of the variety than if other firms are also
selling the variety. In this way the firms profit from the research
they used to produce the new variety.
The  concept  of  patents  contains  a  built  in  contradiction.
Spillovers  stimulate  research  because  they  increase  the
productivity of each firm's research - in other words they increase
technological  opportunity.  However,  more  spillover  means  less
appropriability  and  this  may  discourage  research.  This  is
precisely  the  debate  that  is  going  on  between  scientists  over
whether plants should be patentable under the utility patent law.
Those who  oppose  it  fear that  the spillovers  allowed under  PVPA
will be eliminated since there is no explicit research exemption in
utility patent law.  Economic theory provides  little help. Thus,
empirical research is necessary to determine the impact.
III.  IPR Laws Covering Plants
A Legislation
The Plant Patent Act  (PPA) when passed in 1930 was the first
legislation to provide intellectual property rights in plants.  It
covered new and distinct asexually propagated varieties excluding
tuber-propagated plants  such as potatoes.  Application forms are
straight forward  and  can be filled out by breeders. More than 80
percent  of  the  applications  are  approved.  Table  1  presents  a
summary of the coverage and characteristics of different types of
IPRs.
The U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), which was passed
in 1970, provides owners with the exclusive rights for 18 years to
novel, sexually propagated varieties and inbred lines of hybrids.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which administers PVPA,
checks  applications against  the descriptions of varieties  in  its
data  bank.  If  the  variety  is  assessed  to  be  different,  a
certificate  is  issued.  PVPA  has  two  explicit  exemptions  from
protection.  First, farmers can reproduce seed for themselves and
sell seed as  long as seed sales are  less than 50 percent of total
production of that variety on their farm.  Second, the owners of a
3  Pure line varieties are normally produced in naturally self-
pollinated crops, such as wheat and rice.
3variety can not prevent researchers from other companies or public
agencies from using that variety to produce a new variety.
Like Plant Patents PVPA application forms are straight forward
and  can  be  filled  in  by  breeders.  About  90  percent  of  PVPA
applications are approved.
Plant varieties, engineered genes, and hybrid varieties have
been subject to utility patents since the Ex parte Hibberd ruling
by the Patent and Trademark Office's Board of  Patent Appeals and
Interferences in 1985.  UPs provides exclusive rights for 17 years
for  inventions that are novel,  nonobvious to others in the field
and  useful.  Protection can  be  much  broader  than under  PVPC  or
Plant Patents.  It can include a group of varieties that all have
the patented characteristics while only individual varieties could
be patented under PVPA.  No explicit research or farmers exemptions
exist in UPs.  Farmers can not sell seed and theoretically farmers
must  pay  royalties  to  the  holder  of  the  UP  if  they  plant  the
variety as second year using their own saved seed.  Scientists who
use a patented variety to produce another commercial variety could
either be prevented from selling the second variety or would have
to pay a royalty to the owner of the first variety.
Patents  are  unlike  Plant  Patents  and  PVPA  in  several  key
aspects.  They require  enabling disclosure  of  the  inventions  so
that  other  can use  the knowledge  to make  other  inventions.  The
U.S.  Patent  Office  requires  a deposit  of  seed,  if  a variety  is
being patented and this seed must be made available to others for
research  use.  Patent  applications  are  different  in  that  they
usually require lawyers to fill out the forms which increases the
cost of applying considerably.  Of the applications which include
claims  on  plants  22  percent have  been  granted.  In  addition  it
takes  several years  to grant patents while only a few months are
required for PPs and PVPCs.
There  is no explicit research exemption in UP law.  However,
the courts recognize the right of legitimate research who are not
attempting to produce a commercial product with their research to
use  patented products  in  research.  In  addition  since  a patent
case takes about four years and costs about $1 million a year few
companies  will  take  researchers  to  court  unless  they  think  the
researchers will seriously cut into their market.
Trade  secrets  are  the  fourth  type  of  IPR that  are  used to
protect plants.  Trade secrets are governed by state laws, but they
go  back  to  the  English  common  law  tradition.  They  provide
protection for an invention as long as the secret is not disclosed
in  a  nonconfidential  manner.  They have  primarily  been  used  to
protect Fl hybrids in which the inbreds lines are kept secret.
4Table 1.  Comparison of IPRs of Plants
PPA  PVPA  Utility  Trade
Patents  Secret
Coverage
Asexually  Yes  No  If large  in-  No
Propagated  ventive
Variety1
Sexually  No  Yes  If  large in-  No
Propagated  ventive step
Variety
Hybrid  No  No  Yes  Yes
Variety
Engineered  In protected  Yes  Until
Gene  Variety  Disclosed




Cost of application  Low  Low  High 
Percent of appli-  84  90  22 
cations accepted
1. Excludes tuber propagated crops
B. Case Law
Case law and rulings by the patent system have evolved to help
define the protection offered to plant  breeders.  To enforce the
U.S. PVPA firms must identify violators and bring them to court to
seek  injunctions  against  further  infringement,  royalties  and
punitive  fines.  Adherence to the law has varied over time. When
the  law  was  passed,  firms  ran  a  publicity  campaign  to  educate
farmers  and other  firms about  the provision of  the  law.  In most
cases when  companies  discovered violations,  they  just  needed to
write  the  farmers  or  cooperatives  informing  them  about  the
provisions of law and the violations stopped.  Adherence to the law
weakened  gradually.  Specific  cases  defined  farmers rights  more
broadly than most companies wished.  For example, Asgrow vs. Kunkle
1987 found that even very large sales by farmers were legal as long
as  the  farmer  sold  less  than  50%  of  his  crop  as  seed  for
reproductive  purposes.  The  weakness  of  the  law were emphasized
recently by Pioneer Hi-Bred's well publicized closure of  its hard
red winter and hard red spring wheat program  (Newlin).
5In contrast to the self pollinated crops, property rights for
corn and  other hybrids and potatoes were strengthened during the
1980s.  Firms  speculated  that  the  plants  could  be  covered  by
Utility Patents  immediately after the Chakravarty case  in 1980.
A number of  firms  sent applications to the patent office  in  the
early 1980s.  The ex Parte Hibbard ruling officially gave firms the
ability to patent plants for the first time in 1985.  At the same
time  the  use  of  trade  secrets  to protect  inbreds  to  be used  to
produce hybrid corn was validated in the courts for the first time
in  the  1987.  (Pioneer Hi-bred  Int'l  v. Holden  Foundation Seeds,
Inc. No. 81-60-E, slip op.  (S.D. Iowa, Oct.29,  1987)).
C. Proposed Changes
The top priority of the American Seed Trade Association (ASTA)
is  to  eliminate  the  current  farmers'  exemption  in  PVPA.  ASTA
members are not opposed to farmers saving their own seed, but they
do  oppose  the  farmer's  right  to  sell  seed.  The  other  change
currently under consideration is to amend PVPA so that it conforms
with  the  1991  UPOV  Convention.  Varieties  that  are  "essentially
derived"  from  a  protected  variety  would  also  be  owned  by  the
breeder  of  the  protected variety.  Depending on  how essentially
derived is defined,  acceptance of this provision could reduce the
scope  of  the  research  exemption  and  increase  appropriability
considerably.  A  series  of  committees within ASTA is  working to
develop an acceptable definition of "essential derived."
The most likely changes in U.S. utility patent legislation are
changes  that would  bring  the  U.S.  in  line  with  the  rest  of  the
world.  Specifically, the rule on priority of patent claims might
change from "first to invent"  to "first to file" which is the rule
in  most  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  This  would  reduce  patent
litigation in the U.S.  because much litigation centers  on who and
when a new product or process was invented.
At  a  recent  meeting  in  Washington4 some  public  sector
scientists  have  suggested  that  plants  should  not  be  subject  to
patents or that there should be a research exemption in the utility
patents for plants.  However, little support was expressed for this
position  by  representatives  of  the  private  sector.  Those  who
supported this position seem to have been in the minority.
IV. Previous Evidence of Impact of IPRs
Two  surveys  of  seed  companies  were  conducted  in  the  early
4.  Meeting on  "Intellectual  Property Rights:  Protection  of
Plant  Material"  was  sponsored  by  the  Crop  Science  Society  of
America,  the  American  Society  of  Horticultural  Science,  and
American  Society  of  Agronomy  and  the  Soil  Science  Society  of
America. 26-28 January 1993,  Washington, DC.
61980s  to  answer  the  question  of  the  impact  of  PVPA  (Perrin
et.al.1983  &  Butler  and  Marion  1985).  Figure  1  shows  R&D
expenditure divided  by  the value  of  the crop which  holds  demand
constant  in  order  to  show  the  impact  of  appropriability.  As
expected,  the  ratios  of  self  pollinated  crops  like  wheat  and
soybeans  increased about  the time PVPA was passed.  In  addition
crops  in  which  hybrid  seeds  are  widely used  such  as  maize  and sorghum  have  higher research:  value ratios  than self  pollinated
crops.  This is due to property rights in the form of trade secrets
and greater demand for the seed of these crops because hybrids can
not  be  reproduced by farmers.  Both Perrin et al  and Butler  and
Marion conclude that PVPA had a positive effect on private plant
breeding for small grains and soybeans, but were puzzled why small
grains breeding increased before the PVPA was passed 1970.
Recent research  indicates  that the  increase  in  small grains
research documented  in  Figure  1 was  only partially due  to  PVPA. Most of the research on small grains was on wheat.  The history of
hybrid wheat by Knudson  (1990) indicates that most wheat breeding
in  the  1960s  and  1970s  was undertaken with the expectation  that
hybrid wheat would be successful. As firms gave up on hybrid wheat
they tried to market  improved wheat  varieties protected by PVPA.
When they could not make profits  on varieties most firms  stopped
breeding hard  red wheat  entirely.  Thus, the increase  in  cereals
R&D was largely due to the expectation of increased appropriability
due to hybrids rather than PVPA.
There have been no empirical studies of the impact of utility
patents  on  plant breeding.  In  1987  OTA  surveyed  39  seed firms,
biotechnology firms, universities and USDA about their views on the
different types of IPRs.  On the basis of this survey OTA concluded
that utility patents were  important  in  stimulating biotechnology
firms to  do research  on plants  (OTA 1989:85),  but  less  important
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Figure  1.  Crop  Breeding Research  Expenditures  (59  Firms)  Per
Million  Dollars of Annual  U.S.  Crop  Value  in the Preceding Five
Years.
8V. Empirical Evidence on Impact of IPRs
A. Survey of Private Research
To measure the impact of IPRs on private research since 1980
we conducted a survey similar to the one conducted by Perrin et al
(1983). The first part of the survey requested R&D expenditures and
sales by crop. The second part asked about the impact of PVPA and
utility patents on profits, R&D, spillovers from public to private
research and spillovers between private firms. The survey was sent
to 564 companies who were active members of the American Seed Trade
Association  as  of March  1, 1991.  An additional  90  surveys were
sent  out  to  non-ASTA  members.  In  total  654  firms  were  sent
questionnaires and  237  responded.  121  stated that they did  not
have plant breeding programs. 90  of the responses were from firms
with  plant  breeding  programs  who  completed  the  entire
questionnaire.  5  firms with breeding programs chose not to provide
sales and R&D data,  but completed the second part of the survey.
4  of  the  surveys  were  returned  with  a  note  that  the  firm  had
undergone  a  merger  or  acquisition  and  17  of  the  surveys  were
classified as undeliverable.
In  1990  the  84  participating  firms  reported  seed  sales  of
approximately $ 1.8 billion and R&D of $137 million (Table  2).  R&D
as  a percentage  of  sales  (research intensity)  was  around  8  per
cent.  This is larger than the 59  firms that replied to the Perrin
et  al.  survey.  It  is  less than the 157  firms  that replied to  a
short  questionnaire  sent  out  by  three  private  sector scientists
(Kalton, Richardson and  Frey 1989.  That survey asked only about
number  of  scientists,  broad  classes  of  R&D  expenditure  and  no
information  on  sales.  Kalton et  al do  make a rough estimate  of
total R&D expenditure  in  1989  of  $272  million.  If  Kalton et  al
are  correct,  our  study  includes  about  half of  the  private  seed
research conducted in the U.S.  The share of R&D of different crops
is  similar  to  Kalton  except  for  wheat  and  other  cereals  which
appear to  be underrepresented  in  out survey.  The  information on
PVPCs (below  Table 4) suggests this sample underestimates wheat and
soybeans.
9Table  2.  Sales, R&D and IPRs for Participating Firms by Crop in  1990.
Crop  #firms  Sales  R&D  R&D/Sales  PVPCs  UPs
($ millions)
Hybrid Corn  42  1008  67  .07  133  25 Hybrid Sorghum  9  30  4  .13  4  0 Soybeans  23  208  16  .08  105  2 Vegetables  20  214  24  .11  252  4 Forage  12  111  7  .06  45  0 Wheat  7  35  4  .11  20  1 Cotton  5  2  1  .65  11  0 Grasses  9  102  2  .02  94  0 Other1 21  50  12  .24  55  4
Total  84  1761  137  .08  719  36
Source:  Survey.
1 Includes crops for which the number of respondents
was less than five.
B. Impact of  IPRs on R&D
This section first examines trends in the determinants of R&D. These trends are broken down by crop when possible.  Then it looks at the trends in R&D and R&D divided by sales for the main crops.
1. IPRs and Other Factors that Influence Appropriability
Tables  3, 4, and  5 show the  use of  Plant Patents, PVPA and utility patents for all firms not just those in our survey.  Plant patents  continue  to be  extensively used for asexually propagated flower  and  fruit varieties  (Table 3).  Table  4 shows  the number plant variety certificates.  Figure 2 shows the PVPCs of the four most important field crops which are held by the private sector. One of the most significant changes between the 1970s and the 1980s is increase in certificates for corn varieties.  Table 5 shows the distribution  of the  utility patents  issued  in 1985  through 1988. In contrast to PVPCs the most utility patents were issued for two crops in which the commercial seed  is primarily Fl hybrids  - corn and sunflowers.
10Table 3.  Plant Patents Issued.
Number granted between
Crop5 1931-62  1963-68  1969-73  1974-78  1979-83  1984-87
African  9  0  12  45  54  49
violet 
Almond  6  15  9  11  15  7
Apple  55  22  17  36  33  17
Azalea  49  40  34  27  7  4
Begonia  4  0  7  28  7  4
Camellia  38  5  4  1  0  1
Carnation  50  6  11  33  10  83
Chrysan-  133  38  68  155  99  128
themum
Fuchsia  27  3  0  0  0  1
Gladiolus  30  53  8  6  0  0
Grape  10  8  5  9  16  14
Kalanchoe  0  0  5  33  14  30
Nectarine  59  14  25  29  17  23
Peach  151  29  29  30  34  30
Plum  25  18  6  16  14  31
Poinsettia  13  14  17  22  0  15
Rose  1,061  232  141  239  232  201
Strawberry  30  8  13  18  21  14
Annual  53  108  111  189  162  227
average
Total  2,207  647  556  946  808  907
Sources:  American Association of Nurserymen, Plant Patents with Common Names,
1931-1962;  1963-1968;  1969-1973;  1974-1978  (Washington, DC:  American
Association of Nurserymen, 1963;  1969;  1974;  1981).
SPartial  listing of most common plants, representing from 70
to 79  percent of  plant patents  for the time period.
11Table 4.  Number of Certificates in Force Dec.31,1990 by Crop
Soybean  486  Fescue  90
Wheat  234  Ryegrass  86
Pea  195  Lettuce  85
Cotton  176  Alfalfa  71
Corn  162  Barley  42
Garden Beans  139  Bluegrass  40
Source: USDA Plant Variety Protection Office Official Journal Vol.
18,  December  1990.







Source:  OTA 1989.
Most firms in our sample believed it was in their interest to
use PVPA.  51  firms held at least one PVPC.  Only 11  firms held a
utility patent on a  plant or plant part.  To find out more about
firms'  perception of  PVPA and  UPs,  the survey  included questions
about  the  impact  of  intellectual  property  rights  on  R&D,
profitability and on spillover.  Firms perception of the impact of
PVPA and UPs  is  shown  in Table  6.  Firms were asked to rate  the
impact of PVPA and UPs on types of spillovers and on profits from
plant breeding on a scale from -3  to  3.  The table below reports
both the mean score and the number of firms that rate the impact as
positive, negative or none.
PVPA  appears  to have  increased the  flows of  information and
perhaps germplasm from government R&D and from other private firms.
Of the firms that thought PVPA did have an impact 25
12Figure  2.  No.  of  PVPCs  of  Wheat,
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13thought the impact on information from the government was positive
and only 9 thought  it was  negative.  Regarding  information  from
other  firms, 34  thought PVPA had a positive impact compared to 17
that  thought  the  impact  was  negative.  Firms  were  about  evenly
divided about the impact on germplasm movement.
In contrast, utility patents may have decreased the spillover
of germplasm while they were neutral on information exchange.  30
firms  (38%)  felt  that the  effect  of  utility patents  on  exchange
with the public sector was negative,  14  thought  it was positive,
and  36  felt there was no  impact.  This finding is quite worrying,
although as  the public sector becomes more familiar with patents
this may become less of a problem.  Regarding spillovers within the
private  sector,  28  firms  (35%)  felt  that  UPs  limited germplasm
exchange  between  private  companies,  17  felt  this  effect  to  be
positive, and 35 reported that there was no impact.
If  IPR's positive  impact  on a firms'  ability to appropriate
the gains from research outweighed the negative impact of reduced
spillovers, firms profits  from R&D should increase and R&D should
increase.  67 firms reported that the PVPA increased their ability
to profit  from breeding new varieties, while 24  reported that  it
had no impact and only one reported a perceived negative impact on
profitability.  Firms were less sure about the impacts of utility
patents - 43 said utility patents increased profitability, while 8
reported a negative impact.
Since there is  data to analyze the impact of PVPA on breeding
but  it  may  be  too  early  to  estimate  the  impact  of  the  Hibberd
ruling of  1985  which  permitted  UPs  on plants,  the  survey  asked
firms about the impact of UPs on research.  Firms reported that the
extension of utility patent protection to plants had little effect
on  breeding efforts.  Only  6 reported  that  the  availability  of
utility patent protection increased their research expenditures and
one more commented that they had increased research before 1985 in
anticipation  of  the  ruling.  Eight  firms  reported  a decrease  in
R&D,  with  76  firms  reporting  no  change  total  expenditures.  In
addition 14  firms reported that research priorities changed after
1985 due to the availability of UPs.
14Table 6. Impact of PVPA and Patents on R&D Number of Firms
Impact of PVPA  Impact of UPs
Mean  +  No  - Mean  +  No 
Info from  .27  25  58  9  -.18  15  46  19
Govt. R&D
Germplasm from  .18  24  49  19  -.16  14  36  30
Govt. R&D
Info from  .08  34  41  17  -.51  20  40  20
Other Firms
Germplasm from  .08  24  49  19  -.33  17  35  28
other firms
Ability to  1.43  67  24  1  .89  43  31  8
Profit
_____________________________________________________----------
More or Less R&D  6  69  0
due to ex parte
Hibbard
Source:  Survey
Firms'  perception of  increased profits  from breeding due to
PVPA  and  utility  patents  seems  to  outweigh  their  concern  about
reduced spillovers.  Even for utility patents only 8 firms stated
that  the  profits  will  go  down  despite  the  fact  that  30  thought
there was less spillovers from the government and 28 thought there
was  less spillover form other private firms.
Intellectual property rights for hybrids increasing during  the
1980s  due  to  ex  parte  Hibbard  and  the  court  ruling  on  trade
secrets.  Property  rights  in  some self pollinated  crops  such  as
wheat and cotton in some areas were declining because of the ease
with which  farmers  could  reproduce  seed  and  court  rulings  that
specified the extent of the farmers right to sell seed.  Thus, R&D
and R&D/sales should be increasing in hybrids and declining in some
self pollinated crops.
Different  types  of  seed  firms  may  have  quite  different
research  expenditure  patterns  due  to  different  levels  of
appropriability that they face.  Table 7 shows the different levels
of  R&D  and  R&D/sales  for  several  different types  of  seed  firms.
These differences could be due to the structure of the industry -
15vegetable varieties may be easier to control because there are  a
small  number  of  seed  companies  and  a  small  number  of  growers
(Foster and Perrin 1990).  Their  research expenditure may also be
different at different stages in the life cycle of the firms.  When
the firm is just starting up, it will invest money in research but
have  little  or  no  sales.  Finally,  certain  types  of  firms  are
primarily research firms.  Foundation seed companies will have very
high research intensity because they have low seeds sales and some
of their research is essentially contract research for other firms.
2. Changes  in Technological Opportunity and Demand
In addition to the changes in intellectual property rights the
other  major  variable  that  changed  since  1980  was  technology
opportunity due to advances in molecular biology.  Many firms and
government institutions have applied biotechnology techniques such
tissue culture  and genetic mapping to  plant breeding  in  the mid
1980s.  Using these techniques they are improving the efficiency of
plant  breeding  and  producing  varieties  resistant  to  pests  and
herbicides.  The  public and private sectors  are  also  working on
transgenic plants some 300+ of which are in field trials. So far no
transgenic crop varieties are available commercially.
The extent of biotechnologies impact on private plant breeding
is  indicated by  the  1989  study by  Kalton et  al.  They found  252
PhDs working on biotechnology related to plant breeding compared to
580  PhDs  working  on  conventional  breeding.  The  pattern  of
biotechnology  research  by  seed  firms  is  shown  in  Table  8. Corn
biotechnology attracted three times the research resources of any
other  individual  crops  and  twice  as  much  resources  as  all
vegetables together.  This pattern reflects the size of the market
for  various  types  of  seed  and  firms'  perception  of  intellectual
property  as  well  as  differences  in  technological  opportunity
between crops.
The other factor that our model suggests would influence R&D
is demand for seed.  Firms should do more research in  crops which
have rising seed prices and quantity demanded is rising.  Table 9
shows the value of  seeds planted and Figure  3 the trends  in seed
prices and quantity demanded of the major crops.  Corn was by far
the most important crop in terms of value of sales and it also led
in growth of value between  1974  and the present.  Figure  3 shows
that the  value of  seeds  sold of  corn,  sorghum and  soybeans grew
rapidly between  1974  and  1985  and  then declined or  levelled off.
The value  of  cotton seed  sale grew until  1981 and then declined.
Wheat  is  only one  of  these crops  that declined in  the  1970s  and
1980s  and ended  with its  value  in  nominal dollars  in  1990  lower
than in  1974.
16Table 7.  Sales, R&D, and IPR's by Type of Firm for 1990.




Integrated  4  972.6  52.9  .05  183  15
Regional7 30  317.5  22.3  .07  67  2
Foundation 8 30  132.4  37.2  .28  74  18
& Start-ups 9
Sub-Total  65  1387.5  105.4  .08  324  35
Other Crops10
Vegetables  17  210.1  19.9  .09  207  1
Flowers &  9  128.5  4.8  .04  133  0
Grasses
Sub-Total  26  338.6  24.7  .07  340  1
Total  91  1726.1  130.1  .08  664  36
Source:  Survey
6Firms  that  specialize  in  field  crops  and  had  seed  sales
greater than  $50 million a year in 1990.
7Firms that specialize in field crops and had seed sales less
than $50 million a  year in 1990.
8Firms that specialize in the production of foundation seed.
9Firms  that  were  established  or  entered  the  seed  business
after 1980.
10Firms  that  specialized  in  the production  of  the  following
groups  of  crops.  A  few  start-up companies are  included  in these
categories.
17Table  8  Number of Companies and Scientist Involved in
Biotechnology Research Related to Plant Breeding
Crop  Companies  PhD  Other Scientist &
Technicians
Corn  19  90.1  168.2
Vegetables  17  31.4  90.6
Soybeans  6  17.3  29.0
Cotton  5  7.15  16.8
Sugar beets  3  6.5  9.0
Canola  3  9.5  27.0
Alfalfa  2  2.1  10.4
Sunflower  2  1.0  6.0
Wheat  2  1.1  2.3
Other small grains  1  .5  1
Rice  1  .25  0
Turf grasses  1  0  .9
Forage grasses  1  0  .1
Undifferentiated
by crop  2  85.0  55.0
Total  251.9  411.8
Source:  Kalton, Richardson and Frey 1989.
3.  Trends in R&D
During the 1980s one would expect corn R&D to grow the most
rapidly of the five main crops because IPRs of corn and sorghum
were strengthen the most, the value of seed grew the most and the
most biotechnology R&D was conducted on corn.  Wheat should do
the worst in the 1980s because IPRs were weakened, hybrid wheat
turned out to be commercially impractical, and the value of wheat
seed purchased by farmers declined.  R&D by the other three crops
should be somewhere  in between possibly led by sorghum, then
soybeans and cotton.
Table  10  shows that hybrid corn accounted for the largest
share of total R&D in 1990, followed by the class of vegetable
crops, soybeans, forage crops, hybrid sorghum and wheat.  Hybrid
corn was also the  individual crop for which firms held the most
Plant Variety Protection Certificates  (PVPCs) and was again
18Table 9.  Quantity, Price and Sales of Seed of Five Crops
Tons  Price  Value of  Percent  Value of
Planted  per ton Seed Planted Purchased  Seed
(1,000s)  $s  Million $s  Purchased
Million $s
1985
Corn  493.64  2872.00  1417.73  95.00  1346.84
Wheat  2348.22  227.70  534.69  35.00  187.14
Soybeans  1623.34  444.30  721.25  60.00  432.75
Cotton  119.25  1079.68  128.75  50.00  64.38
Sorghum  63.02  1480.64  93.31  95.00  88.64
1991
Corn  439.46  3276.00  1439.67  95.00  1367.68
Wheat  2401.82  216.72  520.52  35.00  182.18
Soybeans  1486.29  477.87  710.25  60.00  426.15
Cotton  138.39  1303.68  180.42  50.00  90.21
Sorghum  36.19  1594.88  57.71  95.00  54.83
Sources:  Area planted, seed rate and price from USDA 
Agricultural Statistics 1991 Washington:GPO 1991.
Percent purchased from Butler and Marion 1985.
followed by soybeans.  Firms held 252 certificates for
vegetables, which is nearly equal to the total for the major
grain crops.  Thus, PVPCs were primarily used to protect
innovations  in corn, vegetables, and soybeans.  Two-thirds of the
utility patents were used to protect corn varieties or
characteristics.  The rest were scattered among a number of
crops.
Seed research in total has grown rapidly since 1979 or 1980
(Table 10).  Perrin's estimate of  $54  million  (1982  $s)  for 1979
R&D is probably closer to the industry total than our estimate of
$35  million  (1982  $s)  for  1980.11  Using either estimate real
research expenditure in  some crops grew very rapidly. Corn
research grew rapidly as expected  - at least doubling  in real
terms.  Cereals which includes wheat declined as expected.
11.  Firms that went out of business between 1980 and 1990 would
not have been included in our sample.  1980 research by firms that
merged may also not have been reported by the new firm.  Also some
firms who report having R&D programs in 1980 only provide R&D data
for 1990 and/or 1985.
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20Table 10.  R&D Expenditures by Crop, 1979-1990.1
(Thousands of 1982 dollars)
Crop  19792  1980  1985  1990
Hybrid Corn  R&D  25121  21544  35029  51249
R&D/Sales  .038  .033  .056  .067
(32)  (26)  (32)  (42)
Hybrid Sorghum  R&D  3622  1902  2513  3095
R&D/Sales  .043  .078  .073  .133
(18)  (5)  (7)  (9)
Soybeans  R&D  5465  3060  5676  12435
R&D/Sales  .041  .052  .051  .078
(21)  (14)  (18)  (23)
Cereals  R&D  9564  1204  3485  4241
R&D/Sales  .208  .276  .255  .139
(9)  (1)  (4)  (11)
Vegetables  R&D  5506  3110  6811  17956
R&D/Sales  .048  .055  .104  .110
(16)  (7)  (15)  (20)
Forage and  R&D  3879  3727  4563  6537
turfgrasses R&D/Sales  .017  .036  .037  .040
(16)  (10)  (15)  (19)
Other  R&D  1117  893  3669  6708
R&D/Sales  .010  .120  .188  .236
(11)  (5)  (11)  (16)
Total  R&D  54274  35440  61746  102221
R&D/Sales  .038  .041  .063  .078
(59)  (43)  (63)  (84)
Source:  1980  - 1990  Survey.
1979 Perrin,  et.al.,  "Some Effects of the U.S. Plant
Variety Protection Act of 1970,"  Economic Research
Report No. 46  (Raleigh, North Carolina:  Dept. of
Economics and Business, North Carolina State
University, 1983)  p.  25.
1 Numbers in parentheses are the number of  firms with active
plant breeding programs.
21Soybean research between 1979 and 1990 grew 228 percent, which
was more than corn and more than expected.  Sorghum did not grow
much.  R&D on vegetable grew by 326 percent.
B.2. Regression analysis
Regression analysis was used to try to sort out the relative
influence of these different factors on private R&D.  Two
dependent variables were used.  First,  R&D by firm was regressed
on demand,  IPR variables, spillover variables and characteristics
of the firms.  Second, R&D by crop and firm was regressed on the
public R&D by crop, IPR variables and industry demand variables.
The results are shown in Table 11.
None of the industry demand variables, such as growth in
value of sales of seeds by crop  in the previous five years,  were
significant.  Public sector plant breeding R&D by crop of  five
major crops from 1972  to 1988  from USDA CRIS was also
insignificant in  all specifications.
The sales variables is consistently positive and sales
squared is negative in different specifications and with both the
firm and crop R&D as dependent variables.  This indicates the
inverted U type relationship between research intensity and size
of firm found  in the  early empirical tests of the Schumpeterian
theory.  Hybrids are positive and significant at the ten percent
level  in the crop R&D equations.  When hybrids are used as a
dummy variable  in the  firm R&D equations,  they are negative but
insignificant.  In the firm R&D analysis specification 3 they are
positive and significant  in interaction with sales.  The
positive sign on the interaction term seems plausible because
larger firms make more money from hybrids because they have the
legal departments or the resources to hire the lawyers needed to
enforce trade secrets and apply for and enforce utility patents.
Various dummies were used to try to capture the impact of
utility patents with mixed results.  In both data sets the dummy
for  1985 and 1990 was positive and significant at the 5 or  10
percent level which provides some support for the hypothesis that
utility patents increased R&D. The impact of utility patents was
also estimated by the using the firms' responses on the
questionnaire on whether they though UPs increased their profits
from plant breeding.  The firms that thought UPs increased
profits had higher levels of R&D than other firms using both firm
and crop R&D.  In the third specification in Table  11 the time
dummies were 1 for 1980 and 1 for 1985.  Thus, they were expected
to have a negative effect if  firms were gradually convinced of
the increased importance of utility patents.  In interaction with
sales they do have a negative and significant impact on R&D which
implies that the  slope of  the sales variable is higher  in the
later years after utility patents became an accepted tool for
increasing appropriability.
22Table  11.  OLS Regression Analysis of Firm R&D Data
R&D Expenditure by Firm  R&D Expenditure by Crop
Constant  -398.7  -1154.3  138.1  -277.8  -280.5
Sales  .078  .073  .046  0.069  0.068
(.006)  (.009)  (.011)  (0.005)  (0.005)
Sales 2 -1.02E-07  -9.6E-08  -1.62E-07  -9.46E-08  -9.4E-08
(1.OE-08)  (2.0E-08)  (1.OE-08)  (1.2E-08)  (-1.2E-08)
Hybrids  -2.08  -308.7  -580.1  319.65  347.37
(185.9)  (229)  (185.8)  (168.1)  (167.5)
D85-90  455.1  418.9  295.15
(208.7)  (206.6)  (176.1)
Exp.Profits 339.6  334.3  524.4  160.27
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1980*Sales  -. 026
(.003)
1985*Sales  -. 014
(.004)
R  Squared  .75  .774  .813  .649  .657
23The dummies for some types of firms shown in Table 7 were
significant.  Foundation seed firms and the large integrated
firms had to  largest increases in R&D over grass seed firms which
were represented by  0.  They were significant at the 5 percent
level as were the other industry dummies except  flower seed.
The regression indicates that some of variables used to
represent utility patents and firms perceptions of utility
patents did have a positive impact on R&D.  Firm size has a
positive impact and certain types of firms - foundation seed
firms and large  integrated firms - also had a positive impact.
However, several other variables which we believe affect R&D -
public R&D and growth in demand - did not have significant
impacts probably due to the fact that they were crop level
variables rather than firm  level variables.
Conclusions
The data on private research suggests that private firms and
were induced to conduct more research on the crops  in which
intellectual property rights were strengthened most.  PVPA did
not, however,  cause as much increase in R&D as earlier studies
suggested because they had neglected to correct for the firms'
mistaken belief that hybrid wheat would be profitable.  Firms did
not  find that germplasm exchange or information was reduced by
PVPA.
About  38%  of the firms surveyed felt UPs hampered their
exchange of germplasm with the public sector and  35%  said it
reduced the exchange of germplasm between firms.  This problem
may decline as firms and universities get more experience with
UPs,  but at the moment there does appear to be a decline in
information and germplasm exchange.  However, over half of the
firms indicated that UPs would increase the profitability of
plant breeding while less than 10 percent thought the impact
would be negative.  This suggests that overall the firms felt
utility patents were a good thing.
The trends in R&D expenditure by crop were generally
consistent with trends  in  IPRs, demand and technological
opportunity.  Corn research grew rapidly as expected - at least
doubling in real terms.  Cereals which includes wheat declined as
expected.  Soybean research between 1979  and 1990 grew 228
percent, which was more than corn and more than expected.
Sorghum did not grow.
The regression  analysis suggests that UPs did stimulate
research by seed firms as well as by new biotechnology firms.
Those firms that stated UPs had increased profits from breeding
did do more R&D than those who thought it was neutral.  Other
24dummies such as time and hybrid dummies also indicate the
stronger property rights lead to more R&D.
In conclusion, it appears that stronger intellectual
property rights in the form of utility patents and trade secrets
have  increased the amount of R&D in the U.S. despite the concerns
about declining spillovers.  In addition firms confirmed the
findings of earlier studies that PVPA did have a positive impact
on profits from R&D on plant breeding.  These findings provide
preliminary evidence that the strengthening property rights
further through measures such as eliminating farmers rights to
sell seed and adopting UPOVs convention on essentially derived
varieties would increase R&D.  More study is needed to answer
the question of the impact of more private R&D on farmers.
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37400-9151.A NEW LOOK AT STATE LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH
IN U.S.  AGRICULTURE
There  is a large  body  of empirical  evidence  suggesting  the  rates  of return  to investments  in
public-sector research for U.S.  agriculture  have been very high, typically in excess of 30% per
annum.  Consistent  with  this view  are  the  studies  by  Ball  (1985),  Capalbo  and  Vo  (1988),
Jorgenson and Gallop (1992),  Huffman and Evenson  (1993)  and others reporting  rates of total
factor productivity  (TFP)  growth for U.S. agriculture  in the 1.84%  to 1.34%  per annum range
for the post-war  period.  But these high rates of return  to U.S.  agricultural  research  have  not
gone unchallenged  (see,  for example,  Pasour and Johnson  1982).  There are real difficulties  in
measuring  and  modeling the contribution of research  to the stock of knowledge in use and  the
subsequent productivity  or growth  consequences of this changing  knowledge stock. 1 And there
is a suspicion that by not carefully accounting for those quality changes in "conventional"  inputs
that are not the direct consequence  of public research  and  extension investments,  the technical
change effects of these public investments could be seriously mismeasured.  Systematic attempts
to adjust for these quality changes would give us more confidence,  for example,  that the growth
consequences  of increased  human capital inputs or improved  durable inputs (where the quality
improvements arise  largely from private research)  are not spuriously  being attributed  to public
research  and  extension efforts.
This paper is a report of our efforts to construct new,  state-level output,  input, and TFP
measures  for U.S. agriculture over the  1949-85  period.  In compiling  these data we  have taken
1The recent studies by Pardey and Craig (1989) and Cox and Chavas (1992)  raise some serious questions about
the common  parameterizations  used to estimate the productivity effects of research.
1on-board  many (but by no means all)  the measurement issues raised by Griliches (1960),  AAEA
(1980),  Shumway  (1988 and  others.  The  work  is  in the  spirit of Griliches'  (1963)  attempt  to
provide an explicit and  "full" accounting  of the  sources of growth in U.S.  agriculture  and by so
doing  "whittle  down"  the measured  TFP residual.  After  briefly  describing  pertinent  data  and
measurement  issues we highlight the substantial  differences  between our national  and state-level
results  and  the previously  published  work in this  area.
Measurement  Methodology
Partial factor productivity measures,  that express output per unit of an input (e.g.,  land,  labor,
or fertilizer)  are affected not only by advances  in the state of technology,  which enable  increased
levels of output to be produced per unit of measured  input,  but also by changes  in the quantities
of other inputs used in production.  If the goal is to distinguish  between those changes  in output
due to technical changes  arising  from research  (or any other productivity-enhancing  factor) and
those arising as a consequence  of changes  in the mix of inputs and outputs due  to shifts in their
relative prices,  then a more general  concept of productivity  is required.  Aggregate  total  factor
productivity  (TFP) can be  defined  as
TFP  Q,  (1)
where  TFP  expresses  an output aggregate, Q, produced  per unit of an input aggregate, X,  for
a  given  state  of technology.  Obviously  some  suitable  means  of aggregating  across  different
types  of outputs  and inputs is required  when calculating a TFP no matter how small the unit of
production under  analysis.  Unfortunately  we encounter the inevitable  index number problems.
2Changing  relative prices will cause optimizing producers  to alter their mix of inputs and outputs
and,  unless  steps  are  taken  to mitigate  these  effects,  such  responses  to prices  can  result  in a
change  in measured  TFP even in the  absence  of technical  change.
The  method  commonly  used  to  minimize  the  impact  of relative  price  changes  when
forming aggregate  quantity  indices  is to  use a Divisia indexing  procedure.  As Richter  (1966)
and Hulten  (1973)  describe,  the Divisia index is desirable because  of its invariance  property;  if
nothing  real  has changed  (e.g.,  the  only  input quantity changes  involve  movements  around  an
unchanged isoquant)  the index itself is unchanged.  The formula for an index of aggregate  inputs
is
x  = X/f  exp  j  ds  (2)
b  WXX
where XIb  is the index  value of the  base period,  b.
If the economy of interest-measured  at either the sector,  industry or even farm level-is
moving  along  an unchanged  transformation  surface,  the changes  in  inputs,  AX,  weighted  by
current  factor  prices,  W,  will  be  approximately  zero;  the  index  will  be  unchanged.  If the
economy's  transformation  surface  is shifting,  current  price-weighted  changes  will be  different
from zero  leading to changes  in the  index value.  This invariance  property  is,  one  should note,
dependent  upon a maintained assumption of optimizing  agents.
Unfortunately,  the  calculation  of a Divisia  index  requires  continuous  measurement  of
input prices  and  quantities.  In any  discrete  approximation,  some  information  is  lost,  but the
advantage  of using a chained index always reduces  to the notion that recent quantity changes  are
weighted  by  the  most  recently  observed  prices.  Intuitively,  these  indices  are  attempting  to
3evaluate current behavior in the light of current prices.  In proceeding from  the base period  to
some distant period t, the small steps are chained  together,  to minimize the measurement  error
that is possible when only base-period prices,  and period t prices, are used to evaluate real input
quantity changes.
There  are,  of course,  many possible  discrete approximations  to the  Divisia index.  We
have  chosen  to use  the  Trnqvist-Theil approximation  that uses both  current  and  lagged  cost
shares  in weighting quantity changes  yielding
XD  D  - rin  [X  ]  where  wit  sit,  .1  (3)
m  x.
I  1  Xi -1  W  (3)





The Tornqvist-Theil  approximation  in  growth  rate  form involves  weighted  sums  of quantity
changes,  and can be written as
m
n()  D  - DI  2  (Sit + Sit_)  ln(X/Xi_l),  (5) l(XI;  /X1  =  ()  =  (5)
-«l
An input series index is formed by scaling  the series so as to set XIbT  = 1.0 for any arbitrarily
chosen  base year b, and accumulating the measure forward (and if necessary backward) in time
according  to equation  (3) or by  compounding  the period-to-period  growth rates  calculated  in
equation  (5).
An output quantity index can be formed in a symmetric way using growth rates calculated
4according  to equation (6).
In  (QI,  QI,,=  )  (Si,  +  sj,  )ln  (Q,  /Qt,)  (6)
j=1
Here  QIDT is a Trnqvist output quantity  index and the output revenue  shares  in any particular
period t are  given by
=  Qj  Pj,
Sit  ,  (7)
i-1
From equation (1) it follows directly that  the growth  rate  in TFP, tfp,  is  the difference
between the growth rate  in output,  q,  and that  of inputs, x, i.e.,
tfP,  =  q  - x,
dTFP,  1  dQ,  dX,  1  (8)
where  fp,  =  qx
dt  TFP,  '  dt  dt  X,
For  relatively  small changes  in  a  variable,  Z, proportionate  rates  of change  (e.g.,  dZ/Z,)  are
approximately  equal  to  logarithmic  differences,  (In  Z, - In  Z,4)  =  In(Z/Z,_,),  so  a  discrete
approximation of equation 8 is given  by
tfp = ln  I  = ln--  - In -
TFP,,  Ot^T  VJDT TmPt 1 t-  Q4ffr
Data
The primary  data include annual  observations on inputs and outputs for the 48 contiguous states
5(excluding  Alaska  and Hawaii)  covering  the period  1949-85.  To  minimize  the possibility  of
confounding substitution  effects with real changes  in aggregate output and aggregate  input we
collected the output and input variables  to a much higher degree of disaggregation  than is found
in previous studies.  In this regard  we gave particular emphasis  to finding state-level prices  for
both outputs and inputs since the economic  rationale for using Divisia price indices is based on
the idea that input and output mixes change in response to changes in the relative prices actually
faced by producers. 2 A special  effort was  made in the construction  of the labor,  capital,  and
land variables to account for the substantial but spatially uneven changes  in these primary inputs
since  1949.  To  avoid biased indices,  we avoided using  any preaggregated  measures  of either
output or input if an  alternative was available.3 The aggregate output measure reported here
is  a  T6rnqvist-Theil  Divisia  index  that  includes  15  field  crops,  9  livestock  products,  24
horticultural  (fruit and vegetable)  crops,  plus a greenhouse  and nursery  marketings aggregate.
The  quantity  components  of the index  represent  state-level  quantities produced  and  these  are
weighted using  state-specific prices  received  by farmers.4
To  measure  labor in agriculture  and  account  for quality change in  the labor input,  we
2Using the same output data set described  here,  Craig and Pardey  (1990)  showed that state-level growth rates
were significantly  lower when state-level output indices were  formed using national price weights instead of local
ones.  Drechsler  (1973)  advocated  the use of characteristic  prices  on the grounds  that one should use the  price
weights most specific  to the economic activity being measured.
3If quantities and/or prices  of different items within an  input category  such as labor do not move in parallel,
there will be aggregation bias.  For example,  if rates of change  in higher quality labor exceeds  rates of change  in
lower quality labor,  the rate of growth of the labor aggregate is biased downward relative to an index treating high
and low quality items as separate  components  (Star 1974).
4Alterative output aggregates  are possible.  These same data can be used to  form a Divisia output price index
that,  together with  state-level  farm marketings  data  (suitably adjusted  for home  consumption,  change  in farmer-
owned inventories and, if desired, government payments), can be used to derive a broader,  implicit Divisia measure
of  agricultural  output.  To  the  extent  that  producers  commit  resources  (especially  set-aside  acres)  to  "farm
government  programs"  this output measure  may be of analytical interest.
6constructed  measures  of hours  worked and  implicit wage  series for each of 32 distinct types of
labor  within  each  state.  We  differentiated  between  hours  worked  by  hired  workers,  family
members,  and 30 classes  of farm operators  with different age and education profiles.  Census of
Agriculture data on the  age characteristics  of farm operators was used in conjunction with  state-
level  Census of Population data on the  number and  earnings  characteristics  of rural  males  in
various age-education classes  to construct opportunity cost measures of the earnings profiles  for
farm  operators  within each  state.  We  also  incorporated  data from  the Agricultural Census on
days  worked  off-farm by  farm  operators  to take  into account  the  substantial  but uneven  shift
toward  part-time farming.5 Farm Labor data  were  used to  measure  hours  of family  labor.  An
implicit quantity  measure of hired  labor was  derived from ERS  data  tapes  reporting  state-level
expenses  for hired  labor.  The  state-specific  price  for hired  and  family workers  is  a wage  rate
for hired workers  reported  in Farm Labor.
To  measure  capital's  contribution  to agricultural  inputs  we  had  to  deal  with the  usual
problem  of  inferring  service  flows  from  measured  stocks  of  capital  on  farms  as  well  as
accounting for the heterogeneity  of capital  within each of nine  capital  classes.6 To handle both
problems  we  relied  heavily  on  market  values  as  reflections  of  the  relative  effectiveness  of
different  types  of capital  within  each  capital  class  and  as  indicators  of the  rental  values  of
capital.  As  a  first  step,  we  derived  estimates  of depreciation  and  lifespan  parameters  for  a
numeraire machine type in each capital class using blue book values of new and used machines.
5The data indicate that, for many  states,  the number of days  worked off-farm actually declined  for a temporary
period during the mid-1970s.
6Our nine capital  classes consist of trucks, autos, tractors,  combines,  forage  equipment, buildings, cows,  ewes,
and sows.  For a more complete  description  of the data and measurement  procedures  we used  to construct  capital
inputs see Craig,  Pardey  and  Deininger  (1993).
7These parameter  values  were  combined  with information  about the average  age  and  quality of
capital  within each class to adjust published  stock figures and  to construct  rental  series for each
capital  class.
When  working  with  Agricultural Census  data  on physical  counts  of undifferentiated
capital  of  a  given  capital  class,  we  converted  the  published  numbers  to  counts  of  a  new
numeraire  type  assumed  to  be of constant  quality over the  sample.  When no  information  was
available  about  the mix  of types  within a  class --  as  was  the  case  for biological  capital,  cars,
trucks,  and forage equipment  --  the  published  figure was  taken to be  an accurate  count of the
used  numeraire  capital type of the  likely average  age.  Using the parameter of depreciation for
the class,  these counts  were  then discounted  to arrive  at counts of new numeraire  machines.
For tractors  and  combines  a  more  sophisticated  quality  adjustment was  possible.  After
1963,  unpublished  data  from FIEI  on state-level  purchases  of tractors  of 21  horsepower types
and combines  of 8 different types made  it possible  to form  a much more  accurate  measure  of
the average  age and type of tractor and combine in use in each state. Prior to 1964,  the average
horsepower  of tractors  in use  for  the  country  as  a  whole  was  used  along  with  an  assumed
average  age  to  convert  census  counts  to  new  numeraire  equivalents  for  both  tractors  and
combines.
When working  with  the  total  current  market value of a capital  class,  as  in the case  of
buildings,  we constructed  physical quantities  by dividing the  total value by the market  value of
the typical used  structure.  The latter price  series  was  based on a price  series  of a typical  farm
structure  and an assumed  pattern of depreciation of buildings.
To  impute  rents  for the  numeraire  within  each capital  class,  we used  the  relationship
8between  market  values  and  rents.  For all  capital  classes  we employed  the  same  constant  real
discount  rate.  But the factor of proportionality  that  was  used to  convert market  values of new
numeraire  capital  types  into  rents  differed  across  capital  classes  with  different  rates  of
depreciation or lifespans.
The land  input is the  service  flow from land  of three basic  types:  pasture  or rangeland,
nonirrigated  cropland,  and  irrigated  cropland.  The  measure  we  used  differs  from the  land  in
farms  figure  commonly  used by others in  that ours  excludes  non-grazed  forest and woodlands,
which  are  land  in farms  but  not in agriculture.  Our measure  also  includes  tracts  of federally-
owned (e.g., Bureau of Land Management)  land that was rented or leased for rangeland grazing
purposes.  The  price  weights  used  in  aggregation  were  annual,  state-level,  cash  rents.  When
missing observations  made it necessary,  imputed rents were calculated using the correspondence
between observed  rents and land values.  By separating  land into the three types and constructing
a different rental  series  for each,  we hope to  have a more accurate  measure of the quantity and
quality  of land  in agriculture.
There  are  nine  broad  classes  of purchased  inputs  used  in  this  study.  They  include
fertilizers  (further  disaggregated  into  elemental  nitrogen,  phosphorus  and  potash),  a
preaggregated  pesticides,  herbicides  and fungicides  category,  purchased  seed,  purchased  feed,
fuels  and  oils,  electricity,  repairs,  machine  hire,  and  a  miscellaneous  input  category  that
preaggregates  a long list of disparate  inputs such as fencing,  veterinary services,  insurance costs
and so on.
9Output and Input Trends
A useful way to assess  a new data series is to compare it with previously available estimates  that
purportedly  measure  the  same  thing.7 But  often  this  is not  a  wholly  satisfactory  exercise.
Inevitably  there  are  variations  in  data  coverage,  quality,  methods  of  construction,  and
aggregation,  that can  make  it difficult  to  interpret  the  similarities  and  differences  so  revealed.
With  these  caveats  in  mind  we  follow  with  some  selected  comparisons  of  our  series  with
previously  published estimates.
Aggregate output
The  national  output  aggregate  formed  with  state-level  prices  and  quantities  grew  by
1.78%  per  annum  during  the  1949-85  period.  Underlying  this  figure  there  is considerable
regional  variation.  Output increased  by 2.94% annually  in the South East,  but decreased  in the
smaller  northeastern  states.8 States  with average  annual  output  growth  at  or  above  3%  are
Florida, Delaware,  Georgia,  California,  and Arkansas.  By contrast, output decreased  over this
period  in Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  New Hampshire,  New Jersey,  and West Virginia.  In the
aggregate,  our rate of growth  in output is higher than the  1.44%  obtained  by  Capalbo  and Vo
(1988) for 1948-83,  but lower than the 2.38%,  1.92%,  and 1.98% annual growth rates,  obtained
by Huffman and Evenson (1993),  Jorgenson and Gollop (1992),  and Ball  (1985),  respectively.9
Input Aggregates
7Gardner (1992)  recently  reminds  us that appearances  can be deceiving  in this respect.
8See  table 8  for a grouping of states  into  11  production regions.
9 Huffman and Evenson's estimates are from 1950-82, Jorgenson and Gollop's from 1947-85,  and Ball's from  1948-
78.
10Labor:  According to Ball's (1985) estimates  the value share of labor in U.S. agriculture
was  around  54.6%  in 1948  and declined to  20.8%  by  1979.  This  represents  an annual  rate  of
decline in labor use of 3.17%.  Capalbo and Vo (1988)  report a  1949 labor share  figure of 36%,
declining  to  9.5%  by  1983.  By  contrast,  our  data  suggest  a  much  more  modest  long-run
contraction in quality-adjusted labor shares down to 27.2%  in 1985 from a  1949 figure of 44.7%
(table  2).  And,  according  to  our estimates,  quality-adjusted  labor  shares  actually  rose during
the  1981-85  period.  Apparently  the  increase  in  labor  quality  over  the  post-war  period  has
partially  offset the decline  in total hours  in agriculture.
Capital:  Our data have  the share of quality-adjusted capital services  (including  services
from mechanical  inputs, service  structures,  and biological capital) in U.S.  agriculture  at around
11.4%  in  1949  growing  to  14.4%  in  1985  (table  3).  This  translates  into  a  relatively  small
increase  of 0.59%  per  annum,  which contrasts  with other  studies  such  as  Ball  (1985)  whose
capital  share  almost doubles  from  13.2%  in 1949  to 25.9%  in 1979.  Our estimates  of the  rate
of increase  in capital use  in U.S.  agriculture  are in line  with Capalbo  and Vo's more  modest
growth  from  23.7%  in  1949  to  27.7%  in  1983.10  For our data  the  largest  increase  in capital
services  occurred  in the  Delta,  Appalachian,  and  Southeastern  states.
Land:  Using  a  land  in farms measure,  Capalbo  and  Vo report a  steep  increase  in the
'°In Ball's case these capital inputs represent durable equipment (excluding service structures) and farm-produced
durables  and for Capalbo  and  Vo  they represent  durable  equipment, nonresidential  structures  and  animal  stock.
11land share from less than 6%  in 1950 to more than 40%  in 1981.  Ball's real property (i.e.,  land
and  structures)  share  is  quite volatile,  ranging  from 2.9%  in  1949  to  31%  in  1973,  9.3%  in
1975,  and  17.6%  in  1979.  In our  case  the  cost  share  of quality-adjusted  land services  at  the
national  level is remarkably  stable over time ranging  from  18.3%  to  19.7%  (table  4).  But this
stability  at the national  level masks  a  good deal  of cross-state  variability.  The Mountain  states
have land-intensive farms with cost shares  around 30%  while less  than 7%  of the farming  costs
in the Northeastern  states go to land services.  Moreover,  land shares decreased over time in the
Appalachian  and  Southeastern  states  but grew  a little  in the  Corn Belt,  Mountain,  and  Pacific
regions. 
Purchased Inputs:  While  Capalbo  and  Vo report a  decline  in the share  of purchased
inputs  from  37.2%  in  1948  to  26.9%  in  1983,  our  data  has  this  cost  share  increasing  from
25.7% to 40.7%  between 1949 and  1985.  These trends  are consistent with Ball's estimates that
show an  increase from  23.3%  in  1948  to  35.7%  in 1979.  Our data show  the largest  increase
was  in the  southern states (i.e.,  the  Southeast,  Delta,  Southern  Plains and Pacific states)  while
the use  of purchased  inputs  actually decreased  in the smaller Northeastern  states.
Total Inputs:  A summary measure of the real  inputs used in agriculture is given in table
5.  Taking  the  U.S.  as  a  whole,  aggregate  input use  declined  marginally  for  all  sub-periods
except  during  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s  when  it  grew  by  2.4%  per  annum.  On  balance
aggregate input use since  1949 grew by 0.18% per annum at the national level,  1.2% per annum
12in  the  Pacific  region,  and  contracted  in  the  smaller  Northeastern  states  as  well  as  the
Appalachian  and Delta regions.
Productivity Growth
National estimates:  The TFP estimates  presented  in table 6 (and graphically in figure
1) give a rough indication of the quantitative differences  in the most widely used series.  These
series are not strictly comparable  since the Ball and Capalbo and Vo figures were derived using
national aggregate  data while the other two series were formed  using state-level data. But, they
do  indicate  that  the  rate  of growth  of measured  TFP  may  differ  substantially  depending  on
methods used and commodity coverage.  The growth in TFP calculated using our data is higher
than Capalbo and Vo's estimate but some 14% below those of other studies.  One feature to note
is that, despite historically  high rates of growth in real output during the late 1970s,  measured
TFP actually  contracted  during  this period  given  the commensurately  large  increase  in input
(particularly  purchased inputs and capital  services)  use.  The rather large productivity gains  in
the early  1970s and early  1980s came from increases  in real output coupled  with a decline  in
aggregate inputs.
Regional and state estimates:  The state- and regional-level  data display  large spatial
variations in input,  output and measured  productivity trends  since  1949.  For the Northeastern
states measured  TFP actually increased  because the decline in aggregate inputs  was even  more
13rapid  than the  decline  in  aggregate  outputs.  In the  mid-western  states  moderate  productivity
growth was brought  about by  increases  in both inputs and  outputs.  In the Southeast  and  Delta
regions, aggregate  input use for some states such as Alabama and Mississippi declined markedly,
resulting  in high rates  of growth  in measured  TFP despite slower  growth in aggregate  output.
By  contrast,  Florida  had the largest  increase  in aggregate  output of any of the  contiguous 48
states but this was offset by a relatively large  increase in  inputs  so that the measured  growth in
TFP was  not so dramatic.  Regional  comparisons of measured  TFP are  given in table 7.
The Evenson,  Landau and Ballou (1987)  series (as used by Huffman and Evenson  1993)
provide  the  only  other  published  estimates  of  state-level  TFPs  for  U.S.  agriculture.  We
compared these state-level TFP estimates with our own, and -- with the exception of seven states
(Arizona,  Florida,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Nevada,  New York  and Utah)  --  found their rates  of TFP
growth  were  much higher than our own estimates.  Table  8 gives  a summary  indication of the
differences  between  the two TFP series.
Final Comments
The data reported here  represent  our efforts to construct  a highly disaggregated  series  of state-
level  output,  input,  and  TFP  measures  that  give  special  attention  to  accounting  for  quality
changes.  One of our ultimate objectives  is to revisit the rates of return to public research  (and
extension)  issue.  But  to do  so  we  felt it  necessary  to  compile  data  that  lowers  the  risk  of
attributing output or productivity gains to these public  investments that in fact have their origins
elsewhere.  Our first look at these data reveal substantial quantitative and qualitative differences
14with  previous  studies.  Disaggregating  the  data  to  the  state-level  introduces  a  good  deal  of
variation  that offers  the  prospect of a much richer understanding  of the nature  and  sources  of
technical  change in U.S.  agriculture  and  may also minimize our appeals  to a residual  measure
of ignorance  in order  to account for observed  growth in agricultural  output.
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Note  In  the absence  of relevant  quantity  data  the  Ball  (1985)  and Capalbo  and  Vo  (1988)  indices  were  simple  rescaled
(rather  than rebased)  from  a  1977  to a 1949  =  100  "base".
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New Hampshire  140.00
Rhode  Island  180.51
Vermont  126.90
Northeast 2
Delaware  227.5  217.10  1.05
Maryland  181.7  166.69  1.09
New Jersey  136.6  97.12  1.41
New  York  133.6  142.08  0.94
Pennsylvania  202.9  162.00  1.25
Corn Belt
Illinois  165.9  146.05  1.14
Indiana  187.2  149.87  1.25
Iowa  148.9  138.35  1.08
Missouri  184.4  137.73  1.34
Ohio  182.3  142.45  1.28
Lake States
Michigan  220.3  166.41  1.32
Minnesota  194.0  167.72  1.16
Wisconsin  164.8  140.93  1.17
Northern Plains
Kansas  212.3  175.43  1.21
Nebraska  202.2  183.56  1.10
North Dakota  237.9  181.67  1.31
South Dakota  187.4  182.36  1.03
Appalachian
Kentucky  224.5  169.42  1.33
North Carolina  263.2  220.45  1.19
Tennessee  208.3  187.98  1.11
Virginia  186.3  147.39  1.26
West Virginia  186.3  140.11  1.33
Southeast
Alabama  288.6  271.73  1.06
Florida  127.5  176.44  0.72
Georgia  277.3  294.75  0.94
South Carolina  249.3  226.58  1.10
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-
Region/State  Evenson  & Deininger  TFP4 9 )PC
Delta
Arkansas  284.0  255.32  1.11
Louisiana  217.5  212.56  1.02
Mississippi  340.1  318.14  1.07
Southern Plains
Oklahoma  207.8  160.19  1.30
Texas  158.3  132.60  1.19
Mountain
Arizona  100.7  132.78  0.76
Colorado  162.9  130.25  1.25
Idaho  162.9  183.51  0.89
Montana  173.0  172.62  1.00
Nevada  101.2  135.23  0.75
New Mexico  141.9  133.58  1.06
Utah  115.4  147.28  0.78
Wyoming  130.3  127.99  1.02
Pacific
California  186.2  170.85  1.09
Oregon  199.5  153.14  1.30
Washington  231.8  138.48  1.67
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1. Introduction
The U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  has long been concerned  with sectoral
productivity  growth.  The content  of the USDA's Production and Efficiency Statistics can be
traced to the pioneering  work of Glen Barton.  His paper  with Martin Cooper  was one of the
first to publish multifactor productivity  indexes for U.S.  agriculture  (Barton and  Cooper
[1948]).
An early  innovator,  the USDA was  for more than two decades  the sole government
agency  to regularly  compile  and publish multifactor productivity  indexes.  Other agencies,  in
particular  the Department of Labor, have  continued  to  emphasize the much less useful,  and
theoretically  less palatable,  partial factor productivity  indexes.  For its innovativeness,  the
USDA  is to be  commended.
Although  innovative in many  ways,  the  USDA has been resistant to change in others.
Soon after the  USDA began publishing  productivity  indexes,  Griliches  (1960)  challenged  the
quality of some of the data  and a  number of procedures  used  by the USDA to measure
agricultural productivity.  Since  that time,  others  have criticized  specific  aspects  of theproductivity  series and  its  statistical underpinnings  (e.g., Christensen  [1975];  Brown  [1978];
Ball  [1984,  1985];  Shumway  [1988]).  Few of the suggested  changes  have  been  implemented.
The purpose  of this paper  is to address  concerns  regarding  the  USDA productivity
series.  In doing  so,  we  will draw  on the report of the American Agricultural  Economics
Association  (AAEA)  task force  on productivity  measurement  which synthesized  needed
improvements  perceived  by Griliches  and  others  (USDA  [1980]).
2.  The Divisia  Index of Productivity
Suppose that at each point  in time  t  we have a production  function
f  (x,  ..  x n ,  t)  showing  the quantity of output obtainable  from inputs  x 1,  .. ,  x n. Total
differentiation of
(1)  y(t) = f(xl (t)  ,-,xn(t),  t)
with respect to time yields.
(2)  dy(t)  _  af  dxj  a  f
dt  jz  axj  dt  at
Dividing both sides  by y and  rearranging  terms,  we obtain
(a  n f _  d  In  y  d  In xi
A3dt  dt  e i  dt
2If we  assume profit maximization,  the output elasticities  e j equal  input shares  in total
revenue,  and (3) becomes
(4)  In  _ 
==1  t  Py  dt
Equation  (4) measures productivity  growth  by subtracting  from the rate of change  in
output a weighted  sum of the  rates of change  in inputs.  If all prices and  quantities  are
observed,  f  can be calculated without estimation of the production  function.  However,  this
result only applies  exactly  to data generated  continuously.  And since  economic  data come  in
discreet observations,  (4) can only  be approximated.  A common approximation  is
(5)  fT  =  n  yt  - In  yt-  - -- '  (j,  +  5 j,t-)  (In  x,  t  - In  xj,  )  ,
where  Sj  t  is the ratio of the cost of input j  to the revenue  at time  t.  As the time  interval
approaches  zero,  (5) approaches  (4).
The second  term on the right-hand  side of (4) is the familiar Divisia input index,
whereas  the  second term on the  right-hand  side of (5) is the Tornqvist approximation  to the
Divisia index.  This observation  suggests  immediately  a reasonable  approach when  there  are
many outputs.  Let  Ri t be the  ratio of the revenue  associated  with output  i  to the total
revenue  at time  t.  Then the Torqvist approximation to the Divisia output index is
(6)  =  - (Ri,  +  Ri,  -1)  (In  Yit  - In  Yi  t-1) 
i  =1
3The productivity  index presented  here is constructed  as  the ratio  of the Tornqvist
index of aggregate  output to the Tornqvist index  of aggregate  input.
3.  Labor Input
Prior to 1985,  the  USDA data on hours worked  were  not derived  from surveys of
actual hours of labor committed to  agricultural production.  Rather,  the labor  input was
calculated  on a  "requirements"  basis  using estimated  quantities  of labor required  to  perform
various production  activities.  Beginning  in 1985,  estimates  of hours worked  were survey
based.
It is important  not only  to to have  an accurate  count of hours  worked,  but also to
consider  the attributes  of individual  workers.  Griliches  (1960) argued  that the labor input
had  been underestimated  because  of changing  level of formal eduation  in the farm  labor
force.  The AAEA  task force concurred  and  suggested that labor quality has also  been
affected by changes  in such characteristics  as age,  sex and employment status--employee  and
self-employed.  None of these  factors  are considered  in the USDA labor series.
Griliches  (1960)  attempted  an early  adjustment  of the  labor series  based  on sex  and
years of schooling.  Gollop  and Jorgenson (1980)  undertook  a much more involved analysis
of labor quality  in many sectors,  including agriculture,  covering the period  1947-73.  In a
recent working paper, Jorgenson  extended this  series to  1985.  The  series reflects  changes
over time  in demographic  charcteristics  and employment status.
For each of 37 sectors  of the economy,  they tabulated data on wages  and  quantities of
labor  input cross-classified  by the  two sexes,  eight age groups  and five educational  groups
4for both hired and  self-employed  and unpaid  family  workers.  Annual data  on hours  worked
and average  labor compensation  per hour are required  for  160 components  of the work  force
in each  industry.  For this purpose  employment,  hours,  weeks,  and labor compensation
within each  sector are allocated  on the  basis of available  cross-classifications.  This approach
makes  it possible  to exploit all  the published  detail on labor input from  the decennial  Census
of Population  and the Current Population Survey.
The value of labor compensation is equal to wages  paid  plus the imputed wage  to self-
employed  and unpaid  family labor.  We  impute to this class  of workers  the mean wage of
workers  with same  demographic  characteristics.
4.  Capital Input
Our first task  is to construct estimates  of capital  stock  for each asset type.  We
employ  the perpetual  inventory method to estimate the stock of depreciable  capital  assets.
The  stock of capital  assets  is equal to a  weighted  sum of past  investments  where  the weights
are the sequence  of relative  efficiencies  of assets  of different ages.  For land and  inventories,
the estimates  are implicit  quantities constructed  from  balance-sheet  data.
Next we construct estimates  of rental  prices for each type of asset.  We derive
implicit rental prices  based  on an assumed  relationship between  the purchase  price  of an asset
and the discounted  value of future  service flows  derived from that asset.
For this study,  depreciable  capital  assets  include  nonresidential  structures,  motor
vehicles,  farm tractors,  and  other equipment.  Data on investment are obtained  from the
Bureau  of Economic Analysis'  (BEA) Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United
5States.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)  producer  price  indexes  for passenger  autos,
motor trucks,  wheel-type  farm tractors  and agricultural  machinery  excluding  tractors  are
employed as  investment deflators.  This  is because  BLS  collects price  information  for
machines  of constant  quality rather than pricing machines with options farmers  typically
purchase,  as is the USDA practice.  For nonresidential  structures,  we use  the implicit price
deflator  for nonresidential  structures  in the National Income And Product Accounts.
4.1 Capital Stock
The perpetual  inventory method  is employed to cumulate  annual investment into  a
measure  of capital  stock.  In this method,  the sequence  of relative efficiencies  of capital
goods  of different ages  enables us to represent  the capital stock at the end of each period,  say
Kt, as  a weighted  sum of past investments:
(7)  K  =  S(t)  It,,
where  It_,  is investment in period  t-t and the weights  are given by  the sequence  of
relative efficiencies.
Capital goods  decline in efficiency  at each point in time,  generating  the need for
replacement  of productive  capacity.  The proportion of investment to be replaced  at age  -r,
say  m,  is equal to  the decline  in efficiecny  from age  T-1  to age  -:
(8)  mn  =  - (s,  - s,_ 1),  T  =  1,  ... ,  T.
These  proportions are mortality  rates for capital  goods of different ages.
6Replacement  in period  t  corresponding  to the mortality distribution  m, is given by:
(9)  Rt  =  m,  It-,
T=1
Efficiency  loss  is assumed  to be a function of age.  The  sequence  of relative
efficiencies  of capital assets  of different ages  is given by the hyperbolic  fucntion:
(10)  ~~~~~  ()-(L-r)0 (10)  5()  =(L-  -t)  0'
S(T)  =  O,  T  > L
where  L  is the service  life of the asset and  P is a curvature  or decay parameter.  The
calculated  value of this  function gives  the productive  capacity  of an asset  r  years  after the
purchase date  expressed  as a proportion of the original  invstment.  Subtracting  this value form
unity  yields the proportion of accumulated  physical depreciation  t years  after  the purcahse
date.
This function  incorporates  many of the of the commonly used forms of depreciation
as  special  cases.  The upper limit on  p  is  1.  This  corresponds  to the  "one-hoss shay"  form
of depreciation  where  an asset  is fully productive  until it reaches  the end of its  service  life,  at
which point it productivity  falls  to zero.  As the  value of P approaches  zero,  decay  occurs at
an increasing  rate  over time.  If  p  is zero,  the function corresponds  to the formula  for
straight line depreciation where  physical  decay  occurs  in even increments  over the  life of the
asset.  Finally,  if P is negative,  decay occurs  more  rapidly in the  early  years  of service
corresponding  to accelerated  forms of depreciation  such  as the geometric  or declining  balance
patterns.
7Problems arise  as to the value that  should be chosen for  P  in order  to accurately
reflect  efficiency loss.  Little  empirical evidence  is available to suggest a precise  value.
Much of the justification for assuming an accelerated  form of depreciation  is based on studies
which detail the resale  of used  assets  in secondary  markets.  Typically,  these  studies  find that
the value of an asset  does decline most rapidly  in the early  years of service.  However,  these
studies  fail to distinguish between physical  depreciation and  the decline in the value of an
asset.  To illustrate this point,  consider the example of a  light bulb.  If we expect  no decline
in output  (illumination)  over a given period,  say  1000 hours,  the relative efficiency  follows a
one-hoss  shay pattern.  Yet the  value,  assuming  a zero  rate  of discount,  is proportional to the
hours  in service.  That  is,  after  100 hours in service,  the replacement  value of the light bulb
is nine-tenths  of its  original  value.  Therefore,  if we  look at economic depreciation,  the
maximum value of  p  is zero.  If there  is a positive  discount rate  and  future capital services
are discounted  to the present,  we find that the  value of the asset declines  exponentially.
Thus,  the  empirical evidence  does support the theory that the  value of an asset  declines  at an
accelerated  rate.
However,  there  is no justification for extending  this argument  to conclude  that
efficiency  also declines  at an accelerated  rate.  On the contrary,  there  are both technological
and economic  arguments  that support the theory that efficiency  decay occurs  more rapidly  in
the  later years of service.  If one  observes  a capital  asset  in use it appears  that efficiency  is
uniformly  high in the early  years of service.  Only after some time does the  asset begin to
deteriorate.  Expenditures for repairs and maintenance  are required  to maintain efficiency.
As  the asset  ages,  greater  efficiency  loss  occurs  and required  expenditures  for repairs and
8maintenance  reach  such a level that  many are  foregone,  and  the efficiency of the  asset
declines  to the point where  the asset is scrapped  or sold.
In this study,  repairs  and maintenance  expenditures  are defined  to be of a minor or
nature.  They do  not include  major repairs which both increase  the efficiency  of an asset  and
extend the useful life.  This  is consistent with the  accounting practice  of treating minor repairs
as  current expense  and  major repairs  as as capital  expenditures.
Two  studies provide  evidence  that firms attempt to maintain efficiency  until such time
as  technological  obsolescence  or efficiency  decay warrent a decision  to scrape  the asset.  At
that point,  the  asset  is allowed  to  decay  with little effort to  maintain efficiency.  Utilizing data
on.  Utilizing  data on expenditures  for repairs  and maintenance of 745  farm tractors covering
the period  1958-74,  Penson,  Hughes and Nelson (1977)  found that the loss of efficiency  was
very  small  in the early  years and increased  rapidly as the  end of the asset's service  life
approached.
More  recently,  Romain,  Penson and  Lambert  (1987)  compared  the explanatory power
of alternative  capacity  depreciation  patterns  for farm tractors  in a model  of investment
behavior that also  included the  price of capital  services.  They  found that the concave
depreciation pattern better reflects  actual investment  decisions.
Given the  above  discussion,  it seems appropriate  to restrict the  value of  3 to lie
between zero  and one.  It was  assumed that the efficiency  of structures  declines slowly  over
most of their service  life until the point is reached  where  the cost of major repairs  exceeds
the  discounted  value  of the increased  service  flows derived  form the  reapirs.  At this point,
structures  were  assumed  to deteriorate  rapidly.  In the case of machinery,  the efficiency  loss
9was assumed  to occur  over a larger  proportion of the service  life.  The final values  chosen
for  1 were  0.50 for machinery  and equipment and 0.75 for structures.
Each type of asset consists of a homogenous  group  of assets for which the service
lives differ due to quality differences,  maintenance  schedules,  etc.  For each  asset, there
exists  some mean service  life  L around  which there  exists some distribution  of actual  service
lives.  In order  to determine  the amount of capital available  for production the actual service
lives and their frequency  of occurence  must be  determined.  It was assumed  that this
distribution could accurately  be depicted  by the  normal distribution.
One problem  in using  the normal distribution to  calculate the frequence  of occurence
of each of the service  lives is that the distribution extends  infinitely in either direction from
the mean.  Without some adjustment,  the distribution would yield cases where  assets were
discarded prior to the initial investment  date or assets  with unrealistically  long  service  lives.
To eliminate these  extremes,  the distribution  was  truncated  at a point two standard deviations
before  and after the mean.  Two  standard  deviations correspond  to 0.98 times the assumed
mean service life.  This dispersion parameter  was chosen  to conform to the observation  that
assets  are  occasionally  found that  are considerable  older than the mean  service  life and that  a
few assets  are accidently  damaged when new.  The area under the truncated normal curve
was then adjusted upward within the allowed range  of asset lives.  Asset service  lives
correspond  to 85  percent of Bulletin F  lives.
Once the  frequence of occurence  of a particular  service  life was determined,  the
efficiency  function for that service  life was calculated  using the assumed value  of P1. This
process  was repeated  for all possible  service lives.  An efficiency  function for the investment
10cohort  was then constructed  as a weighted  sum of the individual efficiency  functions using as
weights  the frequency  of occurence.  This  function  not only reflects  changes  in efficiency,
but also the discard  distribution around the  mean service  life of the asset.
We construct  the  stock of land in farms as  an implicit quantity index using  as prices
land values  (excluding buildings) per acre.  In an effort to obtain a constant quality  land
series,  we  compiled data on land area and land  values  for each Crop Reporting  District  in
each  state.  Acres  of cropland,  pasture  and  other land were  handled separately  in the  17
Western  States,  as was  irrigated/nonirrigated  land.  The acreage  of the components  is
reported  in the Census  of Agriculture;  USDA compiles annual  estimates  of total land in
farms.  The distribution  of land in each use category  was  interpolated  between the censuses.
The stock of producer-owned  inventories  is constructed  in a  similar manner.  The
number  and average  value of animals on farms  at the beginning of the year  are available
from annual  surveys.  Data on stocks of grains and  oilseeds are also available.  However,  no
distinction  is made  between producer-owned  and commercially  held stocks.  We estimated
producer-owned  stocks  at yearend  1978  as the quantities stored  on the farm plus producer-
owned  stocks stored off the  farm;  quantities  of commodities used as  collateral for outstanding
Commodity  Credit Corporation loans  were  subtracted.  Stocks  were then moved forward  to
1989 by adding,  and back to  1960 by subtracting,  the estimated annual changes  in stocks.
Yearend  stocks were  valued at the average  price  received  by farmers  during the month of
December.
114.2  Retail Prices of Capital Services.
We assume  that firms will add to the capital  stock so long as  the present  value of the
net revenue  generated  by an  additional unit of capital exceeds  the purchase  price of the asset.
This can be stated algebraically  as  (Coen  1975):
(11)  a  (  - AK  (l  +r)  -t  >  q ,
where  P is the price of output,  Y  is the  real  output,  q is the price of an additional  unit of
capital and  r  is the real discount rate.
To maximize  net present  value,  firms should add  to the capital  stock until  this
equation  holds as  an equality.  This requires  that
~)(12) -E)< q (  at)  (l+r)-  +  rq
=  c,
The expression  for c  is the  implicit rental  price of capital  for a particular mortality
distribution  m.  The rental  price consists of two components.  The  first term,  qr, represents
the opportunity  cost of invested  funds.  The second term,
(13)  q( I  aR(t)  (l-r)-t,
is the  discounted  value of all future  replacement  required  to maintain the productive  capacity
of the capital  stock.
Following Coen (1975),  we define  F as  the present value  of the stream of capacity
depreciation on one  unit of capital  according  to the mortality distribution  m; that is:
12(14)  F  =  m t (l+r)  -.
t=l
Since replacement  at time  t  is equal to  capacity depreciation  at time  t:
IRt  (lr) - =




(16)  c=  qr
(1-F)
The real  rate of return  r  in the above expression  was calculated  as the nominal  yield
on corporate bonds  less the rate of inflation  as measured  by the producer price  index  for
gross  domestic  product.  An ex ante rate was  obtained by expressing  observed  real  rates  as
an ARIMA  process.  We then calculated  F keeping  this ex ante real  rate constant for each
vintage  of capital  goods.
5.1  Output
The data on crop output consist of quantities sold (including unredeemed  Commodity
Credit Corporation  loans) plus  additions  to farmer-owned  inventories  and the quantity
consumed  in farm households  during the calendar year.  The USDA collects  annual data  on
quantities of crops  sold.  However,  the  accounting  period often differs  from the calendar
year.  When this occurs,  we use  data on the monthly  distribution  of sales  to distribute
13quantities  sold during the crop year  to the  calendar  year.  In the  case  of livestock,  the
measure  is the estimated weight gained on farms  and  in feedlots.
The value of farm output reflects the value to the producing  sector;  that  is,  subsidies
are  added  and  indirect taxes  are subtracted  form the market  value.  Prices  received by
farmers,  as reported  in USDA's Agricultural Prices, include an allowance  for net
Commodity  Credit Corporation loans and purchases  by the Government  valued  at the average
loan rate.  However,  direct payments  under Federal  commodity programs  are not reflected  in
the data.  Average  prices  for wool,  mohair,  and program  crops  are constructed  as ratios  of
cash receipts plus subsidies  to quantities  sold; dairy assessments  are  subtracted  from receipts.
We then calculate  the value of output by multiplying  adjusted  prices  by the output quantities.
5.2  Intermediate Inputs
Intermediate  inputs comprise all  goods (other than fixed capital)  and services
consumed by the sector.  Goods which  were produced within the sector are recorded  as
intermediate  input only if they  have  also been recorded  as output.  Feed crops  produced  and
consumed on the farm  are excluded  from both output and intermediate  input.  In the case  of
livestock,  only the costs  incurred  in the transaction  are recorded  as  intermediate  input.  This
accounting procedure  is designed  to prevent  the full value of a live animal being  included  as
both output and intermediate  input every time  it moves  from one  farm to another.
145.2.1 Feed,  Seed,  and Livestock
Expenditure  data for livestock feeds are available  from the  Census of Agriculture  and
annual  surveys.  In an effort to  measure  the nonfarm value  added,  the USDA uses Census  of
Manufacturing  data to estimate  the margin between the farm value of feed  crops  and the
value of manufactured  feeds.  The margin  is intended to capture  the  value of salt, minerals,
and other additives,  as well  as processing  and transportation  services  added in the nonfarm
sector.  An estimate of the nonfarm value added  in constant prices  is obtained by  dividing by
the prices  paid  index for livestock feeds.  The  farm value of purchased  livestock  feeds  is
subtracted  from the measure of sectoral output.
For seeds,  the nonfarm  valued  added  is based  on the difference  between prices  paid
for seed and prices  received  for crops,  while the nonfarm  valued added  in livestock
purchases  is the difference  between purchases  from hatcheries  and receipts  for hatching  eggs.
The AAEA task force rejected  the value added  measure  advancing  arguments  similar
to those outlined  above.  Instead,  the  AAEA recommended  that feed crops  consumed  on the
farm,  as well as purchased  livestock feeds,  be included  in the measure  of intermediate  input.
Gross  production of feed  crops would be included  in output from the  sector.  An objection  is
that this approach  counts  feed  crops twice--once  as crop production and  again as embodied  in
livestock output.
The approach  adopted  here  is to  include the  full value of purchased  feed and  seed.
We  construct  Tornqvist price  indexes  as deflators.  Livestock  purchases  consist  of imports  of
live  animals.
155.2.2 Agricultural  Chemicals
For fertilizer  and lime,  the basic  data are annual  estimates  of the tonnage consumed  of
nitrogen  (N), phosphorus  pentoxide  (P205),  and potassium oxide  (K20)  as reported  in
Commercial Fertilizer  Consumption.  Consumption of lime was  obtained  from the National
Lime Institute.  To aggregate  the plant nutrients,  we use  estimates  of the prices  of plant
nutrients  consumed  in the form  of bulk materials  (fertilizer  materials that contain a high
concentration  of a  single plant nutrient).  Several  nitrogenous  materials  are available.  A
weighted  average  price  for a ton of nitrogen is constructed  using  as weights the  quantities  of
nitrogen supplied  by each material.  Prices  for the  two remaining  plant nutrients  are derived
from the prices  for concentrated  super phosphates  (46 percent  P20 5) and muriate  of potash
(60 percent K20).  The measure of pesticides  is based upon current  expenditures  as estimated
by the USDA.  Estimated  expenditures  are deflated  by a  Tornqvist  price  index constructed
from data provided  by the U.S.  Environmental  Protection Agency.
5.2.3  Petroleum Fuels,  Natural Gas,  and Electricity
Data on fuel consumption  in agriculture  by type of fuel and  agricultural  sector  are
taken from the National Energy Accounts: Energy Flows in the United States compiled  by the
Office of Business Analysis,  U.S.  Department of Commerce.  Data are reported  for the years
1947,  1954,  and  1958-85.  For succeeding  years,  we estimate  fuel  consumption based  on
expenditure  and price  data taken  from  annual  issues of Farm Production Expenditures and
Agricultural Prices, respectively.  For the  intervening  years,  fuel consumption is estimated  as
16the sum of fitted values  for consumption  in both crop  and  livestock sectors.  Consumption of
natural gas and liquified  petroleum gas was  a function of specific production activities,
including  grain drying,  irrigation,  and livestock brooding.  Consumption of gasoline  and
diesel  fuel was  regressed  on stocks  of gasoline  and diesel tractors,  stocks of gasoline  and
diesel  self-propelled  harvesting  equipment,  and time.
We estimate  electricity consumption  by dividing expenditures  for electricity  by  the
average price per kilowatt hour provided by the Rural Electrification  Administration.
5.2.4 Other Purchased Inputs
There  remains  several purchased  inputs that account  for a relatively  small  share  in
total intermediate  input expense.  Included are expenditures  for contract  labor, purchased
machine services,  machine and  building repairs  and maintenance,  transportation  services,
irrigation fees paid to public sellers of water,  and purchases  of farm  supplies such as  small
hand tools,  baling twine,  etc.  The deflator for contract labor expenditures  is the piece  rate
reported by the USDA.  For purchased  machine services,  we construct  a Tornqvist price
index of rental rates  for durable  equipment,  petroleum fuels,  and the wage paid to hired farm
workers.  Expenditures  for transportation  services  are deflated  using the implicit price
deflator for the trucking  and wharehousing  industry  (SIC 42).  The Consumer Price Index
(CPI) for automobile repairs  is used to obtain the series  on machinery  repairs  in constant
prices;  the CPI for building repairs  and maintenance  is used to measure expenditures  for
building  repairs  and maintenance  in constant prices.  The index of operating  and maintenance
17costs  computed  by Bureau  of Reclamation  is used  to deflate  irrigation expense.  Finally,
expenditures  for farm  supplies are deflated  by the Consumer  Price Index  for hardware  items.
6.  Total Factor Productivity
Using equations  (5) and  (6),  we compute  indexes of total  output,  total  factor input and
productivity  for U.S.  agriculture  and for selected  states.  The  indexes  are reported for the
period  1900-89 along with average  rates of growth for the 1960-89 period  and  intermediate
periods.  These correspond  to peaks  in business  cycles.
Looking first at the results  at the national  level,  we see  that total output  from the
sector grew  at a  2 percent annual rate.  All of the increase  in output was  accounted  for by
increases  in productivity.  Total factor  input actually  declined  modestly over the  1960-89
period.
Two  intermediate periods  are  of particular  interest.  The  first period is that spanning
the years  1973-79.  Total  output grew  at an annual rate of 2.4 percent.  Growth  in input use
accounted  for most of the growth  in output with productivity growth stagnant.  This period is
bracketed  by the two oil embargoes  which resulted  in dramatic  increases  in energy prices  and
prices  of other purchased  inputs.
The  second  is the period  1979-89.  Growth in total  output slowed during this period.
however,  this relatively  modest rate  of growth  in output was sustained  while total  input use
actually  declined  at a  1.5 percent  annual  rate.  Growth in total factor productivity  was  almost
3 percent per annum.
18A comparison with the nonfarm sector,  done by Jorgenson,  Gollop  and Fraumeni
(1987),  found  only the communications  industry achieved  greater rates of productivity  growth
than agriculture.
Also presented  are results  for selected states.  The regional  disparities  in growth of
the  agricultural sector  is striking.  For the  five  states where  data are complete,  the annual
growth rates  ranged from a  low of 1.8 percent  in Illinois to 3.35  percent in Colorado.
Productivity  growth,  while clearly  cyclical,  exceeded  the annual  rate  for the  U.S.  in each  of
the five states.  With the exception of California,  productivity growth rates exceeded
2 percent  annually.  Productivity  increases  exceeded 4 percent  annually  in Nebraska.
Summary and Conclusion
Measures  of total output,  total factor  input and productivity  are constructed  for the
United  States  and selected  individual  states for the period  1960-89.  The rate  of growth in
total output exceeded  2 percent per annum.  All of the growth in output was  accounted  for by
growth in productivity.  The index of total  input declined modestly.
Regional  disparities  in growth rates of total  output were  striking.  These ranged  from
a low  of 1.8 percent  annually in Illinois to  a high of 3.35 percent  annually  in Colorado.
Differences  in rates of growth of productivity  were similarly  striking.  This underscores  the
need to develop  regionally disaggregated  production accounts.
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